April 1951

As March 1951 drew to a close Eighth Army units were nearing the 38th Parallel. However, with indications that the Chinese and North Koreans were massing forces for a spring offensive, Ridgway decided to move even farther north to secure more defensible positions.

The new advance was divided into two sub-operations code-named RUGGED and DAUNTLESS. The first, Operation RUGGED, was designed to secure a new line, Kansas, just north of the 38th Parallel. The 35^th Infantry would continue her assault against determined enemy opposition from positions approximately 18 miles north of Seoul.

The Enemy Situation

Whether the expected enemy offensive would occur before all RUGGED and DAUNTLESS objectives could be taken was difficult for the Eighth Army intelligence staff to estimate. Some evidence came from recently taken prisoners who gave dates between 1 and 15 April for the start of the next Chinese offensive.

The Advance to Line Kansas

To maintain, and in some areas regain, contact with enemy forces, Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward line Kansas as it completed preparations. The RUGGED advance, as a result, staggered to a full start between 2 and 5 April.

In organizing the RUGGED operation, General Ridgway had widened the I Corps zone eastward to pass control of the 24th Division, which had been operating on the IX Corps left, to General Milburn’s I Corp. While Milburn's forces along the Imjin stood fast, the 25th and 24th Divisions in the eastern half of the I Corps zone attacked north on either side of Route 3 on the morning of 3 April. West of Route 3, the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry of the 25th Division advanced toward high ground rising between a lateral stretch of the Yongp'yong River and the Hant'an River farther north.

Pushing scattered 26th Army forces out of position by fire and occasionally by assault, and turning back a few light counterattacks, the 25th Division took the heights overlooking the Hant'an River on 5 April.

During Operation RUGGED turbulence at the higher American command levels led to significant leadership changes in the Far East Command and the Eighth Army. On 10 April, as the result of a disagreement over strategy, President Truman relieved General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, U.S. Far East Command, replacing him with General Ridgway. Four days later, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, in turn, replaced Ridgway as Eighth Army commander. This action created a political firestorm in the United States, but its impact on battlefield operations, other than the change at the highest levels of command, was minimal.

Operation DAUNTLESS

The second, Operation DAUNTLESS, would see the UN forces continue twenty miles farther to the north. Ridgway intended DAUNTLESS to threaten the enemy logistical hub located in a region nicknamed the Iron Triangle, northwest of Kumhwa, a crossroads town twenty miles north of Line Kansas. With the objective only of menacing the triangle, not of investing it, the two corps were to attack in succession to Line Utah and then to Line Wyoming. Wyoming would then be transformed into a heavily defended outpost line. When the Communists opened their next offensive, the forces along Wyoming were to conduct a fighting withdrawal south to Line Kansas, while causing the maximum amount of casualties and disruption to the enemy. The main defensive battle would then be fought along Kansas.

General Ridgway set an opening date for the DAUNTLESS advance late on 9 April after all but the X and ROK III Corps had reached line Kansas. The I and IX Corps forces were to start toward the Iron Triangle on the 11th. Line Utah, the initial objective line, arched eleven miles above Line Kansas. The opening phase would be primarily a I Corps operation involving attacks by the 3d, 25th, and 24th Divisions.

On the west flank of the DAUNTLESS attack, at approximately I Corps center, the 3d Division reached line Utah on 14 April. In the right half of the corps zone, delaying forces of the 26th and 40th Armies had been more reluctant to give way before the 25th and 24th Divisions advancing toward Ch'orwon and Kumhwa. The 25th Division spent four days crossing the Hant'an River and getting a foothold in the Pogae-San heights, a series of steep north-south ridges between Routes 33 and 3, and needed two days more to cover half the ten-mile distance between the Kansas and Utah lines. East of Route 3, the 24th Division attacking through the Kwangdok-san ridges shouldering the Yongp'yong River gained scarcely a mile in three days.

But by 17 April resistance weakened in both division zones. On the following day, in the 25th Division zone, a battalion of the 35th Infantry, two companies of the 89th Tank Battalion, and an artillery battery moved through the upper Hant'an River valley within five miles of Ch'orwon before receiving fire. Impeded by rugged ground, heavy rains, and somewhat stiffer resistance beginning on 19 April, the two divisions were on line Utah on the 20th except at the left of the 25th Division, where enemy delaying forces held up the attached Turkish brigade along Route 33.

The I Corps' final DAUNTLESS objectives lay in the zones of the 25th and 24th Divisions stretching north of line Utah to Ch'orwon and Kumhwa at the base of the Iron Triangle. Immediately west, the 24th Division did not test the opposition below Kumhwa but deliberately stood fast in the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the neighboring ROK 6th Division to come abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th Division attacked toward Ch'orwon but made no substantial progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the Utah line, especially in the zone of the Turkish brigade along Route 33.

Neither corps developed evidence of enemy offensive preparations during the day. Below the Iron Triangle, the resistance that began to stiffen on 19 April had been expected to grow progressively heavier as I Corps forces moved above the Utah line. On the Imjin front, daylight patrols working above the river again found only a scattering of Chinese. General Milburn concluded in an evening wrap-up report to General Van Fleet that the "enemy attitude remains defensive."

Perhaps the most dramatic- certainly the most visible- evidence of enemy activity to appear as Eighth Army forces closed on the Kansas and Utah lines were billows of smoke rising at numerous points ahead of them. By mid-April, belts of smoke up to ten miles deep lay before much of the I, IX, and X Corps fronts. Air observers confirmed that enemy troops, some in groups of fifty to five hundred, were setting fire to grasslands and brush. Some observers reported that smoke generators also were being used. Fires doused by rain showers were rekindled. Maritime air that frequently stagnated over the battlefront, added sea haze and moisture to the smoke and produced smog. On a number of days-varying from sector to sector rain, haze, fog, smog, and particularly smoke hampered ground and air observation, the delivery of air strikes, and the adjustment of artillery fire.

Though the smoke was intended to shield daylight troop movements, there was not much evidence that enemy forces were moving toward the front. Two captives taken by the 24th and 25th Divisions were from different regiments of the 81st Division, which belonged to the 27th Army of the IX Army Group. One of the latter told his captors that his unit would be committed to offensive operations after the 27th Army finished relieving the 26th. By 20 April these prisoners and the sprinkling of Chinese discovered above the Imjin were the only indications that fresh forces might have moved forward under the smoke.

More evidence appeared on the 22d as the I and IX Corps continued their DAUNTLESS advance toward line Wyoming. The progress of the attack resembled that on the previous day, IX Corps forces making easy moves of two to three miles, the two I Corps divisions being limited to shorter gains by heavier resistance. In the 25th Division zone on the west flank of the advance, six Chinese who blundered into the hands of the Turkish brigade along Route 33 during the afternoon were members of a survey party from the 2d Motorized Artillery Division. The division's guns, according to the officer in charge, were being positioned to support an attack scheduled to start after dark.

Chinese Spring Offensive

Aerial reconnaissance after daybreak on the 22d reported a general forward displacment of enemy formations from rear assemblies northwest of the I Corps and north of both the I and IX Corps, also extensive troop movements, both north and south, on the roads above Yanggu and Inje east of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Though air strikes punished the moving troops, air observers reported the southward march of enemy groups with increasing frequency during the day. On the basis of the sightings west of the Hwach'on Reservoir, it appeared that the enemy forces approaching the I Corps would mass evenly across the corps front while those moving toward the IX Corps would concentrate on the front of the ROK 6th Division.

Civilians entering I Corps lines from the northwest confirmed the enemy approach from that direction, and through the day British 29th Brigade forces along the Imjin observed enemy patrols investigating the north bank of the river for crossing sites. The 3d Division meanwhile found evidence that the III Army Group was included in the forward displacement when a patrol operating north along Route 33 above the division's right flank picked up a member of the 34th Division, which belonged to the group's 12th Army.

At 1700, 25th Division air observers reported a long column of trucks, some towing artillery pieces, moving down Route 33 toward the Turks. Aircraft and artillery attacked the trucks until they dispersed off the road into wooded areas. By 1800 enemy foot troops were seen on Route 33 marching south in close column and just before dark were observed occupying foxholes along the sides of the road. Ten batteries of artillery kept the road and the suspected enemy artillery positions under fire.

In the Pogae-san ridges below Ch'orwon, the 2d Motorized Artillery Division prepared the way for infantry attacks on the 25th Division with a three-hour bombardment, dropping most of its fire on the Turkish brigade along Route 33. On the east wing of the III Army Group, the 179th Division, 60th Army, attacked behind the fire about midnight, its bulk hitting the Turks, some forces spilling over against the 24th Infantry at division center. The latter bent back the left of the 24th's line while the forces attacking the Turkish position penetrated at several points and so intermingled themselves that artillery units supporting the brigade were forced to stop firing lest they hit Turks as well as Chinese. Further fragmented by persistent attacks through the night, the Turkish position by morning consisted mainly of surrounded or partially surrounded company perimeters, and Chinese penetrating between the Turks and the curled-back left flank of the 24th Infantry moved almost two miles behind the division's front. Ahead of the 27th Infantry on the division's right, enemy forces (apparently the westernmost forces of the 27th Army) massed and began their approach at first light, but heavy defensive fire shattered the formation within half an hour, and the Chinese attempted no further attack on the regiment.

Near dawn General Bradley ordered the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments to withdraw two miles and instructed the Turkish brigade to leave the line and reorganize south of the Hant'an River. The 35th Infantry came out of reserve to take over the Turkish sector. The Turks fought their way off the front during the morning and, except for one company that had been virtually wiped out, assembled below the Hant'an in better condition than Bradley had expected. The Chinese followed neither the Turks nor the two regiments, and the division sector quieted as Bradley developed his new line

Along the eastern portion of the I Corps line, the 25th Division, whose front had quieted after daylight on the 23d, was on line Kansas by midafternoon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments reoccupied the division's former positions on the ridges between the Hant'an and Yongp'yong rivers while the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade assembled immediately behind the Yongp'yong.

Though unable to operate at top capacity, the Fifth Air Force alone flew some three hundred forty close support sorties on the 23d, a number that almost equaled the highest flown during a single day so far in the war, and the 1st Marine Air Wing flew over a hundred fifty missions. The bulk of the air strikes supported the I Corps as General Milburn pulled the 24th and 25th Divisions and the rightmost forces of the 3d Division back to line Kansas. He judged that the Fifth Air Force and Marine attacks, in combination with artillery fire, had been instrumental in preventing Chinese forces from following his withdrawal closely.

Chinese following the withdrawal of the 24th and 25th Divisions finally reestablished contact with small, groping attacks near midnight on the 23rd. The midnight exploratory probes in the eastern half of the corps sector developed into stout but not overpowering daytime assaults by three divisions against the 24th Infantry on the right of the 25th Division and on the entire front of the 24th Division. The 179th Division seized Hill 664, the highest ground in the 24th Infantry sector, but failed in daylong attacks to dislodge the regiment and two reinforcing battalions of the 27th Infantry from a new line established in the foothills of the high feature.

Well before daylight on the 25th General Milburn became convinced that the I Corps would have to give up the Kansas line. As suspected, the North Korean I Corps was joining the offensive, although its initial move ended abruptly when its 8th Division attempted to cross the Imjin over the railroad bridge near Munsan-ni and was blown back with high losses from artillery fire and air attacks.

25^th of month

In the eastern half of the corps sector, the remainder of the Chinese 29th Division, the 179th Division, and the 81st Division opened and steadily intensified attacks on the 25th Division between dusk and midnight. Simultaneous with frontal assaults on the 35th Infantry at the left, forces of the 29th Division apparently coming out of the adjacent sector of the 7th Infantry to the west drew close enough to place fire on the regimental command post and supporting artillery units. On the right, Chinese penetrated and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry. Unable to restore the position, General Bradley pulled the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry onto a new line about a mile to the south but gained no respite as the Chinese followed closely.

withdrawal to line Delta

Because of this danger on his exposed right flank, the continuing and effective heavy pressure on the 25th Division, and the threat of a major enemy penetration through the wide gap between the ROK 1st Division and 3d Division, General Milburn at 0500 on the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line Delta, which, as set out in previously prepared corps plans, lay four to twelve miles, west to east, below line Kansas. He instructed the 24th and 25th Divisions to begin their withdrawals at 0800.

With the Yongp'yong River at its back, the 25th Division faced a canalized withdrawal over two bridges in the southeastern corner of its sector, one on Route 3, the other at Yongp'yong town two miles to the west. Earlier, after the Chinese had captured Hill 664 three miles directly north of the Route 3 crossing, General Bradley had set the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge. For the withdrawal he ordered all of the 27th Infantry to cover both river crossings while first the 24th Infantry and then the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th using the Route 3 bridge, the 35th using the crossing at Yongp'yong town. To cover the withdrawing 27th Infantry, Bradley deployed his attached Turkish brigade astride Route 3 five miles below the Yongp'yong River. Despite the difficulty of withdrawing while heavily engaged, Bradley's forces succeeded in breaking contact with small losses. By early evening the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry were deployed on line Delta, left to right, with the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry assembled close behind the line.

Chpt 24

General Milburn intended to make no stubborn or prolonged defense of line Delta. He considered it only a phase line to be occupied briefly in the I Corps' withdrawal to line Golden. Milburn ordered the next withdrawal at midmorning on the 26th after attacks opened during the night by the North Korean I Corps and XIX Army Group made inroads along the western portion of his Delta front. (See Map 32.)

Enemy forces reaching the I Corps phase line after dark on the 26th attacked in each division sector except that of the 24th on the corps right. On the front of the 25th Division, Chinese concentrated an assault between two companies of the 27th Infantry, some reaching as far as a mile behind the line before regimental reserves contained them. A radar-directed bomb strike brought down at the point of penetration and ground fire delivered under light provided by a flare ship eliminated the enemy force.

At 0600 on the 27th, the 24th Division passed to IX Corps control, as had been directed by General Van Fleet, and what had been the boundary between the 24th and 25th Divisions became the new corps boundary. Shortly afterward, General Milburn ordered his remaining forces to withdraw to the next phase line, which would be the last occupied by the I Corps before it moved onto line Golden.

On the I Corps right, the two line regiments of the 25th Division had some difficulty in getting off the first phase line. The 27th Infantry ran into enemy groups that had got behind the regiment during the night, and Chinese closely following the 35th Infantry took that regiment under assault when it set up a covering position to help the 27th Infantry disengage. It was well into the afternoon before the two regiments could break away. General Bradley deployed the same two regiments on the second phase line. In preparation for further withdrawal, Bradley set the Turkish brigade in a covering position midway between the phase line and line Golden and assembled the 24th Infantry behind the Golden fortifications.

As I Corps forces began their withdrawal to line Golden at midmorning on the 28th, enemy patrols investigating the positions of the 25th Division around noon were the only enemy actions the division had during the day. Milburn attached the 65th Infantry, 3d Division, to the 25th Division so that General Bradley, using the 65th and his own reserve, the 24th Infantry, could man the eastern sector of the Golden line while the remainder of his division was withdrawing.

As deployed for the defense of Seoul by evening of the 28th, the I Corps had six regiments on line. With adequate reserves, fortified defenses, and a narrower front that allowed heavier concentrations of artillery fire, the corps was in a position far stronger than any it had occupied since the beginning of the enemy offensive.

An enemy attack appeared to be in the offing during the day of the 29th when patrols and air observers reported a large enemy buildup on the front of the 25th Division, but heavy artillery fire and air attacks delivered after dark broke up the enemy force. Division patrols searching the enemy concentration area after daylight on the 30th found an estimated one thousand enemy dead. Across the corps front, patrols moving as much as six miles above line Golden on the 30th made only minor contacts.

With the coming of the Chinese spring offensive, the 35th RCT had moved back to Line Golden, five miles north of Seoul where it was to hold at all cost. Here bloody fighting took place but the "Cacti" held. During the fight, a company from the "Cacti" put into practice some tricks they had learned with cold steel. They leaped from their foxholes during a Red attack and met the Chinese halfway. Sergeant First Class Clifford Cameron of Yakima, Washington, led the frontal counter-assault, and platoons led by Lt. Leo Whitman of Manhattan, Kansas, and Silver Star winner Lt. William Toomey of Maiden, Massachusetts, struck from the flanks.

In dropping back to No Name line, an extension of Line Golden, Eighth Army forces since 22 April had given up about thirty-five miles of territory in the I and IX Corps sectors and about twenty miles in the sectors of the X and ROK III Corps.

Among U.S. Army divisions, casualties suffered between 22 and 29 April totaled 314 killed and 1,600 wounded. In both number and rate, these losses were scarcely more than half the casualties suffered among the divisions engaged for a comparable period of time during the Chinese offensive opened in late November.

Among a variety of estimates, an Eighth Army headquarters report for the eight-day period from evening of the 22nd to the evening of the 30th listed 13,349 known enemy dead, 23,829 estimated enemy dead, and 246 taken captive. This report included information obtained daily from U.S. and allied ground units only. At UNC headquarters in Tokyo, the estimate was that enemy forces suffered between 75,000 and 80,000 killed and wounded, 50,000 of these in the Seoul sector. Other estimates listed 71,712 enemy casualties on the I Corps front and 8,009 in the IX Corps sector. Although none of the estimates was certifiable, enemy losses were unquestionably huge.