LUZON

THE DRIVE TO CARRANGLAN

Back to History Index

Even while mopping up of Lupao continued on 8 February, Company A, reinforced, began patrolling into the Caraballo Mountains to the north. On the 9^th, the first battalion setup a bivouac near the foothills of north of Lupao, and all companies sent out patrols with the double mission of destroying Jap stragglers, and finding a practicable route over the mountains to Puncan. The Regimental I and R Platoon also patrolled into the mountains. Results were negative; it was found that no road could be driven through in the short time available and that the terrain was so difficult as to make it impracticable to send foot troops over this area of the mountains. They would have to stripped so drastically of heavy equipment and carry so little food and ammunition that they could not fight effectively when they reached their objective.

The eventual objective of the projected mountain campaign was Balete Pass, and the rich Cagayan Valley. To reach this objective, it was essential that Highway #5, the Jap escape route from the Manila area and the only effective supply and evacuation route into the mountains, be controlled by our forces. Drives over other routes might be made, but without Highway #5, they would have no considerable effect.

This mountain campaign would be, we knew, immeasurably more difficult then the headlong drive across terrain which were being made in other parts of Luzon. There might be occasional spurts over lightly defended territory, but generally our daily gains would be measured in yards; every hill, every draw, would be defended desperately from positions three years in preparing, and well stocked with ammunition and food.

The Regiment’s initial objective in the new campaign was to seize Puncan, a village on Highway #5 deep in the hills, from the flank, while other units of the Division drove up the highway itself. But our fist move after finding that a short route over the mountains was impracticable was away from our objective. On 12 February, the regiment left its bivouacs in the vicinity of Lupao and moved to Rizal, in Nueva Ecija Province, some 25 miles to the southeast. From there, the plan was to advance northeast up the Pampanga River Valley, which contained a road, in terrific disrepair but usable, to Patabangan and thence northeast to Carranglan. From Carranglan, as a base, Puncan and other points on Highway #5 could be attacked, and also an attempt made to flank Balete Pass up the old Spanish Trail, which cut toward Highway #5 on the other side of the mountains.

All battalions, meanwhile, patrolled extensively in the areas of our future operations. The 3^rd battalion established a base camp in the foothills and began to work patrols from there. The Regimental I and R Platoon set up a camp at Cabu, deep in the mountains. From the 12^th to the 18^th, the patrol work consisted mostly of reconnoitering the terrain leading up to and surrounding our objective, and gathering data on the difficulties of supply, so that plans could be made to surmount them. But on the 18^th a motorized patrol consisting of four men were sent to investigate a civilian report of a group of Japs about one-half of the way up the Rizal-Patabangan road. The patrol debarked from their vehicle prior to reaching the crest of the hill. As they reached the top of the hill they saw one Jap coming up the other side of the hill. The Jap turned and ran. Our patrol following to a point where they observed a Jap bivouac at the foot of the hill containing about 200 Japs. The patrol engaged in a short fire-fight and withdrew for reinforcements. Two of our men were wounded and five of the enemy were killed. G Company was immediately sent out to establish road blocks to close any route of withdrawal. At 1030, F Company contacted forward elements of the Japs. Our troops deployed to attack after mortar and artillery registration. The Japs retreated to a wooded hill. F Company proceeded to flank the pocket, E and G Company patrols swung wide around the flanks, also providing blocks to the north. But by abandoning most of their equipment, the Japs managed to sneak through the jaws of the trap before they could close.

At 1400, F Company patrol located a hastily vacated bivouac area, and found many packs and a great quantity of rice there. Two Japs were killed in the deserted area, and nine pack horses, one carabao, and two monkeys were captured. On the same day, a three day patrol from 1^st Battalion to Patabangan returned, reported that the town was free of enemy. Natives in the area maintained that there were "thousands of Japs" in the San Juan Naponpon-Norikit area, which agreed with consistent guerilla reports. The 1^st and 2^nd Battalions spent the 22^nd moving into assembly areas and preparing to pump off for the drive to Patabangan. The 3^rd Battalion remained at Rizal in regimental reserve.

The 1^st Battalion route of advance was up the Pampangan River Valley. Since the speed of the 2^nd Battalion, advancing up the Rizal-Patabangan Road, was unpredictable due to numerous road blocks, it was necessary to carry a full load of food and ammunitions. About thirty pack horses were procured for the march. B Company jumped off at 0615, an hour ahead of the rest of the battalion, as a screening force. As had been expected, the route proved almost unbelievable difficult. What there was of the trail crossed the river nineteen times between Rizal and Patabangan. Often it died out completely, and the battalion had to wade up the river, waist deep in the water, struggling and floundering over the boulders of the river bottom, until the trail could be located again. The pack horses proved almost a liability. They had to be pushed and dragged and half carried much of the way.

Despite the difficulties of the march, however, B Company advanced into Patabangan at 1700, and by the time the 2^nd battalion arrived, had set up blocks on all approaches to town. The remainder of the battalion bivouacked for the night 4 miles short of the town.

The 2^nd Battalion jumped off at 0715, with E Company on the left and F Company on the right of the Rizal-Patabangan road. G Company, in reserve, followed the lead companies closely on the road. On this drive we encountered for the first time a new type of improvised land mine, consisting of a 105mm shell, with picric acid block as a booster, and a light brown silken cord stretched across the road as a trip cord. One was exploded; the engineers found ten more between Rizal Patabangan. Both E and F Companies received harassing fire from the high hills on both sides of the road. Reserve squads were sent out to neutralize those elements, while the column pushed on. On the evening of the 23^rd, the battalion entered Patabangan. During the night Company F repulsed a small infiltration group.

The next day, while the 1^st Battalion moved into Patabangan, the 2d Battalion continued onward and Conversion was occupied. Here two 150mm mortars were captured intact; first of those weapons encountered by the regiment, though not the last. On the 25^th, the 2d Battalion moved on through Mankitkit to General Luna, which was also occupied without opposition. The 3d Battalion moved by motor from Rizal to Conversion, where they detrucked and marched to Mankitkit. The 1^st Battalion remained based at Patabangan patrolling extensively in all directions.

At 1800 on the 25^th, the Rizal-Patanbangan road was cut by what was thought to be about a platoon of Japs. The Regimental I and R Platoon was sent to clear the road but, unable to do so, remained at the block during the night, to protect a tractor which had been immobilized by Jap mines dropped from the bank above. At 0900 26 February, the I and R Platoon secured the area around the bulldozer, engaging in a sharp firefight with the Jap force, which proved to be a reinforced company. Company C was sent back to clear the block. B Company was sent to General Luna to protect supply routes to the 2d and 3d Battalions.

While the 3d Battalion occupied Mankitkit, the 2d Battalion pushed on to a point just east of Carranglan, which was to be our base of operations for the attacks on Puncan and Digdig, on Highway #5. During the initial stages of establishing the perimeter the enemy attacked. Having been repulsed in their initial attempt, the Japs, supported by knee mortars, machine guns, and rifle grenades, harassed all points of the perimeter throughout the night. We lost one killed and five wounded, but killed forty of the enemy and captured two machine guns. By 1230 on the 26^th, the 2d Battalion had occupied Carranglan. At 2300 a small group of Japs attacked the perimeter, but were repulsed. On 27 February, the 3d battalion of the 27^th Infantry was attached to the Regiment and advanced up the Rizal-Patabangan road, with Company K in the lead, to help Company C of the 35^th in securing the road. The job took until 1600 of the 27^th. Company C then rejoined the 1^st Battalion while the 3d Battalion of the 27^th assumed security of the road from Rizal to Carranglan. For safety’s sake, we had already called for and received an air drop of rations on the 64^th Field Artillery airstrip near Carranglan. The drop was highly successful; there was better then 90% recovery. The 3d Battalion of the 35^th pushed on to Carranglan on 28 February, setting up a perimeter on the west side of own. The next day Company K moved westward to Maringlu. The following morning, during a hard rain, about twenty Japs infiltrated through the company perimeter and inflicted several casualties. It had been planned that Company L would set up in the vicinity of Company K, but instead they proceeded further westward, about one mile beyond Company K. Company I in the meantime was still in perimeter in Carranglan. Company I of the 27^th Infantry, attached to the 3d Battalion, patrolled to the north and maintained a road block on the road from Conversion.

Back to History Index    The Second Battalion at Puncan