DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
APO San Francisco 96355
30 August 1967
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
TO: Commanding Officer
3rd Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355
1. Name of Operation: Battle of An Thach.
2. Date of Operation: 201100 to 202000 August 67.
3. Location: An Thach Hamlet, Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN.
4. Command and Control Headquarters:
a. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
b. Reporting Officers:
(1) LTC Norman L. Tiller, Sr., CO, 2d Battalion, 35th
(2) CPT Larry W. Hicks, CO, Co A, 2d Battalion, 35th
(3) CPT James L. Lindsey, CO, CO B, 2d Battalion, 35th
(4) CPT William E. Hocker, CO, co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor.
(5) 1LT Homer L. Krout, Platoon Leader, Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Bn,
5. Task Organization:
a. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.
6. Supporting Forces:
b. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.
c. Team Hocker: Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor and
Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Bn, 35th Infantry.
a. The Tactical Air Control Party attached to the brigade provided an
airborne forward controller (FAC) on immediate notice. The FAC played a
vital role as an aerial observer, by informing the ground commanders of
enemy movement and dispositions and by using marking rockets to indicate
b. Observation helicopters from 3rd Brigade Aviation Section
maintained close surveillance of the immediate contact area and advised
ground elements of enemy movement.
c. Gunships from the 174th Aviation Company (Airmobile Light)
covered possible routes of enemy withdrawal preventing the enemy from
a. Weather: On 20 August 1967, from 1130 hours to 1630 hours the
temperature varied from 92 degrees to 97 degrees F; visibility was seven
to ten miles and the wind was five to ten knots from the south-southwest.
Visibility was excellent with scattered cirrus clouds at 15,000 feet.
8. Mission: The mission of Team Hocker (C/2-34 Armor(-) and Recon Plat
2-35) was to conduct a detailed search of the hamlet of An Tho, vicinity
BS812454. Once contact with the enemy was made, by a heavy tank section
investigating a "ground to air" fire report at BS800469, Captain
Hocker altered the mission to close with the enemy. The missions of
Company B and Company A were to block from the north and south
respectively and to assist Team Hocker in the "mopping up" phase
of the battle.
b. Terrain: The site of the battlefield was characterized by thick bamboo
and cacti hedgerows forming irregular rectangles with flat open ground
between them. Concealed behind these hedgerows the enemy had excellent
fields of fire. The hedgerows afforded the enemy natural obstacles not
easily penetrated by a dismounted soldier.
c. Enemy: A reinforced rifle company of approximately sixty men was the
antagonist in this contact. They fought desperately, from bunkers and
trenches, to hold on to their positions without success. The enemy was
quickly encircled. Realizing his predicament he attempted to escape to the
west, moving from trench to trench pausing only long enough to fire a few
bursts and move again. Realizing that he was trapped, his resistance
became fanatical and several enemy soldiers made suicidal charges at tanks
with automatic weapons. The enemy chose to die rather than surrender.
Others attempted to evade by taking refuge in family bunkers. They were
discovered by friendly elements making a final search of the battlefield.
They, too, refused to surrender and continued to resist until they were
killed. The 2d Company, 87th Bn, 2d VC Regiment, 3rd
NVA Division was identified from captured documents. A captured personnel
roster listed forty-one men present for duty, fourteen men were on other
missions, sick leave, or R&R. This unit was equipped with twenty-seven
weapons as indicated by a captured weapons roster. Eighteen of those
weapons were captured, listed below in paragraph 11 b.
d. Analysis: The 2d Company, 97th Bn, 2d VC Regiment assembled
its forces in the village of An Thach presumably to accomplish one of two
missions. One mission could have been to conduct an attack on a nearby P.F.
outpost. Another possibility could have been to evacuate the unit by boat
to Binh Dinh Province. The amount of ammunition collected from the bodies
was sufficient for the enemy to mount and sustain a limited attack;
however, their sixty-man company was an inadequate force to engage a U.S.
company or base camp. Nevertheless, a unit of this size could easily
overrun a P.F. outpost. It can be safely assumed that the enemy intended
to stay only long enough to assemble forces and formulate final plans.
Intelligence reports from 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
indicate that the 97th Bn is presently operating in Binh Dinh
Province; therefore it is logical to assume that this company from the 97th
Bn would have moved south to join its parent unit had it not been
annihilated in the battle of An Thach.
9. Concept of Operation: Evolving from the enemy’s maneuvers and from the
general nature of the terrain, the concept was that Team Hocker would push
the enemy from the hamlet of An Thach (2), vicinity BS800464, to the west
toward the open rice fields. Company B, operating 1500 meters north of An
Thach, was to maneuver to the south, blocking enemy escape to the north;
while Company A was air assaulted at BS805458, south of An Thach, to
engage the enemy fleeing in that direction. Observation aircraft were to
keep watch over the open areas to the west.
a. At 1118 hours the battalion net control station received a report from
the 174th Aviation Company that a helicopter delivering
resupply to Team Hocker had received small arms fire from vicinity
BS800460, about 500 meters northwest of Team Hocker’s location. Captain
Hocker sent a section of three tanks to the north and at 1148 this section
reported chasing two VC into a trench and killing one at BS812455. Almost
immediately the tank section became heavily engaged from several enemy
positions firing automatic and semi-automatic fire. (See sketch
Captain Hocker deployed the remainder of his team to the northwest and
requested an observation aircraft. The brigade FAC, Maj. Murray L. Smith
already airborne over the AO, was above the area of contact within five
minutes. He was able to observe the main enemy force and advised Captain
Hocker accordingly. By 1210 hours all of Team Hocker had deployed on line
moving to the northwest and had killed two additional VC. At 1222 hours
two men from C/2-34 Armor (-) were wounded when their tank was hit by an
explosive round of unknown type. The tank was not disabled and while they
awaited aeromedical evacuation the team continued to pursue and to engage
the enemy. At 1240 hours the battalion requested gunships to support the
battle; they were on station five minutes later. Captain Hocker estimated
the enemy force to be at least a platoon and reported that they were
moving to the west. While Major Smith and gunship pilots kept watch over
the western edge of the hamlet, the tank infantry team routed and killed
eight enemy in trenches vicinity BS796460. By 1315 hours, eleven enemy had
been killed and two friendlies wounded. The enemy was not attempting a
rapid withdrawal but was being moved out by the firepower and the close
order tactics of the tanks and infantry. Enemy fire was still moderate to
heavy and at 1318 hours LTC Tiller, the Battalion Commander, ordered
Company B to move from their location to the north of the battle area
southwest toward the scene of contact.
b. As B/2-35 moved to the southwest LTC Tiller directed them from the air.
When they were within 150 meters of An Thach hamlet B Company deployed on
line and began searching to the south. Team Hocker, still in contact,
reported another enemy killed at 1358 hours. At 1400 hours the Battalion
Commander alerted A Company to prepare to be picked up from their location
and be air assaulted south of An Thach. Between 1400 and 1417 hours, Team
Hocker pushed through the last heavy enemy resistance, killing fourteen
enemy, many at point blank range. (See sketch
II). As soon as Team Hocker
reached the western edge of An Thach, Captain Hocker requested permission
to reverse his course and move slowly back through the contact area. LTC
Tiller granted permission and instructed the team to search the contact
area for hidden VC and for weapons and equipment. When Team Hocker began
the "mopping up" phase of the battle at 1420 hours a total of 26
enemy had been killed and nine weapons, including a 60mm mortar, had been
c. As B Company swept on line to the southwest and Team Hocker searched on
line back through the battlefield too the east, Company A was air
assaulted south of An Thach, completing insertion at 1510 hours and began
a systematic search to the north. (See sketch
III). Team Hocker reported
enemy kills at five to ten minute intervals throughout the following hour,
bringing the total kills to 39 by 1505 hours. At 1630 hours the Brigade S2
reported that Brigade Aviation aircraft supporting the battle had killed
eight VC and captured three weapons. At 1800 hours Company A engaged and
killed two enemy and captured two automatic weapons. Elements of A/2-35
and B/2-35 made contact with Team Hocker securing the pick up zone
vicinity BS800462, while the remainder of Team Hocker continued the
search. Company B moved northeast towards their night location along the
beach. The extraction of A/2-35 began at 1843. At 1905 with two platoons
of Co A extracted, the remaining platoon located a bunker with armed enemy
inside. The last lift was delayed until 2005 hours. In the interim,
1A/2-35 killed five VC and captured their weapons. Following extraction of
1A/2-35 the tank platoon moved to Team Hocker’s night location. (See
d. Contact with the enemy was moderate between 1100 and 1500 hours. Contact
was light from 1500 until 2000 hours. Range of engagement varied from one
meter to one hundred meters. Communications were good within the contact
area and also between reporting stations.
12. Commander’s Analysis:
a. Enemy Personnel losses 53 KIA
b. Enemy weapons seized:
(1) 60mm Mortar (complete)......... 1
(2) M-79 ...................................... 1
(3) SKS........................................ 9
(4) Soviet Machinegun................... 1
(5) BAR....................................... 1
(6) AK- 47................................... 1
(7) Chicom SMG.......................... 1
(8) M-16 ..................................... 1
(9) M1 Carbine ........................... 1
(10) 45 cal automatic pistol .......... 1
This victory can be attributed directly to the cooperation and teamwork
of all the units and individuals involved. It is a lasting example of
several well trained units working toward a common goal. When the initial
report of enemy ground fire came in it was immediately relayed to the
nearest friendly unit which took immediate action. Captain Hocker’s
quick response coupled with the aggressive tactics and thorough search
techniques of his team brought about this enemy defeat. This action points
up the absolute necessity of having air observation over the target area.
Major Smith, USAF, greatly influenced the course of action by assisting
Captain Hocker in the maneuver of his elements directly into the enemy
position. Major Smith continuously reported on the enemy maneuvers until
the 3rd Bde Aviation Section helicopters were able to arrive on
the scene. This type of aerial observation paid off handsomely in the
extremely high kill ratio of this contact, fifty-three enemy KIA to zero
US KIA. Continuous aerial observation allowed Captain Hocker to maneuver
his forces and defeat the enemy unit piecemeal. Captain Hocker repeatedly
concentrated his forces in overwhelming strength at the enemy’s location
as reported by the aerial observers. This outstanding employment of tanks
and infantry together, the firepower and maneuver of the tanks with the
close in fighting of the infantry, resulted in the virtual annihilation of
the 2d Company, 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment.
NORMAN L. TILLER, Sr.
Sketch I – Initial maneuvers by Team Hocker.
Sketch II – The breakthrough by Team Hocker.
Sketch III – The "mopping up."
Sketch IV – Units move to night locations.