Tyson Part Four

TASK FORCE TYSON

28 MAY 1966: 1615 HOURS

Immediately upon returning to Oasis, I was told to report to Gen Walker in the Operations Center at Bde Hqs. I was briefed on the situation at 10 ALFA and was told that LTC Feir had requested that I command the relief force. Once on the ground at the LZ, I was to take command of both units and their attachments and serve as the TASK FORCE (TF) Commander. My mission was to conduct the defense of the LZ, and as soon as the situation allowed, to resume offensive operations. The elements of the TF were Companies B, 2/35^th, and A, 1/35^th , two 107mm (4.2) mortar squads and in total, numbered eleven officers and 258 men. All infantrymen of Alfa Co were issued double basic loads of ammunition, and additional ammunition was loaded on to be distributed to Bravo. The flights to pick up Capt Bisantz's troops were inbound, and just enough time was available to pick up a PRC-25 radio, borrow an M-16 and an extra magazine from SFC Clarence Crawford, Admin Sgt, 2/35^th Infantry, fill my canteen, and get to the helicopter pad.

*Major Stanley Tyson took command the first afternoon and really held the units together. Also you might want to note that the rest of the 2/35^th that was at LZ 11A and providing artillery fire for 10A came under attack two nights in a row but to a much lesser extent than at 10A. I was the BN S-2 during the fight and then took over B Co in June so any knowledge was second hand. I do know that there were a great number of individual heros. In particular I remember stories about two of the platoon sergeants, SFC Johnson and MSGT Crookham, who eliminated the machine gun positions mentioned in the account. There was an SP4 from Detroit whose name I can not remember who spent the entire night by himself in a foxhole and in the morning he was alive with more than 10 dead NVA around his position. I will also never forget listening to Stan Tyson on the radio calling the forward air controller in a cool, calm voice after an AIE had just napalmed his position with, I quote, "Hoss, we don't need any more of that here". The sad part of the story is that we lost some good people.* (Capt Jim McQuillen, HHC2/35)

1700 HOURS: 28 MAY 1966

*The seriously wounded were lifted out of the LZ by the Brigade CO’s helicopter. Prior to this, two DUSTOFF ships had been driven off by enemy fire. One of these had received several hits. Additional wounded subsequently were lifted our without incident by two 52^nd Avn Bn gunships. The enemy was believed to have withdrawn. Resupply was requested. Information was then received that Company A, 1^st Bn, 35^th Infantry would be lifted into the LZ as a reinforcing element and would be placed under OPCON of the 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry. The 2/35^th Executive Officer (Major Wallace S. Tyson) was lifted into the LZ to command the two company task force and to accomplish the mission of holding the LZ the night of 28 May 1966. Company A, 1/35^th Infantry, commanded by Capt Anthony Bisantz, was lifted in at 1700 hours.* (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

Flying as a hitchhiker in one of the supporting gun ships, I arrived at the LZ with the first lift of Alfa Co, 1/35^th. Fortunately, the landing coincided with a break in the action, and the entire unit got in without incident. The pilot told me he didn’t plan on staying long enough to land, and the Huey made a quick pass following the last troop carrier. The ship flared, I jumped from the skids, and I saw Capt Maisano motioning from his CP at the edge of the trees on the south side of the LZ. As the gunship climbed out, the downwash of its rotors blew the poncho from the body of one of Bravo's soldiers lying among the dead and wounded at the unit collection point. At that time, Capt Maisano's casualties totaled three killed and twenty-two wounded. As the remaining flights came in to complete the insertion, casualties were evacuated on the departing ships, including the two POWs and the five 12.7mm's.

10 ALFA was situated in a low marsh-like clearing, completely devoid of any growth aside from the low grasses particular to the swamps of Southeast Asia. The LZ measured not more than 170 meters long by 100 meters wide, with the long axis of its slightly oval shape running from northwest to southeast. Most of the area was covered with standing water from one to five inches deep, with the only dry surface being a slight rise at the southern end of the clearing. The floor of the swamp was thick heavy clay that quickly gave way to rocky ground at the tree line where the elevation rose barely above the water line. The surrounding forest growth was of tall trees with little undergrowth close in to the clearing, but that thickened as the elevation rose and the soil became more supportive. The entry onto the trail that Bravo had been tasked to sweep was clearly visible as it left the clearing and disappeared quickly into the green.

*Alfa Co, 1^st Bn, 35^th Infantry was the battalion reserve/reaction force at the time and was made immediately available for movement into LZ 10A, arriving about 1600hrs. By this time most of the action in the vicinity had ended, although about one kilometer to the east an armed helicopter was downed by ground fire. The crew was extracted by a sister ship and the aircraft burnt on impact, so the hastily planned rescue mission of A Co was called off. * (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

As Alfa Co, 1/35^th arrived, they were directed into their portion of the perimeter, and as they took up positions just inside the tree line, Bravo Co compressed. Each of the rifle companies occupied about half of the perimeter, with Alfa on northwestern end of the oval and Bravo on the southeast. The heavy mortars were mounted on the rising ground in the southern portion of the open area. After making contact with Bn Fwd and giving a quick update on the situation, and knowing that darkness would come early in the jungle, my first priority was to walk the perimeter to ensure that the troops were in the best defensive positions available and that they were taking full advantage of any material at hand to strengthen their line. I talked with individual soldiers and saw that the composition of the ground did not lend itself to digging in. Much would depend on using fallen logs and piles of loose stone as fortifications. The standing trees gave an added measure of protection in that they precluded the NVA from placing machineguns well back from the perimeter and bringing it under fire. Instead, the only effective fire could be brought to bare by individuals who had worked their way close enough to the defense to fire as soldier against soldier. Capt's Maisano and Bisantz had tied their flanks together, and Bravo's Claymore mines and trip flares were shared with Alpha and placed into position. Both units had moved their 81mm mortars out to join with the 107's in the only area that would allow the overhead clearance necessary for the mortars. Each mortar had fifty rounds of high explosive (HE) and a combined total of twenty-five flares. Empty ammunition boxes filled with rock and mud served as a makeshift parapet around the tubes. Because of their exposure, casualties within the mortar sections were considerably higher than with their counterparts along the perimeter.

Map sketch of 10 Alfa as drawn by Stan Tyson. The orientation is the same as the previous photo of LZ 10 Alfa found on the previous page.

*At approximately 1800, the Company A, 1/35 Infantry, 81mm mortar section was lifted into the LZ along with one 4.2 mortar from the 2/35 Infantry 107mm Cannon Platoon. Total mortars available thus consisted of two 81mm mortars for B 2/35, two 81mm mortars from A 1/35, one 107mm of HQ 2/35 Infantry and one 107mm of HQ 1/35 Infantry. All were located on an "island" (the LZ was essentially a swamp) in the northeastern sector of the LZ. By 2000, all DEFCONS had been fired and ammunition and ration resupply had arrived. LP’s were put out and all was quiet.* (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

Lieutenant James Brothers, Artillery Forward Observer (FO), attached to Bravo, was pressed into service as the TF FO. He registered defensive fires around the TF with 105mm's from 11 ALPHA covering three sides of the LZ and with the remaining portion to the northwest covered by fire from two 175mm cannon at Duc Co, some nine miles to the south.

Under better conditions, the TF could have covered a much larger area; however, considering the heavy forest and dense undergrowth, it was necessary to compress the perimeter to ensure that a cohesive all-round defense could be established. With the exception of one platoon, all positions were just inside the treeline and above the water level of the LZ. Even so, even the shallowest prone shelter quickly filled with water. Bravo's 2^nd Plt had to bend back across an open portion of the southeast end of the position, and though partially exposed, their line was able to make use of a small ridge of ground that was mostly above water. Since only a few of the men had anything to dig with, positions were constructed with logs, stones and anything else that was available.

The TF Command Post was set up jointly with that of Bravo Company. Communication with either of the line companies was no problem. However, in order to talk to Bn Fwd the radio had to be moved out from under the trees and out into the open area. Several calls were made without incidence, especially during the hours of darkness, but on one attempt to transmit the following day, a sniper, who had obviously noticed the procedure, fired, missed, and cut off the antenna where its base joined the radio. Daylight communications with Bn Fwd dropped off sharply after that.

*The few remaining hours of daylight were spent in organizing the defense of the LZ. A Company was placed under operational control of 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry. Major Wallace Tyson, the 2^nd, 35^th’s Executive Officer came into the LZ to assume command of the two companies and with him brought a heavy mortar section from each battalion and the remainder of Bravo Co, 2/35^th. Captain Maisano had left his Weapons Platoon behind because of his original mission. As dusk fell the 28^th_,TF TYSON was organized as follows:

*TF TYSON was commanded by Major Wallace S. Tyson. He had one Radio Telephone Operator and an Artillery Forward Observer (FO) working directly for him. Both were taken from Bravo Co, 2/35^th. The FO also coordinated fires of the Composite Heavy Mortar Platoon, commanded by 1LT Clovis O. LaFond, Heavy Mortar Platoon Leader, 1^st Bn 35^th Infantry. The Platoon was comprised of two 4.2 mortars, one from each battalion.

*Company A, 1^st Bn, 35^th Infantry, Captain Bisantz, with three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon with two 81mm. mortars. "Foxhole" strength was about 150 men.

*Company B, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, Captain Maisano, with three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon with two 81mm. Mortars. The company’s foxhole strength was down from 135 to about 110 men after the day’s dead and wounded had been evacuated.

*The position was organized with Bravo Co defending the southern half of the LZ, Alfa Co – the northern half, and all of the mortars were located on the only piece of dry, reasonably firm ground in the LZ - a small circular area in the middle of Bravo’s sector. Each company retained control of its own organic mortars, and Major Tyson controlled the 4.2 inch mortars.

*Due to the high water table throughout the area and the knee deep water in and around most of the LZ, it was virtually impossible for the troops to dig in. Any hole immediately filed with water. Instead they used the available daylight to construct crude breastworks of fallen logs, rocks, ammunition boxes filled with earth, and whatever else they could find. They also spent the time emplacing M18A1 (Claymore) anti-personnel mines, trip flares, and clearing fields of fire for their weapons. The defensive line followed generally along the edge of the LZ and was located 15 to 20 feet into the surrounding forest.

*Just prior to dusk, artillery and mortar defensive concentrations were adjusted around the perimeter. The concentrations on the east side of the perimeter were fired by A Battery, 2^nd Bn, 9^th Artillery (105mm Howitzer) which was located at the 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry base in AO 11. As they were firing at almost maximum range (about 12000 meters) to reach our perimeter, the concentrations on the western side were fired by 175mm guns located at DUC CO (about 18000 meters to the south). Due to the thick vegetation and range dispersion factors, all the artillery had to be adjusted by sound rather than burst observation, and as a result, the concentrations were probably no closer than 250 meters to the perimeter.

*Major Tyson completed checking the perimeter at dark, giving each company commander orders to maintain a 50% alert status until 0150hrs and a 100% alert status from 0150hrs until dawn. The moon rose early the 28^th and stayed bright until about 2300hrs, when the clouds obscured it.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

*I arrived in-country on 3 May 1966 and took over command of the 3rd Platoon from 1LT Pat Lenz. Pat had been wounded and was now Company A’s XO. The "Third Herd" was an incredible group of men. The NCOs were seasoned and solid, and the men all experienced. Great squad leaders who led great soldiers. God, they were good!

*So, on the 26th day of my life as a platoon leader, Company A got a call to make a late afternoon reinforcement of Company B 2/35 they said had dropped into an unsuspecting NVA regimental headquarters around LZ 10-ALFA.

*As our slicks came into the LZ late on the afternoon of 28 May 1966, we could see several abandoned 12.7 mm AA guns around the LZ. Our platoon was assigned to the NE third of the LZ and dark came. There was lots of commo wire around - a sure sign to us that we were in the middle of a large enemy force. We put out an LP roughly 50-75 meters to our center front, manned by SGT Noble Hyde and a couple of guys. I think all of us expected to be hit that night, and everyone got as prepared as they could.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

*We came into 10 ALFA on Huey’s in the late afternoon. Probably around 4:00 p.m. on May 28^th, 1966. We came in low and fast. I could see the soldiers from the B, 2^nd ,35^th standing alone in their positions. I’ve never forgotten the look on a particular soldier’s face when my chopper flew over him. I could tell he was scared . . . really scared. He was alone, facing out towards the woods. At the time I didn’t think too much about why these guys were in one-man positions. We didn’t know they had been hit pretty hard.

*We had heard it was hot, but we didn’t know the situation yet. Our chopper landed and we deployed to the far side of the LZ . . . away from the 2^nd, 35^th. My platoon, 3^rd platoon, was setting up positions when Major Tyson, 2^nd, 35^th XO came by to inspect the positions. It was getting dark and it was overcast. Major Tyson came from my left and disappeared into the forest and the darkness. He was moving down the line to our right. It turned into the darkest night I ever experienced in Viet Nam. That old saying about not being able to see your hand in front of your face . . . well, at 10 ALFA it was true.* (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

28 MAY 1966: 1100 - 1900 HOURS

ENEMY SITUATION

When the artillery preparation started to fall around the clearing 3000 meters from the site selected for the Headquarters element of the 66^th NVA, Lt Col Chau assumed an assault was in progress and that American troops would soon be landing at that location. Because most of his strength was moving along the trail to the east, he started to deploy other troops available to block American movement northward from that LZ. When the actual landing occurred only 1000 meters from his Headquarters, he was caught off balance, and found it next to impossible to recall and redirect his troops back through the forest once they had been committed to the farther location. As such, the force available to reduce the American presence was not sufficient to do the job, and the necessary strength was not able to reassemble until after the remainder of Bravo was safely on the ground. The 66th NVA was caught on the "horns of a dilemma". As long as the American unit sat astride its route back into Cambodia, it no longer had the freedom to continue movement to the east and possibly be boxed in by more such units being inserted on its flanks and across its route of march. Further, it could not withdraw its forces back across the border without anticipating considerable difficulty as long as the Americans were in a blocking position. A new opportunity for success was in the offering in that the Americans had presented the 66^th with a more lucrative target than the Special Forces camp - that being Bravo Co and any reinforcements that were sure to be sent in to assist the surrounded unit. With that in mind, the majority of the NVA units that were moving against Plei Djereng were recalled. One company sized element was left behind and was sent to exert pressure against the 2/35^th Fwd base at 11 ALFA. Long before the first units returned and were able to mount any sort of sustained effort against the defense at 10 ALFA, the remainder of the TF was in position, and the early advantage enjoyed by the 66^th NVA had been lost.

28 MAY 1966: 1900 - 2400 HOURS

The weather cooperated, and the TF enjoyed one of the rare twenty-four to thirty-six breaks in the monsoon season. As darkness fell, Companies sent out four-man Listening Posts (LP's) some 75 to100 meters to their front for early warning against expected enemy probes that were sure to come. By 1930, the mortars and artillery were adjusted with concentrations registered just outside bursting radius of the infantry line. With the exception of sporadic sniper fire and an occasional isolated burst of activity as the NVA probed around the perimeter, the early portion of the night passed without significant problems. Artillery support was called for on a regular basis just to discourage any close-in buildup of NVA. During the first half of the night, the defenders, other than the mortarmen, were fortunate enough to have a full moon that filtered down through the double canopy and gave broken visibility out to thirty to forty meters. For the next several hours, the men in the circle tightened their grip on the LZ, and waited for the enemy to make his next move. The long silence was broken by an occasional shot by one of the infantrymen reacting to a sound coming from out in the jungle. Situation reports were negative, and the troops went on a "one in four" alert.