*The first lift of nine HU-1D helicopters placed 63 men (1^st Plt, company HQ, and part of the 2^nd Plt) into the LZ without incident. As the 1^st Plt secured the NW portion of the LZ, suddenly they began to receive heavy enemy small arms fire from an estimated reinforced squad. After the initial contact, which resulted in four casualties, the LZ appeared secure; however, as DUSTOFF medevac aircraft attempted to land, extremely heavy ground fire was received from the NW. The DUSTOFF aircraft was driven off with several hits. The estimate of enemy strength was raised to a reinforced platoon. Following the DUSTOFF incident, the volume of fire declined, although occasional sniper fire and AW fire continued to be triggered by movement of friendly troops.

*Following the initial DUSTOFF attempt, 52^nd Avn Bn gunships (Buccaneer 6) made repeated passes firing both machineguns and rockets into the wood lines running north and south. Particularly heavy fire was delivered against a machine gun which was firing across the flank of the 1^st Plt from the SW and could not be reached by friendly small arms fire. The gunships, however, did not suppress enemy fire to the degree required. Friendly positions were marked with smoke and two A1E aircraft strafed and dropped napalm on the machinegun position. Still, the machinegun continued in action. Another flight (F4 jet aircraft) appeared on the scene and shortly thereafter neutralized the enemy position with 500 pound bombs. The A1E’s meanwhile, were effectively suppressing enemy fire to the north.

*Immediately following the air strike, the 1^st Plt maneuvered a squad to the southwestern portion of the LZ and made contact with two NVA. Both fled into the woods to the west. A large number of packs and equipment plus, one 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapon were found. The latter was returned to the company CP. The squad continued a clockwise sweep of the entire LZ. A second anti-aircraft gun was found virtually destroyed by the airstrike. Discovery of guns #3, #4 and #5 followed in quick succession as the sweep was completed.* (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

*I was a Squad Leader in 3^rd Plt, B Co. Our platoon was landed after on the 2^nd try because of the fire coming out of the LZ. We tried to land twice, the 1^st Plt and Co CP were already in. The LZ was covered with water in some areas. The 50 cals were in position inside the perimeter. When our troops initially landed they were not manned, the NVA was in the tree line (according to SLA Marshall, in "Battles in the Monsoon", to get out of the rain,) according to Bisantz, they had moved to defend from another direction because the prep fires hit another LZ a short distance from ALFA. Upon landing we secured our sector and began taking fire from inside the perimeter. It turned out the fire was coming from inside huge ant hills the NVA had hollowed out and using as bunkers. After trying grenades, M72 LAWS and failing to knock out the ant hills, SSG Carl Johnson organized a team of two rifles and a shotgun and went from anthill to anthill knocking them out. That resulted in a number POWs and NVA kills. Around 4-5 PM, I was looking around our sector with one of my soldiers, SP4 Otero, trying to find stuff to build our defenses when we came across an enemy AA machinegun on a tripod, we thought it would be a good idea to move it to our position. As we were trying to move it, we came under sniper fire, we got behind a log and began to return fire moving along the log. I got up to fire and got hit in the chest. SGT Larsen came to see what happened and got hit in the head later as they were trying to maneuver to get the sniper. LT Glynne was killed and SGT Stine wounded. I was medevaced about 1800 first day, may have been on the last bird able get in and out. Later it seems like we could have had Company formations at the 85^th Evac hospital in Qui Nhon.* (SGM (Ret) Charles Beauchamp, 3:B/2/35)

*I think 10A was probably "the" fire fight for me. My memory of the beginning of this is being gathered on a loading air strip waiting for choppers and being briefed by LTC Feir. This was a first for me. Before this any action was incidental and not very organized. We flew into the LZ and the action started almost instantly. Contact was not non-stop but regular. I remember thinking what would happen if help could not get to us before dark. I can’t remember when the choppers were shot down in the LZ, what day I mean.

*Whenever there was a pause in the fight we were sent out on a sweep to check out what was out there, and almost each time someone was wounded or worse by snipers tied up in the top of trees.* (Philippe Saunier, 4:B/2/35)

*In Hawaii in December '65 I was reassigned from B 1/14^th to B 2/35^th (as best as I can remember) for deployment to the central highlands of Viet Nam. I was a Spec 4 in Headquarters Platoon and was a Forward Observer (FO) for the 81mm mortars assigned to 1^st platoon (again, as best as I can remember ). During the first Paul Revere Operation we were on daily patrols setting up camp in a different location every night for what seemed like two weeks. On the morning of May 28 we were choppered into an open field with only half of the company. The Hueys were to return with the rest of the company. We started to receive ground fire before setting down. This was about 9:00 AM. We were under such intense fire that the rest of the company weren't able to get in until about 3 PM. I don't remember many names but some I do are Rosalie, a rifleman, Sgt. Rodear (?), and another Miller also FO’s. At about 10:30 Rosalie was wounded after taking out a machine gun nest. Another man and myself took Rosalie to the area where the Capt. and a medic were for aid. The company was pretty spread out by this time. We were pinned down and continued receiving small arms fire. About that time I was shot in the arm and a minute or two later a grenade exploded and hit me in the leg. I started to scream "I'm hit, I'm hit." I believe I started to go into shock. The Capt, looking over at me, yelled, "Shut up Miller, you’re not that bad." That shook me up and I was OK after that. For the next couple of hours or so the medic made the rounds from our position to other wounded in other areas. Around noon the Huey's returned and tried to bring in more of the company but were turned back by enemy fire. As I recall Dustoff also tried to land but couldn't. The Capt. ordered everyone to work their way back to our location to try to fortify our position. Around 3 PM the rest of the company arrived, and I was Medevaced out. I later heard that we took heavy casualties but turned back a regiment of NVA regulars. I spent the next 3 months in Japan and then returned to the states for assignment to the 5th Infantry. (Mech.) in Colorado Springs for the remainder of my enlistment.* (Russell Miller, Hqs:B/2/35)

On the morning of the 28^th, as Executive Officer, 2/35^th, I took a convoy of four vehicles from OASIS to the Bn Rear. The purpose was two fold - the first being to pick up several supply items needed at Bn Fwd, and second, to round up 2/35^th soldiers, who, for whatever reason, had returned to the Bn Rear and had not found transportation back to their units in the field. Upon arrival in Pleiku, I was informed by a member of the staff that Jim Maisano had conducted a combat assault that morning, and his unit was in heavy contact at an LZ designated as 10 ALFA. With the supplies and about forty soldiers in hand, the convoy immediately returned to OASIS

28 MAY 1966: 1255 HOURS

*The strip was under six inches of water. In the gun pits around the field the flood was more than a foot deep. And the guns were there, five of them, five l2.7’s set to clean the skies of just such birds as these. Bravo had flown into the perfect deadfall - perfect, except for the absence of people. The crews had quit their guns to get out of the wet, Bravo’s people hopped to the guns and went into the perimeter around the air strip. That night the company was hit hard by a battalion of North Vietnamese, the same battalion that had been caught flat-footed by the arrival of Bravo in impossible weather and was now making a desperate bid to recover its guns. The fight raged through the night of 29 May and with the aid of the other battalion of the 35^th flown from Oasis ended as a smash victory for TF Walker. It was not easy; the influx of 35^th casualties taxed the capacity of the base hospital at Qui Nhon.* (S.L.A. Marshall, Battles in the Monsoon, New York: William Morrow and Company.,Inc., 1967)

The force applying pressure against the LZ broke contact and withdrew into the heavy forest to the north. Artillery and tactical air support were placed on hold, and Capt Maisano called for the remaining lifts of his unit to join him. Within an hour, Bravo Co had completed its insertion, and the perimeter was secured and expanded. Bravo reported to Bn Fwd that the area was relatively quiet, that two NVA prisoners had been taken, and that five 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns had been captured. One POW could speak a little English, but he would say nothing as to the size or designation of the NVA force that Bravo had stirred up. The prisoner acknowledged he was a member of the company assigned to defend the LZ and that his Company Commander had killed himself when he failed to recapture his guns. Unit casualties up to that point were light and none of the wounded required immediate evacuation. After an unsuccessful attempt to determine just what size unit his 1^st Plt had dropped in on, Capt Maisano notified LTC Feir that following a resupply for his 1^st and 2^nd Plts, he would be ready to move as directed.

Bravo Co started the day with each man carrying a full basic load of ammunition and enough food and water to last for three days. Ten Claymore anti-personnel mines were distributed throughout each squad. By the time the remainder of the company reached the LZ, the two Platoons in contact were running short of ammunition and had to be resupplied before any further offensive action could be mounted. Bravo was instructed to wait for supply ships and to send out casualties, POW's and the 12.7mm's. The unit was then to continue on its original mission: search the immediate area for continued presence of the enemy, and if there were indications the NVA had headed back for the Cambodian border, determine if there had been any activity along the trail that led back to the east toward the Bn base at 11 ALFA. Enemy activity at the moment was confined to sporadic fire from the north and northwest, apparently from individuals who remained in concealed positions following the earlier fire fights, but this was not sufficient enough to be considered an immediate threat to the consolidation of the unit.

28 MAY 1966: 1430 HOURS

*The remainder of Company B was lifted into the LZ. With the exception of some automatic weapons fire at the aircraft, this lift was carried out without major incident. On the ground, the 1^st Plt put down a base of fire to the north. Enemy fire ceased as the aircraft departed. The perimeter was then reorganized and captured enemy equipment and gear were consolidated at the company CP.

*Company B then began a sweep to the north to clear the area and obtain a body count. The initial count totaled ten. Sweep elements then moved out some 150 meters and returned; however, upon return, sniper fire again came from a bunker position at the north end of the LZ. Because the sweep elements of the 1^st and 2^nd Plts were mixed, a consolidated squad attacked the bunker with grenades. Two NVA were KIA and two were captured. Both POW’s were returned to the Brigade CP. Because of this action, another sweep was generated. This sweep likewise generated sniper fire from the NW. Snipers accounted for two friendly WIA. The 3^rd Plt maneuvered against the snipers, later determined to number two, and suffered one KIA and seven WIA, including the Plt Leader who later in the day died of wounds. The snipers, both of whom were excellent marksmen, were firing one semi-automatic and one automatic weapon from positions concealed behind trees. Both were killed by M-79 and M-60 MG fire.* (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

*The mortars came in about noon of the first day, after B company came to the LZ. Lt Mike Glynne was already being medevaced with a fatal chest wound when we came in. We set up in a "relatively" dry rise in the LZ with essentially no cover.* (Ray Pollard, Wpns Plt Ldr: B/2/35)

Shortly after arriving in-country, 2nd Lt Michael Glynne, West Point Class of 1965, wrote a letter to President Lyndon Johnson expressing his support for the presence of American forces in Southeast Asia and explaining how, after being in country and seeing the people and their need, he felt that efforts to bolster the South Vietnamese Government were justified and that our nation was on the right path in its endeavors. In early May, Lt Glynne received a letter from the President thanking him and saying that his support was greatly appreciated and that several of his comments had been related at one of the White House press conferences. Lieutenant Glynne was mortally wounded by a sniper that afternoon during the fire fight.

28 May 1966: 1400 HOURS

Following completion of the resupply and evacuation of casualties, weapons and prisoners, the Platoons were sent out in a "cloverleaf" to sweep the area to the north, south and west. As the Platoon moving to the north advanced into the heavy ground cover out from the LZ, enemy activity began again with sporadic firing from single individuals and small groups disposed along a small east to west stream, some 150 meters from the Bravo base. The volume of fire continued to build, and the flanks extended as more enemy joined the fire fight. The Platoons were recalled, and pressure built against the northern sector of the perimeter. The attacks gained momentum, and Bravo Co was subsequently pinned to the LZ. All motion either out from the LZ or back toward the east was stopped. For the next hour or so, the pressure ebbed and flowed around the perimeter, slowing to almost nil in one sector, only to suddenly break out with renewed strength against another.

*On 28 May, B Company, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry under Capt James R. Maisano was directed to make an airmobile assault into LZ 10A and patrol back eastward toward the battalion’s base in AO l1. Because of the heavy morning ground fog which is common to the Central Highlands at that time of year, the landing did not take place until nearly 1100hrs. Through error, the artillery preparation planned in support of the landing was fired on the wrong landing zone. This may have been the most fortunate mistake of the war as far as Bravo Company was concerned. It is believed that the majority of NVA forces around LZ 10A, immediately upon the start of the artillery preparation at the wrong LZ, deployed in that direction to engage the American forces who would land there following the artillery. At any rate, the NVA defending 10 ALFA were not prepared to receive B Company and, with the aid of tactical air strikes, were quickly routed, although at the cost of one platoon leader killed and about ten men wounded. General Walker, immediately realizing the significance of the captured anti-aircraft weapons, ordered the shift of 1^st Bn, 35^th Infantry into AO 10.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

28 MAY 1966: 1600 HOURS

The action at 10 ALFA was being monitored at both Bn and Bde Fwd's. From the casualty reports that had come in, the capture of the 12.5mm’s and the obvious conclusion that they belonged to a unit much larger than an isolated company of NVA and presaged the presence of a sizable force, it was readily apparent that Bravo was into a situation that could not be resolved unless additional help was sent in. Even if the relief force closed on the LZ before dark, if the NVA felt their losses were worth the effort, the troops defending 10 ALFA could be in for a long and difficult night. An extraction under fire was not an option. The decision was made at that Company B would hold in place and that reinforcements and resupply would be airlifted to the LZ. In that other 2/35^th units were not immediately available for the relief mission, Gen Walker tagged the 1/35^th for a rifle company, and Alfa Co, Capt Tony Bisantz Commanding, was ordered to move immediately to a pickup point and to await their transportation.