*I was in a position with "Kit" Frazier and "Junior" Bonner. That night, at 1:00 p.m. we changed guard. It was my turn. I sat down and leaned against a tree figuring the tree would break my silhouette. A few minutes into my guard shift I heard some rustling in weeds. I turned my head and I heard the steps move out fast. I informed Sgt Frazier and he said to keep a sharp eye out. A few minutes passed, then it seemed like Hell broke loose and came running towards 3^rd Platoon.

*We had sent an LP out a few yards into the woods. I believe the LP consisted of Sgt Noble Hyde, Richard R. Roundtree and I think a soldier named McCauley. It was dark so I was never really sure where they were. Somewhere to the front and off to my right. We were under heavy attack, and the LP was breaking brush trying to get back to the perimeter. They kept yelling, "3^rd Herd! 3^rd Herd!" so we would know it was them coming in. The NVA were right behind them shooting at them, and us. They were caught between the NVA and our perimeter. Some of us were holding fire until they got inside the perimeter. Some were not. They all made it back . . . sort of. Richard R. Roundtree was Company A’s first KIA at 10-ALFA. He was wounded and lived until about 6:00 am. Our medic, "Doc" Ehrenzweig, was giving him mouth to mouth and trying to stop the bleeding.* (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

29 MAY 1966: 0135 - 0330 HOURS

Heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire broke out directed primarily against the positions of the two 3^rd Plts. At that moment, little activity was noted forward of any of the other positions. As the incoming small arms fire reached its peak, a group of forty or so NVA came yelling and charging out of the darkness toward our line. Lt Brothers had alerted the artillery, and when the attack started, so did our supporting fires. The first of 1500 artillery rounds that would be fired in support throughout the fight straddled the charging enemy force and destroyed any advantage their numbers might have achieved had they reached the perimeter. The initial attack broke out directly across the perimeter from the TF CP, and as we waited for the events to sort themselves out, the CP was alerted by a heavy crashing coming through the undergrowth heading directly for us. The tension was broken by a voice loudly announcing that he was an, "LP, comin' in! LP, comin' in!". He not only "came in", he passed through the line, and his momentum carried him well into the open center of the perimeter before he slowed down. The TF mortars added their weight to the defense as fire teams responded with equal measure, and after about thirty minutes, the NVA broke off the action and withdrew back into the darkness and the security of the forest.

The respite was short lived, and within a few minutes, the attack was renewed. The attacking force followed a similar pattern throughout the rest of the night. As each attack was beaten back, the NVA would break contact, and the firing would die down. Several times during the breaks in the action, the sounds of men cheering in the distance could be heard, and their cheers would be answered by those of the enemy who were regrouping closer to the perimeter. As the farther groups closed, their cheers would merge with those to our front, a single voice would order them forward, and another assault would be launched against the line.

*This went on for a while, then they withdrew for a while, then you could hear whistles blowing and them shouting, and they’d rush us again. Several times they got as close as 10-15 meters from us, but we drove them back every time. We fired hundreds of artillery rounds right in front of us, and thousands of M-16 rounds. They got close enough to throw grenades in on us, but we did the same and ours worked better.

*I remember crawling up and down our line with Russ Crawford (the absolute, hands-down, best damn RTO in the Central Highlands), and we came across a rifleman who had lost his helmet in the dark. I gave him mine to wear without thinking a whit about it. Sometime that night, I recall sitting (surely not?) next to one of our M-60s, watching the NVA come up the slope toward us through a clunky Starlight scope. I put that heavy glove on that came with the 60’s spare barrel and walked the muzzle back and forth into the green shapes coming up the slope toward us.

*After a couple of hours of this, maybe 0400 or so, they stopped attacking and it became quiet until dawn. I think one of our guys got hit in the elbow and died from shock later before dawn.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

As the night progressed, the scope of the attack broadened to include the defensive sectors of the 2^nd Platoon, Alfa, and the 1^st Platoon, Bravo. By this time, constant artillery support was being requested, and both the 107mm and 81mm mortars reported they were starting to run low on HE rounds. Several times units were reminded that as an NVA effort broke and ceased firing, the TF had to do the same in order to insure that the ammunition that was left would carry until daylight and last until the possibility of resupply.

29 MAY 1966: 0330 HOURS

Alfa reported one of the squads on its 3^rd Plt line had run out of ammunition, and without coordinating with anyone, had withdrawn into the perimeter. Capt Bisantz indicated it was possible that several NVA had passed through the gap and were inside the defensive circle. The word was passed that everyone was immediately to get into a prone position, and the 81's were told to hang a flare directly overhead. Instructions were given to shoot anyone on his feet when the "lights" came on. The parachute flare popped, and by the blue-white light that exposed the scene below, it was determined that the position had not been penetrated. However, several NVA had succeeded in reaching the positions where the squad had been and were eliminated by fire teams closing from opposite sides of the breach. The errant squad was rounded up and resupplied, was returned to its position, and the continuity of the perimeter was restored.

*About 0330 hrs the enemy attacked again, and was again driven off. By this time mortar ammunition was running low and the mortars had to slow down their rate of fire. Friendly casualties were miraculously low. Only about four had been wounded, and one of these was the man from the LP. The enemy again reorganized, and about 0400 hrs launched his final and almost successful attack of the night. After the firefight had raged for several minutes, again at a hand grenade throwing range, Lt. Conner informed the company that he had received word from his right flank that the NVA had penetrated the perimeter at the company’s coordinating point with Bravo Co. Leading a Fire Team, he moved along the perimeter to that point and linked up with a patrol coming the other way from Bravo Co. The mortars fired two illuminating rounds to light up the perimeter and make sure no enemy troops had infiltrated the perimeter. Lt. Conner’s group killed several NVA right at the gap in the lines. The NVA evidently hadn’t known where they were; at any rate they had failed to exploit their advantage. The gap had been created by squad leaders in both companies repositioning their men without coordinating.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

*After the LP had returned to our perimeter the platoon returned fire as intensely as we were receiving it. Each squad had to send someone back to the CP to get more ammo. The attack continued in waves for a few hours. Mortars were breaking in the trees overhead and all around us. Our mortars were giving it back to them. At one point the NVA broke through the line and were between our positions. Muzzle flashes were coming from all over the place. One of our machinegun positions had to withdraw to a new positions. The attack intensified. Lt. Larry Connor, Platoon Leader for 3^rd Platoon, called in the mortars, or artillery . . . I was never sure which . . . right down on us. People were yelling to get down because the H.E. was going to come down on top of us. It pretty much did. I could feel myself being lifted off the ground . . . being bounced every time a shell hit close to us. The threat was as great from the shells that were hitting the trees above us as it was from hitting the ground around us. Eventually, the shelling stopped and the NVA withdrew. All turned quite around 4 or 5 am. We were all wide-awake now. (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

29 MAY 1966: 0415 HOURS

The NVA broke contact and withdrew to the north of the LZ. At this time, it was estimated the TF had been in contact with an element of about battalion strength. The artillery continued to work along the threatened portion of the line, and as the action fell away, was shifted to harassing fires to the north and northwest. The 105's had been served without interruption despite an abortive ground attack that was launched out of the darkness against Bn Fwd at 11 ALFA. The infantrymen of Capt Michael Tryon’s Charlie Company defending the base had little difficulty dealing with the attacking force.

The problem of ammunition resupply along the line became more acute as the night progressed. The M-79mm Grenade Launcher seemed to be the weapon of choice because of its area effect. The units were cautioned to stretch out their supply of M-79 rounds, because once those on hand were gone, there were no more. Ammunition was redistributed from casualties who had been removed to unit collection points and from the uncommitted portion of the line to those who needed it most. Bn Fwd was notified that if the attacks were renewed and continued to carry the weight of those experienced thus far, by daylight the ammunition situation would be serious and that an early resupply was critical. Surprisingly enough, TF casualties remained light throughout the night, two KIA and nine WIA, probably because most of the troops were prone and the NVA were forced to fire at muzzle flashes rather than at individual soldiers. However, for that same reason, most of the wounds received during the darkness were head and shoulder hits. When it became apparent the NVA were probably going to either withdraw completely or at least wait until daylight to resume their action, the TF was returned to a fifty percent alert, and LPs were reestablished forward of the perimeter.

*By 0430hrs, all firing except for the artillery had dwindled to sporadic exchanges of a few rounds. 81mm mortar high explosive ammunition was dangerously low, Alfa Co. having only 24 rounds left, and Bravo Co. - 12 rounds. This was carefully hoarded in preparation for the enemy^’s next attack. The attack never came. Instead the early morning fog formed; this, coupled with the tactical situation, decided against bringing in the medical evacuation and resupply helicopters until after first light. The reminder of the night passed quietly. The 3d Platoon of Alfa Co., who had almost exclusively borne the brunt of the night’s fighting, had one killed and four wounded. Bravo Co. had two men seriously wounded and two slightly wounded.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

*During the 25^th Infantry Division’s 3^rd Brigade Task Force’s recent heavy contact with North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units, two infantry companies needed additional firepower. As a result, A Battery of the "Mighty Ninth" was brought into action.

*During one hectic afternoon and night, they expended more than 500 rounds. Because of the heavy enemy fire coming in on the infantry companies, the battery fired for 24 hours without a break. All the while, small arms and mortar fire were falling on the battery. Most of the men didn’t sleep for some 48 hours.

*The action took place on Operation Paul Revere currently underway southwest of Pleiku. First Lieutenant Richard Higgins, the Battery Executive Officer, had this praise for his men: "It really made you proud to see the men in this battery because they were shooting their howitzers to save those other men (infantrymen) at the same time mortar rounds were landing in this area."* (Bronco Bugle, Vol. No. 6, Pleiku, Vietnam June 5, 1966)

29 MAY 1966: 0530 HOURS

Just before daylight, Medevacs were requested pick up several of our more seriously wounded men. Bn Fwd indicated that a single ship was inbound and that the pilot had volunteered because the LZ was considered too "hot" for other ships to be ordered in. His ship could take out five of the wounded, and unit commanders had to select which men would go. This was extremely difficult for them, because in this case they were deciding who might live and who might not if the situation did not improve. We could hear the bird approaching from the east long before we were able to see its running lights. As the "Dust Off" passed over Chu Ba, the pilot called for a flare to locate the clearing in the darkness. The ship came in at tree top level, drew green tracer fire from several NVA automatic weapons en route, and dropped down just as the flare sputtered out. The wounded were placed on board, and later the word was relayed that all had survived. However, one of men not selected died before the next Medevac could get into the LZ. That aircraft came in at 0715, and, much to our surprise, was able to lift out with seven of our wounded on board.

*Daylight came. It was a relief because we knew they wouldn’t attack in the daylight. Most of us were ok. Whispers came down the line that Roundtree had died. Dust Off came in right after he died. I remember everybody standing up and looking around at each other with this look of anxiety on all our faces. It was the first time that I’d clearly seen the positions on my right and left because of the fact that we had set up the positions so late in the afternoon. I remember seeing Pace Caldwell on my right . . . Dick Snyder and Bob White on my left. (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)