*In my opinion, SSG Johnson, B company, was a real hero on 10A. He carried a shotgun, and you could hear him rallying his troops through the night between shotgun blasts. I think he was awarded a Silver Star, his third in three wars. The mortar position was a hairy one to be in. I took about 25 guys into the LZ and came out with about 12. My Plt Sgt, SFC Tilly, was badly wounded but recovered in Hawaii.

*We got a break in that the NVA attacked from the East and were barely within artillery range. If they had attacked seriously form the West,. We would have probably been over run. When they plotted the artillery coverage prior to the lift in, they apparently failed to account for the elevation to clear hills between the Bn firebase and the LZ. They could only reach the back portions of NVA formations, but with the mortars providing close support on the perimeter, it was enough.*

*The most spectacular sight I saw in two tours happened when a gunship got hit coming into the LZ, and the pilots managed to bring it down in flames with the gunners on the skids. All escaped, but I don’t know how. Those pilots were marvelous and didn’t leave the bird until just as it hit. It burned to ashes in the LZ, but, unfortunately, its rockets were facing my platoon when it lit off, wounding some of my guys. (Ray Pollard, Wpns Plt Ldr: B/B/2/35)

*Fighting would become so intense the mortar platoons would have to grab M-16’s, and fire into the woods, defending their own positions. I believe 6 helicopters were shot down by enemy ground fire. I remember, as we were defending the LZ and laying down fire, looking back over my shoulder to see one of the door gunners jump from about 20 feet up because his chopper had been hit and was in full flames. That particular chopper was carrying a supply of ammunition and exploded like a fireworks display. It wasn’t a very big LZ and seeing those choppers scattered in the LZ made it look even smaller. Cloud cover gave way and A1E’s were finally able to give us air support. I saw an F105 flying up and down the base of the mountain strafing the NVA positions. (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

General Walker joined LTC Feir at 11 ALFA to consider the best course of action concerning the fight and the troops at 10 ALFA. He was faced with the same decision that had created the TF on the 28^th. That being, whether to extract the ground force or to reinforce it with more troops and attempt to regain the initiative. Unless the NVA were forced back from the LZ, any attempt to extract would be difficult at best, and the trail units would be placed in an almost impossible situation. Otherwise, the troops would have to abandon the LZ, and using the artillery and gunships as escorts, attempt to break out to the east. Neither option was acceptable! His decision was to reinforce with the remainder of the 1/35^th Infantry, under the command of the Brigade Executive Officer, Lt Col Robert Kingston. The TF was advised of the decision and was told that units of the 1/35^th had been ordered to move to extraction points. At best, it would be after 1530hrs before the relief force could be picked up from its current location and airlifted to the LZ. The thrust of the message was to "dig in and hang on" until the relief arrived.

As the morning progressed, the situation had not improved by any appreciable amount; but, it did not appear to be worsening. Of considerable concern was that the NVA seemed to have an endless supply of men to send against the TF, and as friendly casualties occurred with resulting gaps in the line, there was no way of replacing them other than by thinning other areas to serve the demand. I was not alone in my anxiety over this, because on one call from Alfa with a Situation Report, the RTO, Sgt George H. Mikal, gave the update and then asked if he could ask a question. "Major, are we really going to get out of here?" I told him that no American unit that I knew of had surrendered in Vietnam, we were not about to be the first, that Gen Walker had the relief force cranking up, and that we would be still here to greet them when they came in. There was long silence, and he said, "Thanks, I just wanted to know."

29 MAY 1966: 1145 HOURS

An NVA unit numbering around forty broke from the treeline directly in front of Bravo's 2^nd Plt. That unit was positioned across the open southeastern end of the LZ and was back from the treeline some twenty-five or thirty meters. It appeared that the NVA expected to close with Bravo at the treeline, and failing to meet the expected resistance, their momentum carried them out into the open. They were immediately taken under fire and finding themselves exposed, became confused and began milling around. A mortar round fired by Bravo’s 81mm's landed at their leading edge, and the front ranks of the NVA turned and ran back into the others. Some of them made it back into the woods, others broke left or right. Those that ran to their right moved parallel to the line, and then for some distance, stayed within easy visual range of the men in position. The majority of this group became casualties in short order. Of the ones that moved to their left, two automatic weapons teams were able to establish themselves in the trees about 100 meters out. Their fire downed at least one helicopter before they were eliminated. That Huey lost most of its hydraulic fluid, but made it into the LZ without further damage and without injury to the crew. As were their predecessors, they were added to the troops on the line.

*By 1000hrs, the enemy had launched four full scale attacks against the perimeter, each time getting to within hand grenade range before being repulsed. As happened the previous night, each attack was preceded by loud shouting and screaming. At one time the NVA set up an 82mm mortar in direct view of Alfa Co’s CP group, who were actually on the perimeter. Two men were assigned responsibility for the weapon and spent the next two hours killing each NVA who attempted to go near the mortar. By this time friendly casualties had begun to mount and small arms ammunition was running low. The north and west side of the perimeter, already low in numbers, sent all but a bare minimum of their ammunition across the LZ to Alfa Co. headquarters from where it was distributed down the line. An extra machine gun from Alfa’s 1^st Platoon was also brought across to strengthen the defense. A resupply helicopter had been standing by awaiting a lull in the fighting which never came_, until finally, when informed that the situation was critical, the pilot volunteered to go in with the resupply. Accompanied by two gunships to give suppressive fire, the resupply was made and a few of the more seriously wounded were evacuated. However, the resupply was expensive. One of the gunships was hit by ground fire and had to circle back and crash land in the LZ. The crew escaped the burning helicopter seconds before it blew up. While all this was going on, the enemy launched another assault. This too was beaten back as the fresh ammunition supply helped to increase the friendly rate of fire.* (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)

*Sometime later (around 1200?) I was kneeling next to a tree firing another M16 and something slammed into my left side, knocking me down. By this time, my head was numb, but this one hurt like a son of a bitch-it felt like a white hot knife in my side. (I learned later it was an AK round that first passed through three empty M16 magazines in my ammo pouch-they probably slowed the round down enough to keep it from killing me. That did it for me that day. I remember being carried into another Huey and laid down on the floor. This time I stayed. It banked so steeply coming out of the LZ I remember being afraid I was going to slide out the open door on my back, helpless to move.* (Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

*I remember a Bravo troop down in his hole on the perimeter about ten yards from where I was when one of those A1E’s made a tree top pass down the long axis of our line. The target was the woodline to the right of the opening to the trail to 11 ALPHA, and the A1E started firing about 200 meters out. The rounds passed through the foliage immediately overhead, and chunks of bark and bits and pieces of limbs showered down. The soldier was laughing and held up a branch about the size of a broom handle that had only recently been attached to a larger limb not very far up a tree above his position. "Hey Major", he yelled, "bring him back around again so I can give this back to him" (or words to that effect). There was no doubt in my mind that the LZ would hold until the rest of the 1/35^th got there.* (Stan Tyson, TF Cmdr)

29 MAY 1966: 1200 HOURS

*Upon return of the sweep (approximately 0830 hours), sniper fire again became frequent, in fact, B 2/35 Infantry suffered its greatest number of casualties from sniper attacks. Much of their fire was directed at the mortar positions, although it was felt that the primary reason for the enemy’s return was to fire on incoming aircraft. These snipers also used automatic weapons. From 0830 to 1200 hours, the fire was so intense that personnel on the northern and eastern portions of the LZ effectively were pinned down. Armed helicopters were called to suppress the fire (causing 81mm fire on sniper positions to cease). Again because of close proximity of friendly positions plus the heavy foliage density, the gunships were ineffective. An airborne FAC was contacted. He spotted enemy automatic weapon positions at the east end of the LZ. Friendly lines were marked with smoke and two A1E’s made two successful runs. The third run consisted of an accidental napalm attack on the CP of B 2/35^th Infantry. Results of this unfortunate incident were six WIA, all of whom later had to be evacuated. Two successful napalm runs followed, after which the FAC aircraft again hosed down the periphery of the LZ with heavy bombing and cannonading. (Annual Historical Supplement, 2^nd Bn, 35^th Infantry, 1966)

The action concentrating against the TF continued to occupy the center ring of the only "show in town". Unidentified aircraft came up on the radio, inquired how the situation was going, and asked if they could be of assistance.

Just after noon, a Forward Air Controller (FAC) checked into the net and asked if we could use two A1E Skyraider's that were out looking for "targets of opportunity". He indicated the fixed wing aircraft were carrying rockets and napalm. Lt Brothers had the artillery shut down, and the machineguns that had been set up back in the trees to our southeast were designated as the target. Men at opposite ends of the LZ threw smoke grenades to indicate a line of flight, and a compass heading of 140 degrees from the center of the LZ with an estimated distance to where the guns were located were passed to the FAC. The planes made two rocket runs and received return fire each time. The FAC called for the napalm, and as the first A1E made its pass, the aluminum tanks hit well beyond the target. The trail aircraft became disoriented, made a 90 degree error in its flight path, and came in over the LZ on a north to south run. The TF CP group was alerted to the impending danger when one of the nearby troops cried out, "God Almighty, look out!"

The A-1E, at tree top height, released its tanks as it passed over the far side of the perimeter. The tanks impacted directly on the TF CP. The right tank hit exactly five feet in front of the position, and the blast, metal and flame went over and spread out beyond it. The left tank fell about ten meters farther in and hit a large tree, with its napalm passing over most of the men on the ground beneath it and on into the trees. Of the eleven men around the CP, nine were injured. Lieutenant Brothers received third degree burns on his back, and 1^st Sergeant Harry Miller, Bravo, who at the moment of impact, was working with a soldier who had just been wounded, had only enough reaction time to raise his hands to cover his face. In spite of receiving severe burns on his hands and face, his eyes were not injured, and within several weeks, he returned to duty with the company. None of the wounds from the fire or exploding tanks were fatal, but because of them, six men were eventually evacuated from country. The two who were not burned had avoided injury, one by dashing out into the open so that the tanks passed over and hit behind him, and the other, by diving into a water-filled foxhole. The PRC-25 that had been serving as the TF net control station was destroyed, and the Artillery radio was pressed into immediate service to notify the FAC of the error and to call off any subsequent runs. The pilot of the errant A-1E could be heard over the FAC's radio saying, "I will not drop unless requested, I will not drop unless requested." It was obvious he had become aware of the error about the same time as those on the ground. The target in question was still active, and the FAC was requested to bring the aircraft around again, to make a dry run to ensure they were back on target, and then to engage with whatever ordinance they had left. The NVA machineguns ceased to be a problem at that time.

*I spent the better part of the night at the TF/Bravo Co CP near a small mound of mud that had been scraped from a prone shelter. There was no advantage to moving around with just about every sound drawing fire from either inside or outside the perimeter, so I used the mound as a prop for my PRC-25 and stayed put. Later that morning, I had returned to the vicinity of the mound, all of eight inches high, and was working with a FAC to coordinate successive runs by two A-1E aircraft. The first pass was on line, but beyond the target I had designated, and I had the FAC bring them around for a second run. As I was trying to determine the results of the first pass, I heard a warning shout. I turned in time to see the lead A-1E appear directly across the LZ, 90 degrees off the target line, and release its twin tanks of napalm just as it passed over the wood line. They looked like two huge silver cigars slowly tumbling towards the Command Group. I dropped behind my favorite pile of mud, and the tanks impacted and exploded just a few feet in front of us. Because the left tank hit as close as it did, that eight inches of mud was enough to deflect much of the flame and blast up and over our position. The heat and roar were horrendous. The radio was destroyed, my boots, fatigue pants and the camouflage cover on my steel pot were literally smoking, and I had a realistic preview of what Hell just might be like.* (Stan Tyson, TF Cmdr)

*B Company 1^st Sgt was badly wounded in the mistaken napalm drop on the mortar and company headquarters positions. I was between the two when the drop happened but was fortunate enough to see it coming and dived into a water filed fox hole. 1^st Sgt. Co Commander (Capt Maisano) and several others got it right in the face.* (Ray Pollard, Wpns Plt Ldr: B/2/35)

*The enemy attack soon spilled over into Alfa Co.’s sector and practically the whole eastside of the perimeter was under attack. As soon as the initial firing had started, the artillery had again been called and again started its battery volley fire, moving north and south in front of the perimeter in 50 and 100 yd. increments. A team of armed helicopters came on station about 0800 hrs. and added their support to the defenders, coordinating their firing passes with the artillery. Also at this time, a Forward Air Controller arrived at the LZ in an O1E and began circling, awaiting the arrival of tactical air support aircraft. Two A1E’s, carrying rockets, napalm and 20mm cannon, arrived about 0900hrs. The FAC guided then through the low flying clouds on a "dry" pass over the LZ. They climbed out, circled, and immediately came back on a strafing run which was very effective causing an immediate slowdown in the rate of enemy fire. The FAC informed us that they would drop napalm on their next pass. A few minutes passed, and then one of the Skyraiders broke out of the clouds and headed for the LZ from the exact opposite direction from which he had come before, and released two napalm tanks directly over the mortar position. These tanks impacted directly into the Task Force Command Post (CP), putting it temporarily out of action. Of approximately 15 men in and around the CP, none were killed and only two were seriously injured, Bravo Co’s 1^st Sgt. and Senior Medic. Six others were slightly burned. The knee deep water in the LZ had served to muffle the detonation of the napalm and also offered protection to the men in the CP group. Several had merely submerged in their water filled slit trenches as the napalm struck; others, though hit by the burning fuel, quickly rolled in the water extinguishing the flames and suffered only minor burns. The FAC was informed of the accident and was able to divert the second aircraft before it dropped its napalm. An investigation into the cause of the accident later determined it to be a combination of factors encompassing marginal visibility and pilot error.* (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

*I do remember the ARVN planes accidentally dropping Napalm on the command post. The medic there was a good friend of mine, but for the life of me I can’t remember his name. I remember seeing those guys strip off their clothes which were not burnt, and seeing the flesh red but not even blistered like you would have thought.* (Philippe Saunier, 4:B/2/35)

29 MAY 1966: 1300 HOURS

A Bravo company medic came to the CP area and told Capt Maisano that Pfc Donald Evans was dead. The soldier, with the Company 81mm mortars, had been hit in the legs - a bullet passing through one and almost removing the kneecap from the other. Instead of allowing himself to be removed to the relative safety of the company collection point, he chose to stay with the mortars and keep his tubes in action. When an assistant gunner was killed, he reorganized the gun crew and talked the loader and ammunition bearers through the laying and firing procedures. Pfc Evans stayed with the guns until, after receiving at least one more wound, he died from loss of blood and shock.

*I was not on the perimeter with the platoon, instead I was with the mortar squad set a little back from the east end of the line. When the choppers stopped landing and just flew over real low to drop off food and ammo, a couple of us would run out to gather what we could and distribute this to the line. I remember being scared but felt kind of a safety in numbers attitude.

*I remember working with a medic on a wounded guy. I don’t remember knowing him before this but I still remember exactly what he looked like. When I saw his KIA listing I couldn’t believe he was only 18 years. old. The action was so intense at that time we were pinned down by the fire power coming in and Medevac couldn’t come in for the wounded. He just bled to death and there was nothing we could do. I think this went on for at least two nights and three days, but seemed like forever. Then on the third day they brought in Artillery and what seemed like hundreds of men. I remember thinking, boy if this would be how we would always be with all this support, it would be great.* (Philippe Saunier, 4:B/2/35)

*On the Brigade’s present Operation "Paul Revere," southwest of Pleiku, the medical company (Company B, 25^th Medical Battalion) was able to show its efficiency in treating injured personnel of the brigade. On Saturday, elements of the Task Force met heavy contact with what is now known to have been a North Vietnamese regiment. Naturally, there were some friendly casualties.

*"Every wounded man who reached our hospital alive, reached the higher echelon alive, thanks to the finest doctors I have worked with," said Doctor (Captain William Gardner, the Brigade Surgeon. All patients suffering head or eye injuries were immediately evacuated to Pleiku or Qui Nhon. Other patients requiring major surgery are evacuated to either Pleiku or An Khe, then sent off to Qui Nhon to recuperate. A seriously wounded man can be on an operating table in Pleiku within a half hour after he reaches us, "stated Doctor (Captain) Edward Denison, the B Company Commander.

*"They have lost two choppers during this operation while attempting to extract wounded soldiers from the battle areas, " Doctor Gardner emphasized. "They also had a medic shot through both legs." The "Dustoff’ unit supporting the 3^rd Brigade Task Force is the Pleiku Platoon of the 498^th Helicopter Air Ambulance Company.* (Bronco Bugle, Vol. 1, No. 6, Pleiku, Vietnam, June 5, 1966)

*The next thing I recall was coming to on a stretcher inside a MASH tent near Pleiku, laying on my back. I saw LT Pat Lenz, Company A’s XO over me, and I began crying, asking him how many of my men had been hurt. I don’t think he knew then, and I passed out.*(Larry Conner, Plt Ldr, 3:A/1/35)

Throughout the second day, the NVA mortars were employed twice. On the first occasion, they fired nine rounds during the morning attack. The first round was heard to impact hit well back in the forest, and since the TF had no fire mission in progress at that moment, it was assumed that something had blown up out there. A second explosion occurred about ten minutes later, closer, but still "lost". A third impacted about ten minutes after the second, on line and within sight of the LZ. It was determined that an observer was probably in a tree somewhere in the vicinity and as each round was fired, he would send the correction back to the tube position by runner - thus the time lapse between rounds. Capt Masan was told that the next round would hit pretty close to his 1^st Plt positions and for him to move his people to the left and right of the anticipated impact point. The troops moved, the round came in as expected, and did no damage. There was one final adjustment out into the center of the LZ, the tube fired four rounds "for effect", and after that, the mortar ceased firing