Tyson part 2

OPERATION PAUL REVERE

Operation "Paul Revere" was set in motion by IFFV, using forces available within the 1^st Cav Div and the 3^rd Bde of the 25^th Infantry. Its stated mission was to intercept the enemy force along the border by inserting US forces to cover the primary routes of entry into the highlands. The Cav was sent into the northern sector of the area of operations. Command of the 3^rd Bde was passed to Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker, Assistant Division Commander, Maneuver, 25^th Infantry Div, and the Bde was moved southwest of Pleiku to search out a portion of the remote border area that measured almost eighty kilometers (forty-eight miles) in length by forty kilometers in width. Brigade Forward (Bde Fwd) was established twenty-five kilometers from Pleiku at a base named OASIS. The site was near Highway 19 and took advantage of a location and an abandoned air strip that had been used by the 1^st Air Cav the previous year.

*OPERATION PAUL REVERE I began the first of four phases of Operation Paul Revere which started 10 may 1966 and ended 25 December 1966.

22 MAY 1966

*The Reconnaissance Platoon, 2/35^th,, conducted a heliborne assault into LZ 29A and began a long range patrol in the North and West portions of the AO. During its patrol, the platoon accounted for four NVA KIA and one NVA WIA. There were no friendly casualties.* (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd BN, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

As the summer monsoon gained momentum, the area was subjected to heavy rainstorms that fell from just before noon to dusk every day. Shortly after dark, periods of clear skies would follow. Star and moonlight were available, if and when they could penetrate the double and triple canopy of overhead forest growth. By daylight, the clouds would began to rebuild and any advantage gained during the respite would soon be lost to the next day's deluge. During May, 1966, the rainfall totaled 28 inches. Gen Walker assigned his combat battalions sectors of the area west of the brigade base camp, and "search and destroy" operations were started.

Each battalion moved out from OASIS into its assigned Area of Operations and set up a Battalion Forward (Bn Fwd), usually with a Battery of 105mm artillery attached and positioned so as to provide support to the infantry companies that would range westward to the border. The 105mm's fire support range was approximately ten kilometers (six miles), and that set the operational limits for the infantry.

*The initial deployment placed the 1^st Bn, 35^th Infantry far to the south of the Chu Pong Mountain; the 1^st Bn, 14^th Infantry generally north of Chu Pong, in the Ia Drang Valley; and the 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry in Area of Operations Number 11, south of Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp. The entire area of operations for Operation Paul Revere was subdivided into smaller, numbered areas; e.g., Area of Operation (AO) Number 10, AO 11, AO 12, etc. Landing Zones (LZ) within each numbered AO were designated with an alphabetical suffix. Hence, LZ 10A was the first landing zone used in AO 10, LZ 10B the second, etc.* (Captain Anthony Bisantz: A/1/35).

25 MAY 1966

*B Co 2/35 was airlifted out of OASIS to an Area Southwest of Pleiku as part of Operation Paul Revere. The first night out I took an Ambush Patrol to an area just outside of a large abandoned village. The next morning we returned to the company perimeter and were getting ready to move out when we heard 1SG Harris call for help (he had gone outside the perimeter to take a dump) and three armed Vietnamese came up to him and surrendered.

*After that we began our Search & Destroy mission, my squad had the point for the company. Later that afternoon we came up to a Montagnard village. As we were working our way around/through the village, a squad (8) of NVA soldiers came walking single file from the brush on our right about 20 meters in front of us. We looked at each other in surprise and opened fire simultaneously. They ran behind some big trees and we exchanged fire for a few minutes. They faded into the brush leaving their packs and blood trails. Meanwhile, the rest of the company behind us ran in to some NVA towing a wheeled Soviet machine gun. A fire fight ensued resulting in SGT Norkett of 2^nd Plt WIA. By the time the company reached our position it was getting dark, and it was obvious that we were in the midst of an enemy concentration. There was some high ground on our direction of march and Capt Maisano opted to set up there for the night.

*The next day we went on a killer hump and joined the rest of the BN in a large open field. That night after mid-night we were alerted by SGT Clapper of 1st Plt B2/35 LP/OP that an enemy force was moving somewhat parallel/diagonally toward our position.

They ran into our LP/OP and a fire fight took place. We killed 10-12 NVA, and B Co had its first KIA, the Company Senior Medic.* (SGM (Ret) Charles Beauchamp, 3:B/2/35)

26 MAY 1966

The 2/35^th had been conducting operations in an area measuring approximately thirty kilometers from north to south that lay between Special Forces camps located at Duc Co and Plei Djereng. While Duc Co enjoyed the advantages afforded by its nearness to Highway 19, Plei Djereng was isolated and served as a blocking position in the mountainous terrain to the north. There were three east to west valleys that divided the terrain to the west of the battalion, each with its primary stream that served as part of the watershed and that eventually fed into the Ia Drang River. LTC Philip R. Feir, Commanding, 2/35^th, was faced with the decision to determine which route the enemy would chose if they were to attempt passage through the Bn's AO. The two Special Forces camps were located adjacent to the northern and southern approaches, but each was positioned to the outside of the high ridges that flanked the three valleys in question. All three approaches led into the highlands, had ample water and their heavy overhead cover would serve to conceal a main route of advance for units up to regimental size. However, the advantages of the two routes to the outside were flawed because of their proximity to the Special Forces camps, and their use would be subject to discovery by aggressive patrolling, characteristic of the units stationed within the camps. Because of that, LTC Feir determined that the NVA would probably select the middle valley because it had the advantage of remoteness, coupled with flank security provided by the terrain. Further, if his mission included an attack against one of the Special Forces camps, the center route would allow the NVA Commander freedom of movement to the north or south as a later situation might dictate.