May - June 1951

On 30 April, fearing a new Communist effort to take Seoul, General Van Fleet started shifting forces westward, shoring up the area around the capital. He also

fortified the line as much as possible. Fortifications were to include log and sandbag bunkers, multiple bands of barbed wire with antipersonnel mines interspersed, and 55-gallon drums of napalm mixed with gasoline set out in front of defensive positions and rigged for detonation from the bunkers. Notwithstanding the high enemy losses in the previous offensive, General Van Fleet cautioned on 1 May that the enemy had the men to attack again "as hard as before or harder." While Eighth Army units improved their positions over the next week, the front was quiet, with little contact between opposing forces.

On 9 May UN forces made limited attacks north, while intensifying preparations for yet another major offensive slated to begin on the twelfth. But on the eleventh, intelligence indicated that the enemy was once again ready to renew his own offensive, and all UN attack planning was halted.

The Chinese Communists' renewed offensive began on 16 May.

On 18 May, after Chinese had reached P'ungam-ni, then the deepest point of enemy penetration, General Ridgway suggested that General Van Fleet attempt to relieve the pressure on his forces in the east by attacking in the west to threaten enemy lines of communication in the Iron Triangle.

On the western front, enemy attacks had forced back some patrol base and outpost units and had tested the main line in both the I Corps and IX Corps sectors, but these attacks had been isolated affairs, not coordinated actions in a concerted holding operation.

Judging enemy forces in the east central area to be clearly overextended after he reconnoitered the front on 19 May, Ridgway enlarged his concept to take advantage of their vulnerability and ordered Van Fleet to attack across the entire front.

Van Fleet's plan called for the I Corps, IX Corps, and part of the 1st Marine Division at the left of the X Corps to advance on 20 May toward the Munsan ni-Ch'unch'on segment of line Topeka. Once the Topeka segment was occupied, strikes to start encircling the Chinese forces who had attacked in the east were to be made toward the Iron Triangle. One up Route 3 to secure a road center in the Yongp'yong River valley some twenty miles above Uijongbu, another up Route 17 beyond Ch'unch'on to seize the complex of road junctions at the west end of the Hwach'on Reservoir.²

With the objective of reaching the main bodies of enemy forces, including reserves, before they could organize for defensive action, General Milburn had made speed the keynote of the counterattacks opened by the I Corps on 20 May. In setting his three divisions on courses for line Topeka some fifteen miles above his Seoul defenses, Milburn aimed the ROK 1st Division toward Munsan-ni, the 1st Cavalry Division north through Uijongbu and up Route 33, and the 25th Division north along Route 3 toward the road hub in the Yongp'yong River valley. (Map 37)

On 20 May the 2nd Battalion was attacking dug in enemy positions north of Seoul when a platoon of Company E hit heavy resistance, killing the platoon leader and sergeant. Sergeant First Class Donald R. Moyer took command of the platoon and led it in the attack against the enemy.

Sergeant First Class Donald R. Moyer, RA16263096, United States Army, assistant platoon leader, Company E," 35th Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, in action against an armed enemy of the United Nations near Seoul, Korea, on 20 May 1951.

Sergeant Moyer’s platoon was committed to attack and secure commanding terrain stubbornly defended by a numerically superior hostile force emplaced in well-fortified positions. Advancing up the rocky hill, the leading elements came under intense automatic weapons, small arms, and grenade fire, wounding the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Sergeant Moyer, realizing the success of the mission was imperiled, rushed to the head of the faltering column, assumed command and urged the men forward. Inspired by Sergeant Moyer’s unflinching courage, the troops responded magnificently. Enemy fire increased in volume and intensity and the fanatical foe showered the platoon with grenades. Undaunted, the valiant group forged ahead, and as they neared the top of the hill, the enemy hurled grenades into their midst. Sergeant Moyer, fully aware of the odds against him, unhesitatingly threw himself on the grenade, absorbing the full blast of the explosion with his body. Although mortally wounded in this fearless display of valor, Sergeant Moyer’s intrepid act saved several of his comrades from death or serious injury, and his inspirational leadership and consummate devotion to duty, contributed significantly to the subsequent seizure of the enemy stronghold and reflect lasting glory on himself and the noble traditions of the military service.

General Milburn attempted to hurry the I Corps with orders for a top-speed move to line Kansas. Driving up Route 3 ahead of the general advance, the 89th Heavy Tank Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Infantry blocked the road hub on 25 May, and all three of Milburn's divisions reached the Kansas line on the 27th.

Since it was obvious by the 27th that most major Chinese units, mangled as they were, had escaped entrapment, General Van Fleet laid out Operation PILEDRIVER to extend the reach of the counterattack. In the west, the I Corps was to seize line Wyoming to cut enemy lines of communication at the base of the Iron Triangle. The weight of the western attack was to be in the zone of the I Corps. General Milburn was to seize the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa area.

During this time, intensive training was being conducted by the 35th. The command of the "Cacti" changed hands for the second time during the Korean War when Colonel Thomas W. Woodyard replaced Colonel Gerald C. Killecher, 3 June 1951.

For advancing the I Corps right to line Wyoming, General Milburn on 28 May laid out an attack by three divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division moving along the west side of Route 33 to occupy the segment of the line slanting southwest of Ch'orwon to the Imjin River, the 3d Division advancing on the Route 33 axis to take the Ch'orwon base of the Iron Triangle, and the 25th Division attacking astride Route 3 to seize the triangle's eastern base at Kumhwa.

While Milburn organized full-blown attacks to start on 3 June in the I Corps zone, forces edging above line Kansas in preliminary advances encountered stiff opposition. As General Ridgway had predicted, the Chinese were determined to hold the Iron Triangle and adjacent ground as long as possible. Then drenching rains during the last two days of May began to turn roads into boggy tracks and, along with low clouds and fog, limited close air support and both air and ground observation. Two clear days followed, but as the full attacks got under way on 3 June rainstorms returned to hamper operations through the 5^th.

Aided by the bad weather, Chinese delaying forces fighting doggedly from dug-in regimental positions, arranged in depth, held the advance to a crawl through 8 June, then finally gave way under the pressure and began a phased withdrawal, moving north in what air observers estimated as battalion-size groups. Against declining resistance and in drier weather, the assault divisions occupied their line Wyoming objectives between 9 and 11 June. Tank-infantry patrols were sent up each side of the Iron Triangle on 13 June to investigate P'yonggang at its apex. The patrols met no resistance en route and found P'yonggang deserted. The Chinese defenders of the triangle had taken up positions in commanding ground northeast and northwest of the town. Rimmed on the north by Chinese and on the south by the I and IX Corps, the coveted road complex in the Iron Triangle area now lay largely unusable in no-man'sland.

Although the 25^th Division was holding its assigned sector, the task was no easy one. During the first part of June the 25th had pushed forward of Line Wyoming, on the high ground overlooking Kumhwa from the west. Here they took up positions until 21 June, when it moved into the I US Corps reserve near Uijongbu, where it was ordered to prepare plans for offensive operations in the Corps area. Here, the 35th Cacti prepared a secondary defensive line and conducted training and rear area security missions.

The first armistice conference was convened and operations continued but at a diminished pace. Emphasis was placed on the preparation of defensive positions along Lines Kansas and Wyoming.

As directed by General Van Fleet, line Kansas was being organized as the main line of resistance with defensive positions arranged in depth and elaborately fortified. Forces deployed on the looping Wyoming line were developing hasty field fortifications from which to delay and blunt the force of enemy attacks before withdrawing to assigned main line positions. To deepen the defense further, patrol bases were being established ahead of the Kansas-Wyoming front on terrain features dominating logical enemy approach routes. To prevent enemy agents reconnoitering Eighth Army defenses from mingling with local farm folk, the battle area was being cleared of Korean civilians from five miles behind line Kansas northward to the line of patrol bases.

On 23 June the Soviet ambassador to the UN called for cease-fire negotiations. As the real possibility of negotiations loomed, Eighth Army forces continued to improve their positions, building strong-points and conducting active patrolling. Since April the enemy had suffered more than 200,000 casualties and heavy losses in equipment, drastically impairing his ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations.