UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

Fort Benning, Georgia

31 July 1967

THE DEFENSE OF LANDING ZONE 10 ALFA BY TASK FORCE TYSON, 28 - 29 MAY 1966, DURING OPERATION PAUL REVERE I, II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OP A COMPANY COMMANDER.)

Captain Anthony E. Bisantz

Career Course Class 2-67

Roster No 12, Advisory Group No 2

"The strip was under six inches of water. In the gun pits around the field the flood was more than a foot deep. And the guns were there, five of them, five l2.7’s set to clean the skies of just such birds as these.

"Bravo had flown into The perfect deadfall perfect, except for the absence of people. The crews had quit their guns to got out of the wet, Bravo’s people hopped to the guns and went into the perimeter around the air strip.

"That night the company was hit hard by a battalion of North Vietnamese, the same battalion that had been caught flat-footed by the arrival of Bravo in impossible weather and was now making a desperate bid to recover its guns. The fight raged through the night of 29 May and with the aid of the other battalion of the 35th flown from Oasis ended as a smash victory for TF Walker. It was not easy; the influx of 35th casualties taxed the capacity of the base hospital at Qui Nhon." (3:267)

Landing Zone Ten Alfa (not "Alpha") had not "once been a U. S, airstrip" (3:267); it was a jungle clearing about 70 meters wide and 300 meters long,

The water was about 16 inches deep, and in the gun pits about four feet deep.

Bravo Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf had to fight for those guns, killing 30 NVA and capturing three within minutes of landing.

The big fight took place during the night of 28-29 May 1966 and during the day 29 May. It was fought by TASK FORCE TYSON.

OPERATION PAUL REVERE I

Operation Paul Revere I started 10 May 1966. The 3d Brigade of the 25th infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Glenn Walker, operating independently out of its base camp at Pleiku, established a forward base at OASIS about 25 kilometers east of the Special Forces Camp at DUO CO. TF WALKER had the mission of screening the Central Highlands for "…the six to seven NVA regiments stacked up across the border in Cambodia..." (3:260) On 28 May the Brigade was deployed with the 1^st Bn. 35^th Inf far to the south of CHU PONG MOUNTAIN; 1st Bn, 14th Inf generally north of CHU PONG, in the IA DRANG VALLEY; and 2d Bn, 35th Inf in Area of Operation Number 11, south of PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp. (The entire area of operation for Operation Paul Revere was subdivided into smaller, numbered areas, e.g. Area. of Operation (AO) Number 10, AO 11, AO 12, etc, Landing zones within each numbered AO were designated with an alphabetical suffix to the AO number, hence LZ 10A was the first landing zone used in AO 10, LZ 10B the second, etc.)

SEIZURE OF LZ 10A

On 28 May, B Company, 2d Bn, 35^th Inf under Captain James Maisano was directed to make an airmobile assault into LZ 10A and patrol back eastward toward the battalion’s base in AO l1. Because of the heavy morning ground fog which is common to the Central Highlands at that time of year, the landing did not take place until nearly 1100hrs. Through error, the artillery preparation planned, in support of the landing was fired on the wrong landing zone. This may have been the most fortunate mistake of the war as far as Bravo Company was concerned. It is believed that the majority of NVA forces around LZ 10A, immediately upon the start of the artillery preparation at the wrong LZ, deployed in that direction to engage the American forces who would land there following the artillery. At any rate, the NVA defending 10 ALFA were not prepared to receive B Company and, with the aid of tactical air strikes, were quickly routed, although at the cost of one platoon leader killed and about ten man wounded.

General Walker, immediately realizing the significance of the captured anti-aircraft weapons, ordered the shift of 1st Bn, 35th Inf into AO 10.

NARRATION

THE FORMATION OF TF TYSON

A Company, 1^st Bn, 35^th Inf, commanded by Captain Anthony Bisantz, was the battalion reserve/reaction force at the time and was made immediately available for movement into LZ 10A, arriving about 1600hrs. By this time most of the action in the vicinity had ended, although about one kilometer to the east an armed helicopter was downed by ground fire. The crew was extracted by a sister ship and the aircraft burnt on impact so the hastily planned rescue mission of A Co was called off.

The few remaining hours of daylight were spent in organizing the defense of the LZ. A Company was placed under operational control of 2d Bn, 35th Inf. Major Wallace Tyson, the 2d, 35^th’s executive officer came into the LZ to assume command of the two companies and with him brought a heavy mortar section from each battalion and the remainder of B Co, 2-35. Captain Maisano had left his weapons platoon behind because of his original mission. As dusk fell the 28^th_, Task Force TYSON was organized as follows:

TASK FORCE CONTROL

Major Tyson with one radio telephone operator

COMPOSITE HEAVY MORTAR PLATOON commanded by 1LT Clovis O. LaFond, heavy mortar platoon leader, lst Bn 35th Inf, with two 4.2 mortars (one from each battalion).

A Company, 1st Bn, 35th Inf, with three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon with two 81mm. mortars. "Foxhole" strength was about 150 men.

B Company, 2d Bn, 35^th Inf with three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon with two 81mm. Mortars. The company’s foxhole strength was about 110 (135) men after the day’s dead and wounded had been evacuated.

The position was organized with B Co defending the south half of the LZ, A Co – the north half, and all of the mortars located on the only piece of dry, reasonably firm ground in the LZ, a small circular area in the middle of B Co’s sector. Each company retained control of its own organic mortars and Maj. Tyson controlled the 4.2 inch mortars.

Night Defense Organization of TF Tyson

Due to the high water table throughout the area and the knee deep water in and around most of the LZ, it was virtually impossible for the troops to dig in. Any hole immediately filed with water. Instead they used the available daylight to construct crude breastworks of fallen logs, rocks, ammunition boxes filled with earth, and whatever other materials they could find. They also spent the time emplacing M18A1 (Claymore) anti-personnel mines, trip flares, and cleared fields of fire for their weapons. The defensive line followed generally along the edge of the LZ and was located 15 to 20 feet into the forest surrounding the LZ.

Just prior to dusk artillery and mortar defensive concentrations were adjusted around the perimeter. The concentrations on the east side of the perimeter were fired by A Battery, 2d Bn, 9th Artillery (105mm Howitzer) which was located at the 2d Bn 35th Inf base in AO 1l. As they were firing at almost maximum range (about 12000 meters) to reach our perimeter, the concentrations on the western aide were fired by 175mm guns located at DUC CO (about 18000 meters to the south). Due to the thick vegetation and range dispersion factors, all the artillery had to be adjusted by sound rather than observation and as a result, none of the concentrations were probably any closer then 250 meters to the perimeter.

Major Tyson completed checking the perimeter at dark, giving each company commander orders to maintain a 50% alert status until 0150hrs. and a 100% alert status from 0150hrs. to 1330hrs. and again 50% alert until dawn. The moon rose early the 28^th and stayed bright until about 2300hrs. when the clouds obscured it. About 0120hrs. the 29^th Listening Post located about 50 meters in front of the 2d Platoon of A company reported hearing noises of movement to their front. Everyone in the Task Force was alerted and mortars were fired into the area. A few minutes later they reported seeing movement to their right front, estimating it to be a company size unit. Following instructions each of the four men on the listening post opened full automatic fire with their Ml6 rifles and dropped back to the perimeter. Almost immediately the NVA initiated assault fire on the 3d Platoon’s position along the east side of the perimeter,

NIGHT DEFENSE

The defense of LZ TEN ALFA had begun. Why the NVA attacked that night and all through the next day is open to question. Maybe, as S. L. A. Marshall suggests, they wanted to recover their valuable machine guns (all of which were in new condition). Perhaps they thought they could overrun the small American force in the LZ, or finally, perhaps they were covering the withdrawal of a larger force. Whatever their reason, the NVA pressed their attack with a fanaticism that awed, but never overcame, the defenders.

The 2d Platoon’s listening post had caused the NVA to prematurely trigger their attack while they were still 70 to 80 meters from the perimeter. The 3d Platoon’s listening post was directly in the path of the enemy and was immediately pinned down. The fire team leader on the LP gave orders to withdraw to the perimeter. The 3d Platoon meanwhile had demonstrated excellent fire discipline, holding their fire as the ineffective NVA fire swept over their heads. A characteristic of the fight that night and all the next day was that the NVA heavy machine guns, which they normally use with devastating effectiveness, often fired high – sometimes seven or eight feet above the ground. The American forces capitalized on this the next day, moving frequently under the enemy’s "grazing" fire at a low crouch.

Three of the four men on the 3d Platoon’s listening post returned safely to the perimeter. The enemy assault formation continued forward and came into view of the men of the 3d Platoon. On order they opened fire and quickly broke up the enemy assault. After the initial firing slacked off, Lt. Conner, the 3d Platoon leader who was getting his baptism of fire, accompanied by the fire team leader from the LP, crawled forward of the perimeter in an attempt to find the missing man. They found him, seriously wounded, and dragged him back inside the perimeter. Their safe return seemed to signal another enemy assault, this one better organized than the last. The enemy leaders could be heard, haranguing their soldiers, forcing them to attack. This assault was preceded by about a 20 round mortar barrage which impacted behind the 3d Platoon, at the edge of the LZ, causing no casualties. This time the enemy advanced to within hand grenade range. After several minutes of intense small arms firing and exchanging of hand grenades, the NVA were again forced to withdraw.

During all this A Co’s mortars had been delivering steady fire into the area in front of the 3d Platoon. Th Heavy Mortar Platoon had been firing at a greater range, attempting to knock out the NVA mortars. Battery A, 2-9 Arty had started firing battery volley fire as soon as the attack started, adjusting back and forth in the area in front of the 3d Platoon. They were to fire over 650 rounds in support of TF TYSON that night – an awful lot of work for five artillery pieces. The artillery support is even more impressive when one considers that the battery position came under small arms and mortar attack at the same time the attack was launched on TEN ALFA. Many of the cannoneers were wounded manning their guns in defense of a unit 12 kilometers away.

About 0330hrs the enemy attacked again, and was again driven off. By this time mortar ammunition was running low and the mortars had to slow down their rate of fire. Friendly casualties wore miraculously low. Only about four had been wounded, and one of these was the man from the listening post. The enemy again reorganized, and about 0400hrs launched his final and almost successful attack of the night, After the firefight had raged for several minutes, again at a hand grenade throwing range, Lt. Conner informed the company that he had received word from his right flank that the INA had penetrated the perimeter at to company’s coordinating point with Bravo Company. Leading a fire team, he moved along the perimeter to that point and linked up with a patrol coming the other way from B Co. The mortars fired two illuminating rounds to light up the perimeter and make sure no enemy troops had infiltrated the perimeter. Lt. Conner’s group killed several NVA right at the gap in the lines, The NVA evidently hadn’t known where they were; at any rate they had failed to exploit their advantage. The gap had been created by squad leaders in both companies repositioning their men without coordinating.

By 0430hrs all firing except for the artillery had dwindled to sporadic exchanges of a few rounds. 81mm mortar high explosive ammunition was dangerously low, A Company having only 24 rounds left, and B Company - 12 rounds. This was carefully hoarded in preparation for the enemy^’s next attack. The attack never came. Instead the early morning fog formed; this coupled with the tactical situation decided against bringing in the medical evacuation and resupply helicopters until after first light. The reminder of the night passed quietly. The 3d Platoon of A Company, who had almost exclusively borne the brunt of the nights fighting, had one killed and four wounded. Bravo Company had two men seriously wounded and two slightly wounded,

DAY DEFENSE

An dawn broke the fog started to lift in the area, however, the MEDIVAC helicopter at Brigade Base remained grounded by fog at that location. The 3d Platoon was directed to move forward on line to sweep the battlefield of the previous night. This they did, finding numerous dead NVA soldiers, weapons and equipment. After Lt. Conner had moved forward about 200 meters, he asked for assistance in conducting the sweep. Lt. Light, commanding the 1^st Platoon on the west side of the perimeter, was directed to bring half of his platoon across the LZ to assist the 3d Platoon. The two units linked up and continued to sweep eastward.

After they had moved forward another 200 meters, Lt. Conner reported finding a stack of 20 enemy bodies alongside an intermittent stream. At this time the MEDEVAC ship arrived and the wounded were loaded aboard. Just as the loading was completed, firing started east of the perimeter in Bravo Company’s sector. Lt. Conner was ordered to immediately pull back to the perimeter with Lt. Light. The order was acknowledged and they started to move back. The enemy fire in B Company sector increased but was not yet of major proportion. Suddenly an intense firefight broke out in the area in front of A Company, and radio contact with Lt. Conner was lost.

Lt. Kelsey, commanding the 2d Platoon, was ordered to bring the major part of his platoon to the 3d Platoon’s sector. At this time Conner’s location was not known precisely, so Kelsey was told to move east in an attempt to find him. Almost immediately Kelsey and his men engaged in a firefight with about 50 NVA who were advancing toward Bravo Company’s position. Simultaneously Lt. Light crawled to the company commander and told him that Conner and about l5 men were pinned down by a large enemy force. Light too had been pinned down and wounded in the head, but by crawling for about 100 meters had managed to get back to the perimeter.

Kelsey was ordered to break off engagement and move north to assist Conner. Guided by Lt. Light, Kelsey’s platoon quickly overwhelmed the enemy force; killing about 20 in the process. Conner’s group had been hit hard with seven men being killed initially and eight or ten others pinned down by a heavy machine gun only 20 feet away.

Kelsey’s men covered the evacuation of the dead and wounded, and enemy material (which included a CHICOM AM radio, one heavy barrel machine gun on wheels, two light machine guns and numerous AK47 ASSAULT GUNS). No time was taken to search the enemy dead as the situation in Bravo Company’s sector was rapidly deteriorating and it was imperative to re-establish the perimeter. The enemy’s main assault began just about the time Kelsey got to the perimeter. Kelsey’s men stopped where they were, roughly at a right angle to the perimeter and started firing at the flank of the attacking enemy. They maintained this position the rest of the day, delivering flanking, enfilade fire against the NVA. As the enemy took cover from Bravo Company’s fire to their front by crouching behind anthills and trees, Kelsey’s men kept picking them off from the aide.

The assault on the southeast aide of the perimeter, in Bravo Company^’s sector had not been affected by the engagements of Conner and Kelsey and the enemy rapidly closed to within hand grenade range. The mortars, which were located in the open about 35 meters behind the perimeter were out of action almost immediately as the fire of the NVA cut down the crews anytime they manned their guns. Unable to man their tubes, the mortarmen became riflemen, some crawling forward on their stomachs to reinforce the line, others firing from their own positions.

The enemy attack soon spilled over into Alfa Company’s sector and practically the whole eastside of the perimeter was under attack. As soon as the initial firing had started the artillery had again been called and again started its battery volley fire, moving north and south in front of the perimeter in 50 and 100yd. increments. A team of armed helicopters came on station about 0800hrs. and added their support to the defenders, coordinating their firing passes with the artillery. Also at this time a Forward Air Controller arrived at the LZ in an O1E and began circling, awaiting the arrival of tactical air support aircraft. Two AlE’s carrying rockets, napalm and 20mm cannon arrived about 0900hrs. The FAQ guided then through the low flying clouds on a "dry" pass over the LZ. They climbed out, circled, and immediately came back on a strafing run which was vary effective causing an immediate slowdown in the rate of enemy fire. The FAC informed us that they would drop napalm on their next pass. A few minutes passed and then one of the Skyraiders broke out of the clouds and headed for the LZ from the exact opposite direction from which he had come before, and released two napalm tanks directly over the mortar position. These tanks impacted directly into the Task Force command post putting it temporarily out of action. Of approximately 15 men in and around the CP, none were killed and only two were seriously injured, B Co’s 1^st Sgt. And Senior Medic. Six others were slightly burned. The knee deep water in the LZ had served to muffle the detonation of the napalm and also offered protection to the men in the CP group. Several had merely submerged in their water filled slit trenches as the napalm struck; others, though hit by the burning fuel, quickly rolled in the water extinguishing the flames and suffered only minor burns. The FAQ was informed of the accident and was able to divert the second fighter before it dropped its napalm The cause of the accident was later determined to be a combination of factors encompassing marginal visibility and pilot error.

By 1000hrs. the enemy had launched four full scale attacks against the perimeter, each time getting to within hand grenade range before being repulsed. As happened the previous night, each attack was preceded by loud shouting and screaming. At one time the NVA set up an 82mm mortar in direct view of A Company’s CP group, who were actually on the perimeter. Two men were assigned responsibility for the weapon and spout the next two hours killing each NVA who attempted to go near the mortar. By this time friendly casualties had begun to mount and small arms ammunition was running low. The north and west side of the perimeter, already low in numbers, sent all but a bare minimum of their ammunition across the LZ to A Company headquarters from where it was distributed down the line. An extra machine gun from A Company’s 1^st Platoon was also brought across to strengthen the defense. A resupply helicopter had been standing by awaiting a lull in the fighting which never came_, finally when informed that the situation was critical, the pilot volunteered to go in with the resupply. Accompanied by two gunships to give suppressive fire, the resupply was made and a few of the more seriously wounded were evacuated. The resupply was expensive however. One of the gunships was hit by ground fire and had to circle back and crash land in the LZ. The crew escaped the burning helicopter seconds before it blew up. While all this was going on the enemy launched another assault. This too was beaten back as the fresh ammunition supply helped to increase the friendly rate of fire.

REINFORCEMENT

By 1100hrs. appeared the enemy had given up trying to overrun the perimeter. He had not withdrawn from the battlefield however, as any careless movement along the line attracted enemy fire. The decision was made to commence reinforcement with the rest of the lst Bn, 35th Inf, which had been standing by at the airstrip at DUO CO. The first lift arrived about noon bringing in the Battalion CO, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kingston, the S-3, Major Frederick C. DeLisle, and C Company commanded by Captain Alvino Cortez. As each lift of aircraft made its approach into the LZ the entire east aide of the perimeter opened up with full automatic fire, paying particular attention to the trees from which the helicopter crewman had reported receiving fire. This tactic was evidently successful as no further aircraft were downed by small arms fire.

The build-up continued rapidly with little enemy opposition until about 1400hrs. when the LZ was hit with a mortar attack. Four helicopters were unloading at the time and immediately took off. One of the helicopters flew directly over one of the exploding mortar rounds and settled directly back into the LZ. The other three escaped. Before the last enemy round had detonated, the mortars in the LZ began firing counter battery fire. A radio telephone operator on the east aide of the perimeter had heard the enemy mortar fire and quickly adjusted A Company’s mortars into the area.

Following this incident the remaining resupply was done on the fly with individual aircraft touching down for only a few seconds at a time.

At 1300hrs. B Co, 1^st Bn, 35^th Inf commanded by Captain Timothy J Crotty had been lifted into LZ 10B, about 2.5 kilometers northwest of LZ 10A. Their landing was unopposed and the company patrolled southeast, joining the battalion in LZ 10A. about 1600hrs. As they moved into their sector of the perimeter, the enemy launched his last and most damaging mortar attack. This attack of approximately 18 to 20 rounds was not directed against the LZ, but against the perimeter, which, due to the increased forces in the LZ, was now located about 50 meters into the woodline from the edge of the LZ. The mortars impacted directly on the battered 3d Platoon of A Company causing 15casualties, only six of which were serious enough to warrant immediate evacuation.

Thus ended the Battle of 10 ALFA which "…drew the strategic gaze increasingly toward the possibilities of the troubled zone short of the Cambodian border." (3:268)

SUMMARY

The next few days were spent in burying the enemy dead, policing the battlefield and searching for the enemy. An abandoned enemy regimental size base camp complete with prisoner of war compound was found one kilometer southeast of the LZ. Although no significant enemy contact was made, three enemy soldiers were captured. Two of them bad been seriously wounded and abandoned by their comrades, the third was just lost and had set up his sleeping hammock within 300 meters of the LZ. He was captured during one of the regular morning "sweeps" of the perimeter.

The Battle for LZ 10 ALFA was a significant victory for TF WALKER. Friendly losses were:

Also captured were large quantities of small arms ammunition, grenades and equipment.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The Battle for LZ 10ALFA was unusual in that NVA forces attacked a substantial U. S. force without making their usual elaborate battlefield preparations and rehearsals. The enemy’s actions were more reminiscent of the CHICOM tactics of the Korean war than the anti-guerilla tactics he normally employs in this area. Also unusual was the length of the engagement, 16 hours, versus the average of about 31/2 hours. (1:1) The whys and wherefors of the enemy’s reasons for the attack will probably remain forever a matter of speculation.

The NVA tactics, both at night and during the day, remained consistent in their inflexibility. Each assault came over the same ground and from the saw direction as the previous one. This cost him dearly during the daylight phase of the attack as the defenders were able to "draw down" on the west side of the perimeter to reinforce the east side This was a calculated risk on the part of the company and task force commanders which met with success. A single limited attack from the west would have put a severe strain on the defensive line and probably required a major reshuffling of forces within the perimeter.

The firing battery in support of TF TYSON was located to the east almost 12 kilometers away which is the approximate maximum range of the 105 howitzer. As the enemy was attacking from the east the defensive perimeter was directly on the gun target line along which the greatest dispersion of fire could be expected. This discouraged the adjustment of fire close to the perimeter until the situation became so critical as to warrant the acceptance of friendly causalities from our own supporting fire. In this particular instance no casualties resulted although the artillery was adjusted to within 100 meters of the defensive line. Perhaps the range dispersion characteristics of 105 rounds fired at maximum range have been overemphasized in training.

The value of listening posts close to the perimeter in heavily vegetated terrain has been the subject of much discussion. Those opposed to this practice say that such close in listening posts do not give adequate warning, and, in the event of enemy attack, prevent the defenders from effectively firing until the members of the LP return to the perimeter. The standard operating procedure (SOP) in A Company and B Company was that fire team size LP’s would be positioned forward of each platoon at a distance from which they could be detected from the perimeter and when moving about during daylight hours. This distance usually worked out to between 50 and 50 (150) meters. The purpose of the SOP was to effectively double the distance from the perimeter at which a large enemy force could be detected. The primary mission of the LP was early warning and secondarily, within its capabilities, delay through the adjustment of indirect fire, weapons and small arms fire. The fire team leader on the LP had the authority to withdraw the LP when he accomplished his primary mission of early warning. In this particular engagement the 2d Platoon’s LP performed its mission and returned safely to the perimeter, while the 3d Platoon’s LP was temporarily pinned down by the enemy. In retrospect, the 3d Platoon’s LP should probably have been ordered to withdraw as soon as 2d Platoon’s LP had detected the enemy’s presence. However, at this time it appeared that the enemy threat was coming from the north and not the east, and additional security from other attacking forces would be gained by leaving the LP in position.

Battlefield searches or "sweeps" are SOP in Viet Nam whenever the tactical situation permits. Since the enemy had broken contact at 0430hrs., the 3d Platoon’s sweep forward of the lines would appear justified and as they were deployed in a line formation they were tactically well disposed to take care of any activity to their front. However, when firing started on their right flank and they were ordered to return to the perimeter, they bunched up and, due to their closeness to the perimeter and hate to return, failed to insure proper flank security. The painful results of this lapse in security are obvious.

The actions of the 2d Platoon n maneuvering to relieve the 3d Platoon members who were pinned down is a classic example in small unit leadership. Lt. Kelsey led his platoon under fire, engaged a larger enemy force in a firefight, then, under orders, disengaged and maneuvered in another direction to relieve 3d Platoon and cover its withdrawal tot he perimeter – a perfect display of maneuver control and fire discipline.

The Battle of LZ 10A is an excellent example of a hastily organized perimeter defense in secondary rain forest.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. NVA tactics are rigid and once committed to a plan of attack they will not vary it.

2. Close in listening posts are invaluable in providing early warning and disrupting enemy attacks.

3. Any unit should maintain all around security at all times, even when moving over ground which had recently been crossed and is located within a hundred meters of friendly positions.

4. Good fire discipline is essential to the success of a prolonged perimeter defense.

5. NVA forces frequently employ their mortars at very close ranges. Counter mortar fires should be planned at these ranges as well as further out. Small arms fire from the defensive line will sometimes silence these mortars.

KEY PERSONNEL

Officers of Alfa Company 1st Bn 35th Infantry

Front Row - L to R - LT Bob Williams, Arty FO; LT Jim Kelsey; LT Larry Conners; LT Everette Light - Back Row - L to R - LT Pat Lenz; CPT Tony Bisantz; LT Dick Coleman; LT Ray Takamia = Missing - LT Shiori Sakamoto Photo courtesy of Tony Bisantz taken May 9, 1966 at 3d Bde Base Camp - Pleiku

1. DA Pamphlet No. 525-2, Lessons Learned Viet Nam Primer (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 21 April 1967).

2. FM 31-30 Jungle Training and Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 1965).

3. Marshall, S.L,A, Battles in the Monsoon (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967).

4. :Operation Report, Quarter Ending 31 July 1966" (Nha Trang, Viet Nam: I Field Force, 4 November 1966). (SECRET)

5. "Operation Report, Quarter Ending 31 July 1966" (Pleiku, Viet Nam: 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div, 15 August 1966). (SECRET)

6. Tactical Operations Handbook (Fort Benning, Georgia: United States Army Infantry School, September 1966).

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