LUZON

THE DRIVE NORTHEAST FROM KAPINTALAN

23 APRIL – 12 MAY 45

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On the 23^rd, the 2d Battalion commenced a new drive with the mission of securing an enemy strongpoint on a ridge thirteen hundred yards north-northeast of Kapintalan, and six hundred yards north of their former positions on the Fishhook. While we pushed up toward this objective, the 27th Infantry, which had established itself on Balete Ridge between Mount Myoko and Balete Pass, was to attack from the east. When the two regiments made contact at the objective, all Jap forces north and south of the line would be cut off from retreat.

The plan called for one company to push ahead as rapidly as possible to gain each successive objective, overrunning or bypassing opposition with no attempt to eliminate it completely. The following companies were to cover the territory gained in a more systematic fashion, investigating and destroying all enemy positions found. The 1^st Battalion, still occupied in the mopping up the Kapintalan area, would gradually extend their patrols farther afield to make the final mop up, slowly moving north as the job was completed.

G Company jumped off at 1300, moving slowly over very rugged and densely wooded terrain toward a small ridge which was he day’s objective. Just short of this ridge they ran into determined enemy resistance from a dug-in enemy force. The company attacked immediately, overran the position, and occupied the ridge at 1640. Fourteen dead Japs were counted.

The next morning F Company passed through G Company’s lines and continued northeast. About four hundred yards out, they received heavy fire from caves and pillboxes in a ravine, but bypassed this opposition and followed the next ridge northeast toward their objective.

E Company, while tidying up enemy positions bypassed or missed by the forward units, repeated G Company’s cave experiment of the 22^nd. Observing two Japs entering a cave just after dawn on the 24^th, hey immediately sealed it, and opened it up again at 1600. By a coincidence which has caused considerable annoyance since, hey found eighteen dead Japs and a new 47mm with pneumatic tires, as well as assorted sabers and battle flags. The annoyance comes when an E Company man tries to tell the story; he is always interrupted with a disbelieving "G Company did that!"

At 0945 on the 25^th, F Company occupied the second objective without opposition, and sent out a strong combat patrol to the northeast, to reconnoiter a route of advance to the final objective, about three hundred yards away, and to obtain a toehold on the hogback leading up to it if possible. The remainder of the company waited ready to advance.

The next morning at 0600, about a platoon of Japs flanked the ambush party north of the 2d battalion CP, reaching a small hill overlooking the CP, and commenced raking the area with knee mortar and machine gun fire. G Company flanked the hill and drove the enemy off by 0800, killing twenty three Japs and capturing twenty small arms and two heavy machine guns. Meanwhile, however, the CP received a severe pounding. The Battalion Sergeant Major was seriously wounded and his assistant was killed when a mortar shell landed on the edge of their foxhole.

I should be observed that throughout this phase of the campaign, the Battalion CP and the Regimental CP received considerable intermittent mortar and artillery fire. Although this fire was tactically ineffective, since none of the CPs were knocked out, it was indicative of the effectiveness of Jap observation and reconnaissance. A trained infiltrator, taking full advantage of the dense growth in the ravines, could go almost anywhere unobserved. Any unit which remained in the same location for two days in a row could expect shelling on the second day. The enemy artillery pieces were emplaced in caves. Indirect fire could seldom knock them out. The most effective weapon against them, and the one which eventually abated the nuisance, was the 90mm Anti-Aircraft gun, which could be set up on high ground overlooking the caves, and fired directly into their mouths.

On the 26^th, F Company continued pushing up the wooded ridge toward their objective, and at 1315 ran into a nest of pillboxes and spider holes on the forward slopes of the hill which was their next objective. The enemy resistance was biter and determined, and the outpost was not reduced until dark. The next morning, after beating off an attack by a small group of Japs using knee mortars and two heavy machine guns, F Company continued pushing up the hill, but advanced only one hundred yards before coming under machine gun crossfire. They withdrew a short distance and laid mortar fire on the enemy positions, after which they succeeded in reaching the top of the hill. The rest of the day was spent consolidating the position.

During the afternoon of the 28^th, Company A moved up to the position F Company had just taken, and on the morning of the 29^th, began an advance northeast to form a junction with the 27^th Infantry, which was moving down the same main ridge. After moving about two hundred yards, Company A encountered a large enemy force dug in on the ridge to their front. A fierce firefight ensued, and the company was unable to advance farther. At 1400, they were pulled back to permit an artillery concentration in the area. At 1030 on the 30^th, the company again jumped off, and advanced three hundred yards against light resistance before running into another strongly defended p[position. This enemy force still held up the drive on the 1^st of May. In an attempt to flank the positions, two platoons were sent around to the right, and one to the left, but both groups met heavy rifle and machine gun fire form all points of the enemy perimeter, and withdrew to their original position for the night.

On 2 May, after a heavy artillery concentration, A Company pushed off again at 1030 and passed through the enemy positions with only light resistance. The company continued to push northeast on the 3^rd, making no contact with the enemy until 1330, when they received heavy rifle fire from a hill to their front. At this point, they were six hundred yards from Company B of the 35^th Infantry, which, attached to the 3d Battalion of the 27^th infantry, was at that time the forward element of that battalion.

On the 4^th and 5^th, A Company continued to attack this hill, but despite the help of two M-7s, they met no success. Several flanking attacks were met with heavy rifle and machine gun crossfire from all points of the enemy perimeter they approached. On the 6^th, this company took over A Company’s positions. A Company thereupon moved to outpost a planned supply route to the 27^th Infantry, which was being supplied by airdrop.

After an artillery preparation, K Company jumped off at 1015, 7 May, but met heavy rifle and machine gun crossfire after only advancing a short distance. The resistance came from at least six machine guns and their supporting riflemen situated on the forward slope of the hill. Throughout the day, the company pounded at these positions with all weapons at their command, but were unable to make any headway. On the 8^th, two platoons moved two hundred yards up the ravine to the right to make a flanking attack, but were met by machine gun and rifle fire. For a short time they were cut off from the remainder of the company, but at last, after receiving several casualties, managed to extricate themselves. Several more casualties were incurred while rescuing the wounded, but at least all of them were evacuated to the company perimeter.

On the 9^th, after another artillery preparation, the company drove almost half way up the slope, spotting several pillboxes and knocking one out before they were forced to withdraw. The difficulties of moving up this slope were enhanced by the fact that our own artillery and mortar fire had almost denuded the area of growth, without materially damaging the enemy’s positions. They simply withdrew deep into their caves when the shells began to fall. Only direct fire could knock out these positions, and there was no dominating terrain facing the slope from which it could be based. On the 10^th, heavy mortar fire was placed on the enemy positions and another attempt was made, this time with flame throwers. But the enemy positions were as strongly defended as ever, and their fire lanes were so skillfully interlaced that the flame throwers could not be brought close enough to operate effectively.

On the 11^th of May, after a mortar and M-7 preparation, K Company jumped off in coordination with E Company 27^th Infantry, which had been attacking to the north end of the Jap perimeter under much the same conditions and with the same results as K Company’s attacks. The two companies made contact at 1800, and on the morning of the 12^th a line between the two companies was secured. The 12^th and 13^th was spent mopping up emplacements on the plateau and the many caves dug into its slopes. From the 11^th to the 13^th, more then one hundred Japs were killed by the two companies, and approximately two hundred caves were counted. Some were so deep that ladders were required to enter them, and almost all were connected by tunnels, so that it was possible for the Japs to shift troops all around their perimeter without once venturing above ground. It would almost be true to say there was more blank space then earth in the hill. On one occasion during the mopping up operations, a K Company man dug his foxhole completely through the roof of a cave, and almost fell into a nest of sealed up Japs. The hole was quickly filled, and he chose another spot for his foxhole – and, for once, left it rather on the shallow side. It is easier to scrunch down then to scrunch up.

The course of the battle for this unnamed plateau was an archetype of all the fighting in the Caraballo Mountains. Possessing the initial advantage of being on the defensive, and exploiting the rugged terrain to the full, The Japs dug in so deeply that even though the surface might be occupied, they could hold out indefinitely against any number of troops attempting to reach them in their caves. The only possibility they did not anticipate – and for countless numbers of them , it was a tragic oversight – was the technique of cave-sealing our troops have developed. It is improbable that even a fairly accurate estimate will ever be obtained of the number of Japs sealed in caves during the course of the war against Japan.

In general, the reduction of Japanese strong points in the mountains followed the same pattern. After days and even weeks of seemingly futile attacks and an often fantastic amount of pounding by bombs, artillery, and mortars, an attack would be made, no different from others that had failed, and the position would be taken with comparative ease. During the Luzon Campaign, even the Emperor’s Birthday, Empire Day, and Army Day elicited no large-scale response. This, together with the comparatively huge number of prisoners captured during the campaign, seems to indicate that the well-known Banzai Spirit is beginning to wear thin. The Japs have proven, that they can take any amount of physical punishment, and come back for more. They can face to certainty of personal death with equanimity, and sometimes even joy. What they cannot take is the knowledge of racial defeat.

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