LUZON

LUPAO

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The town of Lupao and its surrounding bamboo groves and thickets forms a rough crescent where the road from Munoz joins the main highway. The surrounding country is largely rice paddies, graduated down on all sides from the town so that there is no clear route of approach or point of observation.

A word about rice paddies. They are Normandy hedgerows in miniature. About fifty feet to a side, they are all at different levels to facilitate flooding. Between are dikes a foot thick, sun-baked to the hardness of brick, and covered by grass. They offer excellent cover - for fifty feet. When you try to go from one paddy to another, there is nothing to do but climb over the dike. Of course the Jap snipers know this, and never hesitate to pay their respects as you pass over. The whole area is as flat as the proverbial pool table, and graduated down from the towns, so there is no place from attackers may observe. More then ever, the advantages are with the defenders. Before coming under attack by the 35^th Infantry, Lupao was considered of minor importance in the Japanese network of defenses protection. Highway #5, their main escape route from Manila to the Baguio area. The Japanese strength was thought to be concentrated at Umingan, San Isidro, and San Jose. Advanced reports from Guerrillas and Civilians had indicated that Lupao was garrisoned by about a Company of Infantry, from a group especially trained as raiders, plus fifteen or twenty tanks. Air reconnaissance failed to disclose anything of importance, so no air strike was thought necessary. One Battalion was considered sufficient to secure the town in one day.

In accordance with a 25^th Division order of the 1^st of February, Field Order #2. CP/35, 2 February 1945, directed the First Battalion not only to advance immediately to seize and secure Lupao by 1800, 2 February 1945, but to send patrols to the south, reconnoiter for a road to the east, and establishing a block on this road. The Second Battalion was to follow the First Battalion to reach San Rogue by dark, and the Third Battalion was ordered to move to Masiil-Siil as Regimental Reserve.

The afternoon of 2 February, the First Battalion started the drive on Lupao. B Company led off and made excellent progress until it ran into heavy fire from machine guns, mortars, and light artillery. These came from a small barrio just north of Lupao, bordered by a copse of woods vertical to the highway. Later investigation disclosed that the strong point of this area was a 15 foot erosion ditch, really exploited for both cover and concealment. A 75mm Anti-Tank rifle was in the center. This gun commanded the road from San Rogue for at least 500 yards. Reinforcing this was a 75mm mountain gun and a 47mm Anti-Tank gun. Supporting riflemen and machine guns were dug in for 500 yards to the left. The right flank was secured by two dug in tanks across the road. B Company withdrew at dark, and artillery and mortar fire was laid on the enemy positions. The 75mm Anti-Tank gun was knocked out with its first round still in the chamber

The next day, B Company resumed the offensive on the east of the road, with A Company on the west and C Company in support. Again, no progress could be made.

Now the Third Battalion was sent around to the south of the town. Their mission was to cut the road between Lupao and San Isidro, and to attack the town from the south. To get there, a road had to be built, and Company C of the 65^th Engineers did just that. This road cut behind the First Battalion, then came into the open below Lupao. The road was built as the troops advanced, with the bulldozers sometimes a part of the point. At 1450 on the 3^rd, the road block was established as ordered.

Again, the First Battalion was drawn back 400 yards, this time to enable two platoons of 4.2 mortars to work over the enemy positions. The north end of town was obviously where the Jap strength lay; hence, on the morning of the 4^th, the 3^rd Battalion was to attack from the south, attempting to draw the Jap strength down there. Then, three hours later, the 1^st Battalion would assault the supposedly weakening northern positions. A platoon of tanks was to cover the left flank of the advance by patrolling the gulley paralleling the road.

The 3^rd Battalion jumped off at 0730 on the 4^th, closely following an artillery barrage. I Company was the base of fire. The First Platoon was pinned down a hundred yards from the town by fire from tanks, which, though not dug in, were so well camouflaged that our men were almost on them before seeing them. Almost every clump of bamboo and every hut concealed a tank. It was noon before casualties could be evacuated by their platoon; then the remaining men withdrew to allow artillery to be employed. M-7’s also were sent up to deal with the tanks.

On the other side of the road, Company K advanced. Their 3^rd Platoon, with a section of heavy machine guns for flank protection, moved two hundred yards into town. There they lost contact with I Company. Here too were tanks. The point actually came within ten yards of three; they were so close that the tanks could not depress their guns enough to fire on them. All available anti-tank weapons were brought to bear, and eight hits with bazookas and rifle grenades were scored on one tank. Before more ammunition could be brought up, one tank charged down the road, splitting the left squad from the rest of the platoon. The remainder of the platoon withdrew, only to come under fire from another concealed tank on their right. 4.2 mortar fire finally covered their retreat to the original line of departure, where contact with I Company was reestablished.

Meanwhile the 1^st platoon advanced into the bamboo grove to their front. They encountered severe fire from well dug in and concealed positions and, under cover of their own fire, withdrew into a slight ditch bordering the bamboo grove. Their position became untenable when they began to receive sniper fire from their rear and 50 caliber fire from our M-7’s who were firing at the enemy in the bamboo grove as they came down the road. With some difficulty, the 1^st platoon withdrew and once more contacted the 3^rd platoon.

At 1800 the same attack plan was repeated and successfully executed. The only variation was that the company moved forward in the cover just to the right of the road, now designated as the company boundary, and echeloned to the right after the edge of the town had been gained.

I Company was initially in reserve, with the 1^st platoon providing protection for the forward CP. At 0900 a tank broke through and, though hit by 37mm fire, overran one gun and was finally knocked out by Captain Fair, the L Company Commander, with a bazooka. The rest of the company provided flank and rear protection to the Battalion. With the reserve thus committed, it was necessary to bring up L Company to keep the bulldozer road open for supply and evacuation.

The 1^st Battalion had not been able to jump off quite as early as had been panned. At 1055, the Nips launched a counterattack, spearheaded by three tanks. Two were knocked out and the third was repulsed. The attack jumped off at 1130, with A and C Companies abreast. B Company had relieved the Regimental I and R platoon in securing the left flank of the Battalion.

By noon, C Company was in the open field southwest of the barrio. A Company along the road, had made slower progress, and was at the northern edge of town. From then on they were able to make little progress. Jap tanks and machine guns interlocked fire all around the barrio. From 1700 to 1730, C Company knocked out three tanks by bazooka fire, two of which were loaded with troops. It was believed that these tanks were not counterattacking, but trying to escape from the town. By 1730, all of their bazooka ammunition was exhausted, so C Company withdrew to a position in line with Company A.

Obviously, the Japs were not going to be tricked and weaken their defense at the north of the town. The next step, then, was to hit them harder still in the south. To do this, the 2^nd Battalion, with E Company leading, moved around the bulldozed road. They were in position to attack on the right of the 3^rd Battalion at 1000 on the 6^th.

At 0645 on the 5^th, the 3^rd Battalion had jumped off, following a five minute artillery barrage. I Company advanced about 200 yards before being pinned down by fire from camouflaged tanks. One was knocked out by a supporting Sherman, another by our own M-7. The first and second platoons of K Company attacked abreast, while the support platoon guarded the M-7’s. This platoon was later used to maintain contact between K and I Companies. L Company, on the left, never did reach their line of departure. They ran into at least six dug-in tanks, together with supporting machine guns and riflemen. Astride the Munoz road, they finally reached the schoolhouse. They lost their company commander, but killed at least forty Japs.

Now the 2^nd Battalion went into action. E Company held its position on the right flank of the 3^rd Battalion. G Company passed through K Company and assumed their positions. The Munoz road formed the boundary between battalions. By dark, the two battalions held the southern half of the town. Half of the open space in the center of town also was occupied.

The 1^st Battalion employed the morning of the 5^th to reorganize. An afternoon attack showed that the Japs had not weakened their defense of the barrio to the north of Lupao in the least. For the rest of the battle, this drive of the 1^st Battalion became a holding attack.

On the 6^th, both the 2^nd and 3^rd battalions jumped off at 0730. By 0900, E Company had knocked out a tank and captured two Jap fuel trucks intact. With G Company, they pushed their lines halfway to the north edge of town. In the 3rd Battalion sector, I and L Companies, abreast, drove north of the schoolhouse. Bazookas and anti-tank guns accounted for four tanks, an M-7 bagged another.

By 1000, both Battalions had reached the last road before the north edge of town. There were still strong Jap positions in the woods fringing the town on the north, so the battalions pulled back to allow artillery to be employed. Following this, the work of ferreting out the surviving tanks was resumed. One tank, in a bamboo thicket, put up a hard fight for an hour before it burned under fire from our M-7’s and supporting Shermans.

The two battalions dug in for the night. The hours of darkness were relatively quiet, though tanks could occasionally be heard moving about. 4.2 mortars were used for harassing fire on the Japs.

The morning of the 7^th was devoted to patrolling. Efforts were made to fix the positions of all the tanks, and to discover routes of approach to them. Three Sherman M-4 tanks and two M-7 self-propelled howitzers were attached to each battalion. Only two Jap tanks had been knocked out by noon, while one of our M-7’s had been knocked out of action. This M-7 was saved from destruction by the action of the only crew member not wounded, who although ordered to abandon the gun, continued to back it out of the line of fire.

F Company relieved M, and moved forward in a coordinated drive with the Shermans, which knocked out two Jap tanks and damaged a third. On the other side of the road, one assault platoon and the support platoon of L Company were pinned down by intense machine gun crossfire, in addition to the ever-present direct fire from dug-in tanks. Two tanks were knocked out, but the Battalion lines remained echeloned to the left rear at a 45 degree angle.

By evening, the 3^rd Battalion had knocked out one tank, and the 2^nd Battalion two more. The lines were approximately those of the furthest advance of the previous day. The intensity of the day’s action can be gathered from the fact that five platoon leaders became casualties.

The night of February 7-8 saw the death throes of the Japanese garrison. At 0100, A Company knocked out one tank with seven hits from a bazooka and damaged another. At the same time, eight tanks broke through C Company’s road block. Three were knocked out; the others ran into the foothills. During the night, they tried to shell our positions in Lupao, but apparently were unable to depress the muzzles sufficiently. The shells sailed harmlessly over the town. The tanks were cut off from any possible escape, and on the 8^th the tanks were found abandoned by their crews.

At 0450 on the 8^th, another tank attempted to run through the G Company lines, but was shattered by combined 37mm and bazooka fire. Heavy mortar fire could not be employed as it had been on the other nights because of the tightening circle of our lines.

At 1000, the assault battalions attacked after careful reconnaissance, but the back of Japanese resistance was broken. One tank and five more vehicles were captured. At 1015, a man from G Company crossed the open ground to his front and reached B Company drawing only sniper fire.

Finally, at 1130, the Regimental Commander declared the town secure. A week long battle had cost the 35^th Infantry ninety six killed and two hundred sixty eight wounded. The Japanese lost thirty three tanks and had nine hundred twenty one men killed, and two captured. And they had been driven from a deliberately fortified position, a position of their own choosing, one nigh perfect for defense. They had been crushed, armor and all, by the Infantry man and his attached weapons. This battle, with its fellows at San Manuel, Munoz, and San Jose, wrote "finis" to the history of the Japanese 2d Armored Division.

As a fitting climax, an American flag, which had been secreted in the Municipal Building of Lupao during the Japanese occupation, was hoisted, exactly at noon, over the battered town square.

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