January 1951

The defenses along the Imjin River were abandoned because the units on the right flank had crumbled. The Chinese made a strong attack on 1 January 1951, against the 1st ROK Division on the right, and its line was penetrated as a large column hit on an extremely narrow front. Additional columns of hostile soldiers poured through the gap for exploitation of the breakthrough

Initially, Eighth Army pulled back thirty miles to a defensive line along the Han River to protect Seoul. By 2 January both I and IX Corps had successfully concluded the new withdrawal and, with extensive firepower at their command, their chances of holding the city were good. However, there was a distinct danger that the two corps could be outflanked to the east and forced to defend Seoul with their backs to the sea. Ridgway, unwilling to risk the loss or isolation of so much of his combat power, reluctantly ordered the retreat of both corps to "Line C," just south of the Han. For the third time in the war so far, Seoul was to change hands.

Followed by hordes of refugees hauling their loved ones or a few personal treasures on their backs or on oxcarts, I and IX Corps began withdrawing from Seoul on 3 January. On the whole, the allies accomplished the evacuation of Seoul with minimal casualties.

The withdrawal to Line C was complete. However, even as units were moving into position on this defensive line, plans were being executed to withdraw some thirty-five miles farther south to Line D, running from P’yongt’aek in the west, northwestward through Wonju to Wonpo-ri.

Ridgway assessed the situation and, after the withdrawal from Seoul was completed, ordered the entire Eighth Army to withdraw again to Line D, which was somewhat redrawn to run straight east from Wonju to Samch’ok instead of northeastward to Wonpo-ri. Beginning on 5 January all five corps of Eighth Army pulled back to this line. Despite its losses, the Eighth Army situation was thus much improved from the last days of November, with better coordination between units and fewer open flanks.

Successive phase lines were occupied to delay the Red’s onslaught as defensive positions were being prepared south of Osan. This line was held, and the Chinese were halted.

A limited objective offensive, launched on 15 January, encountered stiff resistance. Air, armor, and artillery coordinated their fires to kill many thousands of the Communists in their hillside entrenchments. The hard-hitting armored spearheads led the advance to successive objectives as bayonet-wielding infantrymen combed the hills in sub-freezing temperatures, dislodging the enemy from his positions, and forcing him to take refuge on the north side of the Han River.

At daylight on 15 January, the 25th Division sent a strong armored force to the vicinity of Suwon to disrupt enemy concentrations, and to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy. The resistance was neutralized in the vicinity of Osan; the column advanced, bypassing blown bridges and hazards, and entered the outskirts of Suwon, where well fortified entrenchments were encountered.

On the 15th of January the 35th Regiment of 25th U.S. Division passed through 29th Brigade and drove northwards to contact and harass the enemy, and to ascertain his strength and intentions. This force remained out, operating forward of the 29th Brigade (English) for several days.

On 20 January 1951, General Ridgway, Eighth Army commander, issued a directive designed to convert his current reconnaissance operations into a deliberate counterattack. Since the enemy situation was still unclear, the action, code-named Operation Thunderbolt, was designed to discover enemy dispositions and intentions with a show of force. The operation had the additional objective of dislodging any enemy forces south of the Han River, the major estuary running southeast from the Yellow Sea through Seoul and beyond. The projected attacks did not represent a full-scale offensive. Phase lines-lines drawn on maps with specific reporting and crossing instructions-would be used to control tightly the advance of the I and IX Corps. The units were to avoid becoming heavily engaged. To accomplish this, each corps would commit only a single U.S. division and ROK regiment. This use of terrain-based phase lines and of limited advances with large forces in reserve was to become the standard procedure for UN offensive operations for the rest of the war.

The 35th RCT was given the mission of taking the town of Suwon. During this time, the Reds were far from idle, and US soldiers on the line rarely passed a night without being awakened to repel a counter-attack or enemy raid. One such raid occurred on a company of the "Cacti" attached to Task Force Eyewitness.

"I couldn’t sleep," recalled Sergeant Robert Gonzales, a mortar section chief from San Francisco. "While the guard was changing, I heard a lot of small arms and mortar fire just ahead of our position.

The man in the forward observation post was shouting into the phone that the Chinese were attacking. The company position was being overrun by screaming Reds. Then mortar fire was called for and Sergeant Gonzales and his men went into action. But before the mortars started firing, the section was hit on the right flank by Chinese riflemen. Corporal Donald L. Meissner, of Kansas City, Kansas, immediately placed his light machine gun in plain view of the Reds and opened fire.

Corporal Daniel Montage of New Mexico put another machine gun into action just behind Meissner and the Reds were caught in withering cross-fire. ‘Boy, were we mowin’ ‘em down," declared Meissner. "They kept coming toward the bush where I was and Montage kept knocking ‘em down." The Red attempt to destroy the mortar section had failed.

On the twenty-sixth, Suwon, north of Osan, with its large airfield complex, was recaptured. Close air support sorties supported the advance, damaging enemy lines of communications and pounding points of resistance. As part of the I Corps attack, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division advanced against stiff enemy resistance in high ground south of Seoul.

Contact was maintained with the enemy while the United Nations reinforced their troops and strengthened their defensive positions. Reconnaissance in force was employed to inflict destruction on the Chinese Reds.

The first, or western, phase of Operation Thunderbolt lasted from 25 to 31 January. As January neared its end, Chinese resistance began gradually to increase, indicating that the main enemy line had almost been reached. By the end of January a new defensive line had been established from the Han River, running just south of Wonju to Samch’ok on the eastern coast.