August 1950 – Part 2

From Komam-ni a 2-mile-wide belt of rice paddy land extended north four miles to the Nam River. On the west of this paddy land a broken spur of P'ilbong, dominated by 900-foot-high Sibidang-san, dropped down to the Nam. Sibidang provided excellent observation, and artillery emplaced in the Komam-ni area could interdict the road junction at Chungam-ni. Colonel Fisher, therefore, selected the Sibidang-Komam-ni position for his 35th Infantry Regiment in the northern part of the 25th Division defense line. The 35th Regiment line extended from a point two miles west of Komam-ni to the Nam River and then turned east along that stream to its confluence with the Naktong. It was a long regimental line-about 26,000 yards.

The part of the line held by the 35th Infantry-covering as it did the main Masan-Chinju highway, the railroad, and the Nam River corridor, and forming the hinge with the 24th Division to the north-was potentially the most critical and important sector of the 25th Division front. Lt. Col. Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion held the regimental left west of Komam-ni; Colonel Wilkins' 2d Battalion held the regimental right along the Nam River. Maj. Robert L. Woolfolk's 3d Battalion (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry) was in reserve on the road south of Chirwon from where it could move quickly to any part of the line.

South of the 35th Infantry, Colonel Champney's 24th Infantry, known among the men in the regiment as the "Deuce-Four," took up the middle part of the division front in the mountain area west of Haman.

Below (south of) the 24th Infantry and west of Chindong-ni, Colonel Throckmorton's 5th Regimental Combat Team was on the division left. On division orders, Throckmorton at first held the ground above the Chindong-ni coastal road only as far as Fox Hill, or Yaban-san. General Kean soon decided, however, that the 5th Regimental Combat Team should close the gap northward between it and the 24th Infantry. When Throckmorton sent a ROK unit of 100 men under American officers to the higher slope of Sobuk-san, enemy troops already there drove them back. General Kean then ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team to take this ground, but it was too late.

It soon became apparent that the enemy 6th Division had shifted its axis of attack and that its main effort now would be in the northern part of the Chinju-Masan corridor just below the Nam River. General Kean had placed his strongest regiment, the 35th Infantry, in this area. Competent observers considered its commanding officer, Colonel Fisher, one of the ablest regimental commanders in Korea. Calm, somewhat retiring, ruddy faced, and possessed of a strong, compact body, this officer was a fine example of the professional soldier. He possessed an exact knowledge of the capabilities of the weapons used in an infantry regiment and was skilled in their use. He was a technician in the tactical employment of troops. Of quiet temperament, he did not court publicity. One of his fellow regimental commanders called him "the mainstay of the division."

The 35th Infantry set to work to cover its front with trip flares, but they were in short supply and gradually it became impossible to replace those tripped by the enemy. As important to the front line companies as the flares were the 60-mm mortar illuminating shells. This ammunition had deteriorated to such a degree, however, that only about 20 percent of the supply issued to the regiment was effective. The 155-mm howitzer illuminating shells were in short supply. Even when employed, the time lapse between a request for them and delivery by the big howitzers allowed some enemy infiltration before the threatened area was illuminated.

Lt. Col. Arthur H. Logan's 64th Field Artillery Battalion, with C Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, and Captain Harvey's A Company, 88th Medium Tank Battalion, supported Colonel Fisher's regiment. Three medium M4A3 tanks, from positions at Komam-ni, acted as artillery and placed interdiction fire on Chungam-ni. Six other medium M26 tanks in a similar manner placed interdiction fire on Uiryong across the Nam River.

The FIRE test came to the Regiment in August when the "Cacti" held the key to the vital Chungam-ni-Masan route. The enemy, who had confidently moved quantities of weapons and ammunitions into the break, were forced to abandon it and flee, leaving many dead and wounded on the field of battle.

The Communists, still believing the "Cacti" could be smashed, commenced their attack at 0430 on the morning of the 18th. Enemy shells fell for two hours. US troops had to contend with continuous sniper fire from the rear, as well as from Reds who had infiltrated behind the lines during the night.

The enemy attack came at approximately 0630. At that time, an estimated battalion struck Company "A", and forced the unit to give ground. Company "C" was ushered in and ejected the foe, restoring all positions. As the fighting continued, two additional companies of South Koreans were sent in to bolster the right flank

In the pre-dawn hours of 18 August an enemy attack got under way against the 35th Infantry. North Korean artillery fire began falling on the 1st Battalion command post in Komam-ni at 0300, and an hour later enemy infantry attacked A Company, forcing two of its platoons from their positions, and overrunning a mortar position.

After daylight, a counterattack by B Company regained the lost ground. This was the beginning of a 5-day battle by Colonel Teeter's 1st Battalion along the southern spurs of Sibidang, two miles west of Komam-ni. The North Koreans endeavored there to turn the left flank of the 35th Regiment and split the 25th Division line.

On the morning of 19 August, A Company again lost its position to enemy attack and again regained it by counterattack. Two companies of South Korean police arrived to reinforce the battalion right flank. Against the continuing North Korean attack, artillery supporting the 1st Battalion fired an average of 200 rounds an hour during the night of 19-20 August.

After three days and nights of this battle, C Company of the 35th Infantry and A Company of the 29th Infantry moved up astride the Komam-ni road during the morning of 21 August to bolster A and B Companies on Sibidang. While this reinforcement was in progress, Colonel Fisher from a forward observation post saw a large enemy concentration advancing to renew the attack. He directed artillery fire on this force and called in an air strike. Observers estimated that the artillery fire and the air strike killed about 350 enemy troops, half the attack group.

The North Koreans made still another try in the same place. In the pre-dawn hours of 22 August, enemy infantry started a very heavy attack against the 1st Battalion. Employing no artillery or mortar preparatory fires, the enemy force in the darkness cut the four-strand barbed wire and attacked at close quarters with small arms and grenades. This assault engaged three American companies and drove one of them from its position. After three hours of fighting A Company counterattacked at 0700 and regained its lost position.

The next day, 23 August, the North Koreans, frustrated in this area, withdrew from contact in the 35th Infantry sector. Having discovered that moving to Masan through the 35th was no easy task, the Reds made no attack on the unit during the next few days. But the bitter fighting was not over.

At the end of August the North Korean People’s Army also planned a crushing blow against the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. The enemy’s 6th Division would attack through Haman, Masan, and capture Kumhae, fifteen miles west of Pusan. Aerial observation revealed a continual flow of hostile reinforcements and a build-up to the front. Prisoners of war told of a forthcoming attack to capture Pusan, the United Nations’ vital supply base.

Just before midnight, on 31 August, an intense artillery barrage was received almost simultaneously along the entire Division front. A major, determined assault was launched against the 25th Division line. The vicious enemy fought without standards of human decency. This force consisted of the 6th and 7th North Korean Divisions, the 83rd Mechanized Regiment, elements of the 4th North Korean Division, elements of 105th Armored Division, and their supporting units.