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Recollections of 10 Alpha
I was the 3rd Bde, 25th Div S-2 during 10 Alpha. More
importantly, I was the Commanding Officer of B Co. 2/35th Inf. until
just before we deployed and, therefore had strong personal reasons for
keeping track of the action.
You have to recall that this action occurred before the Brigade
was hit with the dumb-ass "Infusion Program". You
remember, bring in the "FNGs" and rotate out the guys who
"knew the haps". Most of the soldiers who formed the
core of the Bde at the time of 10 Alpha had lived and trained
together in Hawaii, deployed together and got bloodied
together. We were true comrades in arms. It should be
recorded somewhere that "Infusion" was a stupid policy that
should never be repeated. Probably conceived by some bean-counting
Personnel Officer in Saigon or some Psychologist in the Pentagon who
never saw a shot fired in anger, let alone heard one. Replacements
brought into the "family" are not the same as bunches of
soldiers coming in and bunches going out because of some mystical
notions about six-months on-line. "Infusion"
destroys unit cohesion and espirit de corps. This unit cohesion
and espirit was absolutely a driving force factor in the
outstanding success of 10 Alpha.
Another perspective you should know comes from members of the 52d
Avn. Bn., who were in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang operations with the 1st Cav
that is now the backdrop for "We were Soldiers Once and
Young". They flat out told us they had never seen fighting as
intense as 10 Alpha and that included the Cav’s operations of November
and December, 1965.
How did 10 Alpha start? Brigadier General Glenn Walker, CG,
3/25th; Major Joe Hunter and I were out in the "Old Man's"
Charlie-Charlie ship making our usual daily trip to units in the
field. In my opinion, General Walker was the incarnation of
"Sam Damon" the protagonist in Anton Mierers
(sp?) book "Once and Eagle". A soldier’s
soldier. The finest officer that I ever met or served with and
that covers a lot of territory.
At any rate, while we were out on the day it started we got a call
from a very, very excited RTO at the Special Forces Camp at Duc
Co. One of their elements was under attack and they "needed
help". We turned toward Duc Co and, while en-route, tried to
get answers to the usual questions of SALUTE (remember: Size, Activity,
Location, Unit, Time. The kind of intell you need to make
decisions).
Before continuing, three things need to be shared. The first is
fact, the other two come from my personal set of lessons learned in
combat. First, I am a former Green Beret and damned proud of it. I was
an A Team Leader in Laos before Vietnam was an issue. Second, confusion
on the battlefield is not uncommon (I was also a Battalion Commander
during my second tour in VN). Third, the basics and professionalism are
essential to success in battle.
Back to 10 Alpha. At this point, I'm going to say some things that
may not sound very complimentary of ""America's
Best". That is not the intent. I’m simply telling you what
recall happening over 30 years ago. As we flew to Duc Co trying to get a
picture of the situation, confusion was evident. Trying to get situation
awareness when radio is the primary means is difficult at best. We
tried. The Duc Co RTO tried.
We arrived at Duc Co within 15-20 minutes of the initial call. The
senior SF person, at least the one who I have the clearest picture of at
this point in time, was the Team Sergeant. He briefed us on the
situation, as he knew it. Something like this: Most of the A Team and
about a company size force of CIDGs had gone on combat patrol. They were
about 10 "klicks" from the Camp (again from the fog of 30-plus
years their position was WNW of Duc Co). For some reason, they split
into two groups. When they got about 1 "Klick" apart, one of
the elements was ambushed and came under heavy fire. Small arms, machine
guns and maybe some 60mm mortars. They were in trouble. They needed
reinforcements.
General Walker alerted our operations center (at the Tea
Plantation just East of DUC Co) and plans were put in motion to get
reinforcements to the unit in contact ASAP (in fact, I’m sure now that
I’m thinking about it that we had a platoon of tanks at Duc Co within
an hour). Every military operation has to have an objective. Where was
this operation’s objective? The SF could not tells us with certainty
where the unit in contact was. It had no radio in operation. Its sister
unit could here the fight but couldn’t pinpoint the location. Jungle
vegetation distorts sound. Talk about confusion on the battlefield! We
didn’t know where the unit in contact was. We didn’t know where its
sister unit was. We didn’t know where the enemy was. We couldn’t
launch an air assault or send the tanks not knowing where to go and we
couldn’t fire our artillery in support not knowing where to shoot.
It got a little hot around the operations map in Duc Co. From the
SF side, their comrades in arms were in deep stuff. It was hard for them
to understand why we couldn’t do something right then. From the 3/25
side, how could we "roll" when we didn’t know where the
objective was?
General Walker took charge of the situation. He was able to get
some Air Cav support so that we could begin to locate the SF unit.
Concurrently, we (He Joe Hunter and I) got into the C&C ship to
locate possible LZs in the area.
Ever wonder how LZ 10 Alpha got its name? During this time frame
we were on search and destroy operations (By the way, that is the best
role for U.S. Army conventional forces during
counterinsurgency/counter-guerilla operations. We can’t pacify a
people who don’t know us and can’t communicate with us, and
vice-versa. Having U.S. Forces tied down in pacification operations was
another dumbs--t idea cranked up by some statistician in Saigon or
Pentagon Politician). In order to ease planning, coordination and
communication, General Walker simply broke our AO into about fifty
10-kilometer square sections. We kept track of intell, operations, LZs,
etc. by this 10K system.
LZ 10 Alpha was an LZ we had identified in planning for possible
contingency operations in Section 10 of the fifty Sections of our AO.
By mid-afternoon, we had located the spot closest to where the
ambush had occurred and began operations in preparation for an air
assault. We organized a two-company Task Force led by Major Stan Tyson,
XO, 2/35th Inf. The major problem was that 10 Alpha was at
max range from our closest 105s and there wasn’t enough time left in
the day to move a battery closer. The 105s could safely reach only the
near edge of the LZ. That meant gunships and fast movers had to prep for
the Combat Assault and cover the far edge of the LZ. A fairly tricky
fire support plan beautifully orchestrated by Joe Hunter.
We launched at near dusk. High risk. We wanted to get in before
dark. Not because of the "Dinks" but because night helicopter
operations in the jungle sans night vision equipment are probably not
something you want to do very often.. (Another "by the way".
We could move and fight at night just as well as Victor Charles. LTC Gil
Proctor and his "Golden Dragons" proved that eartlier on when
the 3/25th were operating around the old Montangnard Camp NE of Ban Me
Thout. Thinking we couldn’t fight at night was another fantasy of
civilian experts and non-Infantrymen in Saigon and the Pentagon
Politicians. We gave up the night and we must never do that again. The
old USSR Infantry Manual had some words in it like: The darker the night
the more miserable the weather the better the friend of the true
Infantryman. That is right.)
Was the operation launched too late? For some Green Berets and
CIDGs, yes. Could we have gone sooner? As a professional soldier, former
Green Beret and close observer of the events, no. General Walker’s
assessment of the situation was accurate and his decisions absolutely
correct. Leaders decide. Not all decisions will be popular and that’s
the price Leaders pay. He was at Normandy and Bastogne and he loved
soldiers. He did what he had to do. Our situation awareness did not
warrant going in before we did. Remember this was an enemy willing to
stay and fight and we haven’t faced that lately.
The operation at 10 Alpha was a success. That’s documented. I
wrote this to fill in some of the blanks. Our OPLAN and fire support
Annex was so well conceived and executed that the "Dinks" were
surprised and late in manning the five .51-caliber machine guns that
ringed the LZ (no other Combat Assault that I know of netted five
.51-caliber machine guns). That it was indeed close fire support can
best be attested to by some of the guys from B 2/35 I saw who were med-evaced
from the LZ because they were singed (but none fatally) by some of the
"nape" our fast movers deposited. A contributing factor was
that the .51-caliber machine gun positions were full of water (wet
monsoon), proving "Charlie" was human. We in the Infantry who
fought him knew that and that’s why we kicked his ass in every fight.
It’s the revisionist historians and nay-sayers who don’t how human
he was or don’t want to admit how God-damned good we were.
We went in the next day. We had to get a mini-dozer brought in to
bury the enemy KIAs.
No body count problem at 10 Alpha.
Ronald J. Rabin
Colonel, Infantry
U.S. Army, Retired
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