*Right after dawn we were ordered to pick up our line and sweep our front, collecting weapons and counting bodies. We stood up and cautiously moved down a slight, wooded slope, all in line. The slope in front of us was absolutely strewn with NVA bodies, weapons, and pieces of bodies from the artillery. We moved about 150-200 meters (not sure today) down this slope to a dry creek bed, where we found scores more bodies where our shells had caught them moving up to attack us. At the creek bed we found a barely alive NVA soldier who had been horribly wounded by our artillery. I asked our medic if he would make it back to our lines, and he just shook his head no.

*We turned around and began making our way back to our line. Each of us were carrying AK-47's and SKS’s slung over our shoulders. As we approached where our line had been (maybe 50-75 meters away), a burst of machine gun fire tore into us from our front and on each side. At first, we thought our own guys were firing on us as we approached the perimeter. Within a few moments, however, it became clear that after we had moved down to the creek bed, the NVA crept behind us and our line. My platoon sergeant, SFC George Williams(?) was shot in the neck right in front of me, and something hit me in the head and knocked me head over heels. To this day I can remember exactly what it felt like-getting hit square in the head with a baseball bat. I landed on my back and couldn’t see out of my left eye because my scalp was hanging down over it bleeding. I found out later we’d been hit with one of their heavy MGs that they pulled around on two wheels. A round had hit the left side of my head and creased my skull.

*I remember crawling over to SGT Williams and laying on top of him, trying to give him some cover. The enemy machine gun that hit us was directly in front of me, maybe 15, 20 meters, in some kind of bunker that had been empty just a short time ago. They were so close I could hear them talking while they fed another belt into the gun. I shot my 16 and Williams’ bone dry at that bunker. I fired the 8 rounds from my .45, and then had nothing left. At some point I was laying there with three empty guns watching bursts walk up and down our sides, thinking that I was getting paid something like $3.80 an hour for this as an O-1 (second lieutenant) with over four years service.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

*We all looked around waiting for someone to give the order to "move out." Someone yelled, "Alright, move out!" Everyone started moving out on-line . . . keeping abreast and in sight of everyone else as much as we could. We walked just a few meters and there was a shot on my right. Then another. An NVA was moving across our front . . . running from right to left. He was empty handed with no gear and running fast. He fell. Then another NVA ran out, again from right to left. Another shot . . . and another. He fell right in front of the 1st squad positions, into what turned out to be a stream bed about 75 yards out. It never occurred to us that we were being baited out, away from our perimeter. We proceeded outward to the streambed where we found 30 to 40 bodies scattered about. We found an NVA still alive but seriously wounded. He was dying. Within a few minutes he was gone. Then there was sporadic firing back at the LZ. 3^rd platoon got the word to turn around and head back to the LZ to support the perimeter that was under probing attack. We picked up and carried some NVA mortar rounds and tubes that we had found at the streambed. We were going to take them back to the CP for the "count." It was about 8:00 am on the 29th.

*We did an about face and headed back towards the LZ. 3^rd squad was in front and 1^st squad bringing up the rear. "Junior" Bonner, Kit Frazier, Pace Caldwell, Dick Snyder, Bob White and myself were taking up the rear. Sporadic small arms fire broke out in front of the platoon. It sounded like AK’s. One shot, then two, then a series of automatic fire. Most of us thought it was our own guys on the perimeter shooting at us. We were so close to our own perimeter and this sort of thing had happened before to other units. After all, we couldn’t have been more than 100 meters from the perimeter . . . only 100 meters from safety . . . from our own people.

*We couldn’t have been more than 30 yards from the 3^rd squad, yet we couldn’t see anyone. Then grenades started exploding. Someone yelled, "They’re PAVNS! They’re PAVNS!" Then grenade after grenade exploded . . . some of theirs, some of ours. I could hear the AK’s clearly now. I could hear M16’s returning fire. I could see the smoke. 1st squad dropped the NVA mortar shells, along with the tubes, and rushed forward to help. We rushed forward to see Lt. Light, 1st Platoon Leader, lying on the ground, next to a small tree, with blood coming from his forehead. Lt. Light yelled at us to move up front . . . to help out. To this day I have no idea why the 1^st platoon leader was out there, all alone, with 3^rd platoon.

*We moved forward, under fire. I could see members of the 2^nd and 3^rd squad only 5 to 10 yards in front of us. We moved forward again, firing . . . rifles, shotguns, and grenade launchers. We moved into a position where we could support the rest of the platoon. We were all within 5 or 10 yards of each other, but because of the heavy underbrush, once we were in the prone position, we could only tell the other persons position by their voice, or screams, and by the sounds of the M-16.

*I moved forward and to the right of Sgt Jesse Spencer. Pfc. Walter Wetzel, 2nd squad, was laying down behind a small tree about 12 inches in diameter. I moved forward until my helmet was almost touching his crotch. Sgt Spencer was right next to him with his right arm draped over Wetzel’s left leg. All three of us were trying to get behind the same small tree. It was obvious by now that we were pinned down under heavy machine gun fire, with lighter automatic weapons and riflemen in support.

*Pace Caldwell was a few feet to my left. I could see blood coming from his shoulder. Bob White moved to the right, in line with the rest of us. Dick Snyder moved to my left along with Kit Frazier and Junior Bonner. I lost sight of them after a few seconds. On my right was "Freeman," one of the machine gunners. He was shot thru the hand and the machine gun was damaged. He was saying something to me that I couldn’t hear when another bullet hit his thigh. I thought it was an incendiary round because I could see smoke coming from his wound as he moaned in pain. Within seconds, Freeman was hit again. I looked at Bob White and saw his head jerk and hit the ground. I thought he was dead. Then he lifted his head and adjusted his helmet. Bob White was hit twice more in the helmet before it was over.

*As Jesse Spencer, Walter Wetzel, and I, lay behind this small tree, I briefly looked up and saw bullets coming thru the tree, tearing it apart. A bullet came across Wetzel’s butt. He started to get up from the intense pain of the wound on his butt. Spencer and I grabbed him and yelled at him to stay down. Thinking they had us zeroed in, Spencer and I crawled to the left of Wetzel looking for another, much bigger tree. I don’t know where Sgt Spencer went, but I never found that bigger tree. There just didn’t seem to be any trees big enough out there that morning.

*Things stayed that way for what seemed like hours. Them firing at us . . . us firing at them. It was clear the 3rd platoon was at a serious disadvantage. It became an issue of just hanging on until help could arrive. Some of us were out of ammo. Some of us had one or two rounds left. I had three shotgun shells left. Some of the guys picked up AK’s from dead PAVN’s because they had run out of 5.56 ammunition. Both machine guns were out of commission. And just when we thought things couldn’t get any worse someone yelled out, "They’re standing up. They’re getting ready to charge!" I remember thinking about having a shotgun and not having a bayonet mount, and how I had left my .45 back at my position before we moved out to sweep the area.* (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

*Lt. Kelsey, 2^nd Plt, was ordered to bring the major part of his platoon to the 3^rd Plt’s sector. At this time Conner’s location was not known precisely, so Kelsey was told to move east in an attempt to find him. Almost immediately Kelsey and his men engaged in a firefight with about 50 NVA who were advancing toward Bravo Co.’s position. At that moment, Lt. Light crawled to the Company Commander and told him that Lt. Conner and about l5 men were pinned down by a large enemy force. Lt. Light also had been pinned down and wounded in the head, but by crawling for about 100 meters had managed to get back to the perimeter.

*Lt. Kelsey was ordered to break off engagement and move north to assist Lt. Conner. Guided by Lt. Light, Lt. Kelsey’s platoon quickly overwhelmed the enemy force - killing about 20 in the process. Lt. Conner’s group had been hit hard with seven men being killed initially and eight to ten others pinned down by a heavy machine gun only 20 feet away.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

*At some point, I could hear a heavy volume of fire coming in our my right side. It was LT Kelsey and his platoon. They flanked the NVA and broke through to us. They literally saved our lives that morning.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

*Then, like something out of some Hollywood movie, I saw a soldier named Wolfgang Wagner, coming towards me in a crouch. It told me 2^nd Platoon had reached us. They swept in from our right and took out the machine gun and provided cover while helping us withdraw with our wounded. The battle raged on after 3^rd platoon was brought back inside the perimeter.* (Richard Hunter, 3:1/A/35)

*Lt. Kelsey’s men covered the evacuation of the dead and wounded and captured enemy material (which included a CHICO AM radio, one heavy barrel machine gun on wheels, two light machine guns and numerous AK47 Assault guns. No time was taken to search the enemy dead as the situation in Bravo Co.’s sector was rapidly deteriorating, and it was imperative to re-establish the perimeter. The enemy’s main assault began just about the time Lt. Kelsey got to the perimeter. His men stopped where they were, roughly at a right angle to the perimeter and started firing at the flank of the attacking enemy. They maintained this position the rest of the day, delivering flanking, enfilade fire against the NVA. As the enemy took cover from Bravo Co.’s fire by crouching behind anthills and trees, Kelsey’s men kept picking them off from their open flank.* (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)

Lt Light survived the fire fight, but six days later while still at !0 ALFA, his platoon was in an ambush position, and he was accidently killed by one of his platoon’s replacements. During the night, as Lt Light was moving within the position checking his people, the soldier, who had dozed off, awoke with a start, mistook the Lt for an NVA, and fired.

As the two companies resumed their positions, the NVA closed rapidly behind them and renewed their efforts against the perimeter. Over the next four hours. the NVA effort slowly expanded to the flanks so as to involve more and more of the TF. Even so, the NVA force never attempted to involve the entire perimeter at any one time. With the advantage of interior lines, even though harassed by random sniper fire, the uncommitted portion of the defense still served as a ready source for reinforcements and limited ammunition resupply for the more engaged positions within the circle. The attackers came in uncoordinated bunches - not in the human waves of the Chinese in the Korean War - but in groups of 10 to 15 up to mobs of 75 to a 100. They would charge - yelling, throwing grenades and shooting - and move straight against the perimeter without any effort to take advantage of the ground and cover. Many of the enemy were cut down by the concentrated fires of the defenders, the mortars and artillery. Others were stopped by the door gunners of helicopters that were attempting to resupply the position and the gunships that roared in every time there was a break in the artillery support.

*Another perspective came from the members of the 52^nd Avn Bn, who were in the Chu Pong/Ia Drang operations with the 1^st Cav. The told us they had never seen fighting as intense as 10 ALFA, and that included the Cav’s operations of November and December, 1965.* (Col Ronald J. Rabin, former S-2, 3^rd Bde)

*It’s like yesterday to me. I think of that place a dozen times a day. On our way out to make a recon of our front line, we actually didn’t have a confirmed enemy killed. We just got out of the front line and we started to see NVA dead, and some playing dead. The CO, Tony Bisantz, calls me on the radio and asked what is going on out. I told him we had a body count of 29 and some playing opossum. All hell broke after we got back inside. Capt Bisantz was standing behind this tree, two radios, one in one ear, one in the other. I seen this nice position earlier in the morning, and said man, they made a fine fighting hole and deep too. Well the fire fight was going good now so I hit that position. It had a good field of fire, and in it I went. After I fired a few rounds, I smelt something that took my mind off the war. I said to myself that someone had crapped in this hole. I fired a few more rounds and said no wonder no one was in this dammed hole, who the hell could stand it! I was about to leave when I got company landed in there with me. A few seconds went by, and he said, "are you that scared?" "Hell no man, it isn’t me!" He didn’t believe me, he said he would rather to get shot than stay in there with me, the dirty b------- left me there. I figure I may as well go get shot, too, so I left, also. After the fight was over I checked on this position and found only the exposed tree roots dripping this awful sap that smelled like a 2 week old slit trench...but I’m glad we don’t have them trees here in sunny California.* (Russell Crawford, RTO, 3:A/1/35)

*The assault on the southeast aide of the perimeter, in Bravo Co.^’s sector had not been affected by the engagements of Lt.’s Conner and Kelsey, and the enemy rapidly closed to within hand grenade range. The mortars, which were located in the open about 35 meters behind the perimeter were out of action almost immediately as the fire of the NVA cut down the crews anytime they manned their guns. Unable to man their tubes, the mortarmen became riflemen, some crawling forward on their stomachs to reinforce the line, others firing from their own positions.* (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)

29 MAY 1966: 0100 - 0700 HOURS

ENEMY SITUATION

As the recalled units of the 66^th NVA returned to their regimental base area, they arrived after midnight in two major increments - one group around 0100 and the other shortly before 0600. From the welcoming cheers that were heard from time to time, smaller elements continued to arrive well into the morning. The NVA Commander committed his units to the action against the American position as they became available. Thus, instead of waiting and mounting an overwhelming effort, his strength was spent piecemeal, and he failed to capitalize on his advantage of superior numbers. Once committed, individual units acted independently and without the benefit of centralized direction and control.

*The defense of LZ 10 A had begun. Why the NVA attacked that night and all through the next day is open to question. Maybe, as S. L. A. Marshall suggests, they wanted to recover their valuable machine guns (all of which were in new condition). Perhaps they thought they could overrun the small American force in the LZ, or finally, perhaps they were covering the withdrawal of a larger force. Whatever their reason, the NVA pressed their attack with a fanaticism that awed, but never overcame, the defenders. * (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

29 MAY 1966: 0830 HOURS

Sixty percent of the perimeter became actively engaged in the defense, and because of constant heavy contact along the line, and the danger of ground-to-air fire, the resupply ships were diverted to 11 ALFA pending a break in the action. After an hour of continuous effort, the NVA broke off and retired into the forest. As was the previous experience, there would be breaks in the fighting that might last from ten to up to thirty minutes. To take advantage of any opportunity the lulls might present, the resupply ships and Medevac's were placed in orbit nearby, and at 0945, with the first break in the action, three ships flying at tree top level and "hellbent for breakfast" came into the LZ. They off-loaded 107mm and 88mm mortar ammunition, along with small arms and rounds for the M-79 Grenade Launchers. Alerted that the ships were inbound, wounded were moved from the collection points closer to the touch down areas. TF wounded filled those ships to capacity. A second effort was made to resupply at 1015, but the aircraft were driven off by heavy ground to air fire. Rather than abandon the mission completely, the helicopters made one more pass and the door gunners "kicked out" their loads at 20 feet and about 110 knots. That became the final resupply for the morning. No more aircraft were able to land at 10 ALFA until late in the afternoon.

When aircraft would come up on the Cmd Net and report they were inbound, Lt Brothers would lift or shift supporting fires coming from 11 ALFA and Duc Co to keep from hitting our own people. During those respites, the TF picked up the firepower of the gunships that were escorting the supply aircraft, in addition to the searching fires from the outboard door gunners, and used them to make strafing runs parallel to our positions. Pilots reported engaging enemy troops as close as twenty meters from the perimeter. They would pass on any information concerning what they observed, roll out, and once they had cleared the area, the artillery and mortars would commence their close support missions once again.

*The next thing I recall was being helped back to the LZ. The NVA kept attacking and we kept firing back. I found another M-16 and fired it so much the barrel burned out. When things seemed to have died down a bit, one or two Huey slicks came in and someone put me on one to be lifted out of there. Just as they did, they attacked again and I hopped off, thinking I wasn’t hurt that bad. All that morning (it seems today) they kept attacking and we kept beating them back. We had lots of air support. We had 500 pound bombs, rockets, 20mm cannon, napalm, 40mm grenade launchers, everything - all "danger close" to us. We kept telling them to bring in the next run closer, 20 meters closer. I remember laying there watching a pair of A-1E Skyraiders make several runs, Huey gunships (one got hit right over us and crashed I think), and a couple of F4 Phantoms. I remember the F4s because they looked so big, and because they came in nose high, flaps down and air brakes out to slow down enough to lay their bombs in close to us. Like the arty and our Huey pilots, our air force guys were just incredible that day. I’ll never forget them for it.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

The mortars were experiencing difficulty getting their rounds in close enough to the line to be effective, because the minimum range of the weapons placed most of the rounds out into the forest and in a "lost" condition. To counter this, the crews built supports under the bipod legs of the mortars, and with minimum charges, were firing their rounds almost straight up so that they would impact just beyond the bursting radius of the shells.

29 MAY 1966: 0930 HOURS

The only positions that had not become engaged in the expanding fire fight were those of Alfa's 1^st and Bravo's 2^nd Plts, and both were directly across from the portion of the perimeter that experienced the heaviest NVA pressure. The TF Cmd Post was at the junction of these units. The action against the defense continued with varying degrees of intensity - slowing to a halt against one sector and swelling to a peak against another only a dozen or so meters away. However, at no time was the entire position involved, thus allowing both men and ammunition to be moved to bolster more critical points.

The NVA continued to bring pressure against the line, but the effort seemed to lack centralized direction and consisted more of squad or platoon sized groups working independently and not part of any centralized plan of attack. Other than for a brief moment that was quickly neutralized a few hours before daylight, no coordinated enemy force had reached the perimeter up to that point. At times, others were seen trying to extract the wounded and dead that lay forward of the defensive position. To that end, the standing trees served to screen the NVA working parties in their retrieval effort.

General Walker had been overhead several times since just before daylight, and he had been keeping abreast of the situation by monitoring transmissions between the TF and Bn Fwd. On occasion, he came up on the TF net and requested an update; but basically, he left the fighting to those on the ground. He used his influence to insure that the troops continued to get all the support that was available in that part of Vietnam, and on one occasion, because of increased sniper activity against the exposed position of the radio during transmissions to Bn Fwd, the General served as an airborne relay.