PLEIKU PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LANDING ZONE 10 ALFA

28 - 29 MAY 1966

*There are parts missing from this story. Parts that someone who was in 1^st or 2^nd platoon can fill in. Maybe even someone from Command, or the 2^nd/35^th. Maybe one of them can shed some light on the events of the 28^th and 29^th of May, 1966. I only know what happened to my squad, and me, and what I saw at 10 ALFA. I still don’t know anything about the BIG picture of what happened there on those two days. I don’t even know if there was a BIG picture. After 9,000 miles and 36 years, 10 ALFA seems like such a small place. (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

KILLED IN ACTION : 28- 29 May 1966 (Please see KIA Section - ED)

"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends"

INTRODUCTION

The following is a description of the contact between TASK FORCE TYSON and the 66th North Vietnamese Army Regiment at Landing Zone 10 ALFA, Pleiku Province, Republic of South Vietnam, 28 and 29 May 1966. Combat elements within the Task Force were Companies A, 1^st Battalion, 35^th Infantry and B, 2^nd Battalion, 35^th Infantry, and a Section of 107 mm Mortars from the Headquarters Company of each of the line battalions. This account was compiled from an After Action Report written by Major Wallace S. Tyson; a Monograph written by Capt Anthony Bisantz at the Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA; the Annual Historical Supplement, 1966, of the 2^nd Battalion, 35^th Infantry; the 3^rd Brigade Bronco Bugle; and from personal experiences provided by others who had first hand knowledge of the battle. Excerpts from the After Action Report are shown without an ‘*’. All others are identified by an ‘*...*’ and a source recognition at the end of the segment. The narrative of this battle is presented in four primary sections BACKGROUND; OPERATION PAUL REVERE; TASK FORCE TYSON; and REINFORCEMENT. Conflicts in sequences of events and times are to be expected depending on recollections of the individuals, their understanding of events as they unfolded and the inherent confusion common with any battlefield.

BACKGROUND

The 25^th Infantry Division began its departure from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii on Christmas Day, 1965, en route to the Republic of South Vietnam. In conjunction with the overall plan of deployment of US forces in-county against areas of known enemy presence, or because of input from intelligence sources, into areas of anticipated activity, the 1^st and 2^nd Brigades were kept under Major General Fred C. Weyand's Divisional control and were deployed to Military Region Three. They were positioned at Cu Chi, twenty miles northwest of Saigon. Because of building pressure against the Central Highlands by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regulars moving out of sanctuaries west of the Cambodian border, the 3^rd Brigade of the 25^th Infantry was designated "Separate" and was deployed directly to Pleiku Province in the western portion of the Highlands. The Advanced Party arrived in Pleiku on 26 Dec 1965, and the remainder of the Brigade, under the command of Colonel Everett A. Stoutner, completed the air movement of 4,000 men and over 9,000 tons of equipment in twenty-five days. The 3^rd Brigade was composed of the 1/14th Infantry Battalion; 1/35^th Infantry and 2/35^th Infantry Battalions; 2/9^th Artillery Battalion; 1/69^th Armor Battalion; 3^rd Provisional Support Battalion; C Troop, 3^rd Squadron, 4^th Cavalry; and D Company, 65^th Engineers.

Pleiku was the capital city of Pleiku Province and was located at the junction of Highway 14, a north/south artery that paralleled the Vietnamese/Cambodian border and connected Kontum, Pleiku and Ban Be Thout with regions farther south, and Highway 19. The latter was little more than a dirt track from the Cambodian border east to Pleiku, and macadam from that city to Quin Nhon, some seventy miles farther east and on the coast of the South China Sea. Pleiku served not only as a Provincial Center and Headquarters for General Vihn Loc and the ARVN (Army, Republic of Vietnam) II Corps, but also as a major supply point for ARVN Regular and Regional Forces in the area. An airfield just outside the city provided a critical logistical link for the Special Forces Teams that were positioned in fortified camps, at extended intervals along the border, for the purpose of providing early warning against enemy movement of personnel and supplies from the west. Prior to the arrival of the 3^rd Bde, 25^th Infantry, the major US ground force in the region was the 1^st Air Cavalry Division, based approximately forty miles east along Highway 19 at An Khe. Even with the tactical advantage of unchallenged air mobility, the Central Highlands presented an area of high mountains and dense jungles greater than the Cavalry could reasonably be expected to cover. Intelligence from Special Forces and ARVN sources had indicated a heavy buildup of NVA strength to the west and predicted a major thrust against Highway 19 and its connections north, south and east. One report estimated that as of 01 Jan 1966, Pleiku City had a life expectancy of two to three weeks. The 3^rd Brigade was positioned in the Highlands to help block the NVA effort, and from the onset, was tagged as the "fire brigade".

Search and Destroy Operations along the Cambodian border.

The NVA objective to seize the Highlands, cutting the Republic in half and severing ground communications and the logistical link between the northern and southern portions of the country, began the previous year with attacks from the west against Pleiku and Kontum in conjunction with the onset of the summer monsoon. The potential disaster for the Republic was turned back by the US 1st Cavalry Division and ARVN units, with the troopers of the Cav earning their Combat Infantry Badges several times over in the fighting that began on 27 Oct 1965, centered in the valley of the Ia Drang and the Chu Pong massif.

With the Brigade base camp established outside of Pleiku City, the 3^rd began its acclimation to the climate, terrain and local enemy units. Operations were expanded as expertise and familiarity grew, and these included company and reinforced battalion-sized "search and destroy" missions north of Kontum along the border with Laos, medical assistance visits to isolated Montagnard villages in the back country, and road clearing and convoy security missions along both Highways 14 and 19. One such security mission placed the 2^nd Battalion, 35^th Infantry high in the Mang Yang Pass above Highway 19 on Easter Sunday. The road into the pass still bore the evidence of the destruction of French Mobile Force 100 in July, 1954, and the rusted hulks of the French vehicles and the numerous clusters of French and Vietnamese graves along the approaches to the pass testified to the effectiveness of the ambush and the Viet Minh fire power that destroyed them.

10 MAY 1966

Intelligence was received by Headquarters, First Field Forces Vietnam (IFFV), Lt General Stanley "Swede" Larson, Commanding, through the network of Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps along the border of the Central Highlands that a major ground force was moving out of Cambodia into either Pleiku or Kontum Provinces. Additional information indicated the NVA had been given the contingency mission of attacking one or more of the isolated Special Forces camps en route. Earlier contact with the NVA in that area had identified both the 33^rd and 66^th NVA Regiments, and it was reported that both had spent sufficient time in "sanctuary" to recover from their defeat in the Ia Drang by the 1^st Air Cav six months earlier. Replacement of personnel and resupply had been accomplished by use of the trail network (Ho Chi Minh Trail) in Cambodia and Laos reaching back into North Vietnam.