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ORLL 3RD BDE, 4TH DIV
PERIOD ENDING 1-31-68
(Edited)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE TF, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96355
AVDDC-OP
2 February 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
TO: See Distribution
SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES
1. (c) GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 November 1967 to 31 January
1967 the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division participated in Operation Baker
for 62 days, Operation Muscatine for 23 days and Operation Wheeler/ Wallowa for
7 days for a total of 92 days in combat. The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry
Division has participated in 632 consecutive days in combat as of 31 January
1968.
a. Mission: The 3d Brigade’s mission in Operation Baker was to assume
responsibility within the Duc Pho AO for:
(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA
elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as
the Viet Cong infrastructure,
(2) Provide convoy security in zone, and from Quang Ngai south on Hwy #1 to
the Brigade AO.
(3) Be prepared to provide one rifle company on two hours notice, and an
additional rifle company in an additional two hours, for employment anywhere
in the Americal Division TAOR on order.
(4) Be prepared to provide a company size reaction force to support the
defense of Quang Ngai Airfield, on order.
(5) Support Revolutionary Development in the 3d Brigade AO.
(6) Conduct psychological operations in support of tactical operations and
revolutionary development,
(7) Be prepared on 12 hours notice to provide one reinforced infantry
battalion for employment anywhere in South Vietnam.
(8) Be prepared on an additional 12 hours notice to deploy the remainder of
the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division anywhere in South Vietnam.
b. The 3d Brigade’s mission in Operation Muscatine was to assume
responsibility for the southern 2/3 of the Muscatine AO for:
(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA
elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla unite as well as
the Viet Cong infrastructure.
(2) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Hwy #1 from
BS623865 to BS63381O.
c. The 3d Brigade’s mission in operation Wheeler/Wallowa was to assume
responsibility of the northern half of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO for:
(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA
elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as
the Viet Cong infrastructure.
(2) Assume responsibility for providing security as required for the 39th
Engr Bn repair mission on Hwy #535.
(3) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Hwy #1 from
BT114497 to BT175418.
d, Operational Areas. (See Inclosure #1 for Duo Pho AO, Inclosure #2 for
Muscatine and Wheeler/Wallowa AO’s).
(1) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in the Duc Pho AO encompassed
the majority of Due Pho & Mo Duo Districts, Quang Ngai Province.
(2) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Muscatine
encompassed Binh Son & Son Tinh Districts, Quang Ngai Province.
(3) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa
encompasses Duy Xuyen, Que Son, and Duc Duc Districts in Quang Nam Province.
e. Task Organization: Principal units of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry
Division, with commanders names and dates of command, and the major supporting
and operational controlled units are as follows:
Headquarters, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division
Commander: Colonel George E. Wear (1 Nov 67-31 Jan 68)
1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC Robert G, Kimmel (1 Nov 67-14 Nov 67, KHA)
LTC William W. Taylor, Jr. (15 Nov 67-31 Jan 68)
2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC Norman C. Tiller, Sr. (1 Nov 67-10 Dec 67)
LTC William J Livsey, Jr. (11 Dec 67-31 Jan 68)
2nd Battalion 9th Artillery
LTC Gerald B. Bobzien (1 Nov 67-31 Jan 68)
2. INTELLIGENCE:
a. General: During this reporting period, 1 November 1967 through 31 January
1968, enemy activity is categorized in three phases, based on the three separate
areas of operation.
b. Phase One: 1 November 1967-2 January 1968, Duc Pho - Mo Duc areas of
operation. This phase began in the middle of the enemy’s Winter Campaign that
was designed to produce a propaganda left through a series of quick victories in
order to bolster the morale of his followers. On the night of 30th October
1967, a Battalion size force attempted to destroy the bridge over the Song Ve
River (BS695635) and was driven off by elements of the 2nd ARVN Division. As a
result of a night ambush on 31 October 1967, a prisoner was captured that
confirmed the fact that the 97th MF Bn, 2nd MF Regt attacked the Song Ve Bridge
and was based in the Nui Lon Mountains (BS6747) and Song Ve Valley (BS6049).
Airborne Personnel Detector missions (People Sniffer), agent reports and usual
sightings confirmed the fact that the enemy had moved back into the mountains on
the western border of the Brigade’s reconnaissance zone. On 3 November 1967,
the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted a ten day operation in the Song Ve
valley where it contacted small elements of the C-18 LF Company and Scattered
NVA food gathering parties. The ten day operation resulted in 25 enemy KIA, and
the capture of 15 weapons.
On the 4th of November, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry launched a thirty
day operation in the heavily forested, mountain area in the Southwest portion of
the Brigade’s AO (BS7428) against elements of the 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA
Division. Captured documents and the PW’s revealed that the 1st
Battalion, 14th Infantry had engaged support elements of the 22d NVA Regt to
include the Signal, Reconnaissance, and Mortar companies, plus scattered
elements of the 8th and 9th NVA Battalions of the 22d NVA Regiment. The
operation terminated with 109 enemy KIA, 57 weapons captured, to include two
82mm mortars and 28 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. On or about 6 December
1967, the 22d NVA Regiment with two of its Battalions, withdrew from the
mountains and moved into the lowlands of Binh Dinh Province (vic BS9108) where
they were quickly engaged by the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry
Division and elements of the 22d ARVN Division. Within a fifteen day period, the
22d NVA Regiment had lost over 600 men. The 7th and 8th NVA Battalions along
with regimental support companies sustained the bulk of the losses. The 9th NVA
Battalion avoided contact. In December 1967, the 97th MF Battalion moved South
and lost over 150 men to elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The remainder of this
phase was devoted to platoon and company size operations directed against
village and hamlet infrastructure. The local force units in close coordination
with the village and hamlet guerrillas, continued to harass the Brigade by
planting mines and booby traps on the trails and roads throughout the A0 with
particular emphases along Highway #1. The enemy in the area took advantage of
the Christmas and New Year cease fire to rest and resupply prior to the Spring
Offensive.
c. Phase Two: 2 January 1968-25 January 1968. This phase found the Brigade
Operating in the Son Tinh and Binh Son Districts north of the Song Tra Khuc
River against several local force units. The enemy’s most potent threat in
this new AO was his ability to avoid contact behind an uncountable number of
mines and booby traps which accounted for 9 KHA’ s and 30 WHA’s.
The single significant contact that took place during this phase was on 17
January 1967. Company B and Recon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, combat
assaulted into an area where four local force VC Companies (T18, 21 Sapper, 31,
95) had just recently assembled in preparation for a forthcoming attack. Brigade
Aviation and gunships flying in support of the combat assault were the first to
observe and engage the enemy soldiers who were moving about in a communications
trench. The contact ended late in the afternoon on the 17th with 80 enemy KIA
and 36 weapons captured. The remainder of this phase was spent conducting
platoon and company size search and destroy operations against small bands of
local guerrillas that continued to move ahead of the advancing troops and place
booby traps in their paths.
d. Phase Three: 26 January 1968-31 January 1968. A large buildup of enemy
units in the Northern part of the Americal AO caused the Brigade to move North
into the Quang Nam Province and assume the AO occupied by the 3d Brigade, 1st
Air Cavalry Division. A relief in place was effected and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air
Cavalry Division moved farther to the North. The first part of this phase was
spent in platoon and company size operations in an attempt to gain intelligence
as to the enemy’s probable actions during the "TET" period.
Intelligence reports revealed that the 2d NVA Division Headquarters, the 1st VC
MF Regiment and the 3d NVA Regiment moved from their base areas, Vic AT8733 -
AT9641, into the northern part of Duy Xuyen District Vic AT9751 - AT0351. As
part of the enemy’s overall plan to attack during the normal "TET"
cease fire period, two fire bases Within the Brigade AO received light to
moderate mortar (82mm and 120mm) and 75mm Recoilless Rifle attacks on 30 and 31
January 1968. Agent reports revealed that a VC Company of the 105th LT Battalion
with an NVA mortar platoon attached were responsible for shelling the Brigade’s
fire support bases. Thang Binh and Que Son District Headquarters were shelled
and attacked by VC Local Force units that were working in close coordination
with local guerrilla forces.
3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
a. Plans:
(1) During the period covered by this report, the 3d Brigade was
responsible for planning the relief of elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade
(LT) within a portion of the Muscatine A0 effective 021200 January 1968.
(2) During the latter part of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade planned
and conducted the relief of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Div in a portion
of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO effective 261200 January 1968.
(3) During the reporting period the 3d Bde sponsored the 11th Inf Bde (LT)
and the 198th Inf Bde (LT) (See Inclosure #4)
b. Operations:
(1) General: The 3d Brigade continued with the mission assigned for
operation Baker until 021200) January 1968. During this reporting period,
elements of’ the 3d Brigade conducted search, and destroy operations in
their respective areas of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Contacts during
the period were light and in some cases initiated by the enemy; however, in
all cases the enemy force was defeated and enemy casualties were moderate to
heavy. Friendly casualties were light. The 3d Brigade enemy/friendly killed in
action ratio is a very respectable 22.5 to 1 for the entire reporting period.
During Operation Muscatine, 021201 January 1968 to 261200 January 1968,
searching for, locating, and destroying the enemy in tunnels and caves became
a necessity for the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The most
significant contact during Operation Muscatine occurred on 17 January and was
a result of a combination of timely intelligence, thorough planning, and a
combat assault which forced the enemy into an untenable position where he was
destroyed by ground elements and armed helicopters. In addition to the normal
objectives of an Infantry Brigade, the additional objectives of interdicting
the enemy’s supply routes and inhibiting his freedom of movement were
established. These objectives were accomplished by continual H&I artillery
fires, strategic location of firebases, and Continual movement of troop
elements in the field. By denying the enemy the ease of movement and the
liberal amount of supplies he had become accustomed to, he was forced to
disperse and operate in small elements. Consequently, the enemy was caused to
spend more time foraging and this decreased his ability to attack in force. In
both the Baker and Muscatine AO s the concept of’ operations included an
advance over suspected avenues of enemy movement and a methodical search for
enemy personnel, caches, and fortifications. The objective was to deny the
enemy use of the inhabited lowlands and thereby cut him off from his source of
food, intelligence, labor and recruits. The general plan was to have infantry
battalions establish firebases with the battalion command post and supporting
indirect fire elements. One rifle company was employed to guard the firebase
and conduct local operations while the remainder of the infantry elements
conducted operations throughout the TAOR. After the enemy was found and fixed,
all available firepower was brought to bear as the infantry advanced,
methodically searching every enemy position. These procedures were continued
during the initial phases of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 261201 January 1968 to 312400 January 1968.
(3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the Battalion
conducted search and destroy operations in two TAOR’s. During Operation
Wheeler the Battalion, OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division, operated near Tam
Ky, Republic of Vietnam with the Battalion CP located at "LZ MARY
LOU" (BT132203). During Operation Wallowa, the Battalion CP was located
at "LZ BALDY" (BT132453). The Battalion reverted to 3d Brigade
control on 26 January when the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed
responsibility for the northern portion of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO. During the
period 26 January - 31 January, no significant contacts occurred.
(4) 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the Battalion
conducted search and destroy operations in the Baker A0, the Muscatine AO and
the Wheeler/Wallowa AO. From 1 November to 18 December 1967 the Battalion CP
was located at "LZ LIZ" (BS751436). On 19 December 1967 the
Battalion became OPCON too the 198th Infantry Brigade (LT) and
established a Battalion CP at "LZ SUE" (BS567877). From 9 January to
31 January the Battalion participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, OPCON to
the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) with Battalion CP s at "Fire Support Base
West" (AT990250) and at "LZ ROSS" (BT029341). Throughout the
period the Battalion had many minor engagements with one moderate contact.
(8) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery:
(a) General: During the period 1 November 1967 to 2 January 1968, the
mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support of the 3d
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on Operation Baker. Battery A was OPCON to
the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry
(Airmobile) Division in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa in direct support of the
1-35th Infantry. Battery B was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry, and
Battery C was in direct support of the 2-35 Infantry.
(b) During the period 2 January through 25 January traditional. missions
continued in the following AO s.
1. Battery A - Operation Wheeler/Wallowa.
2. Battery B — Operation Muscatine.
a During the 11 January through 25 January Battery G, 6th Battalion,
11th Artillery was OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery with the
mission of Reinforcing.
3. Battery C - Operation Muscatine 2 January - 11 January.
a. During the period 11 January .through 25 January Battery C became
OPCON to the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) in operation Wheeler/Wallowa.
(c) During the period 25 January through 31 January the 2d Battalion, 9th
Artillery continued the mission of direct support to the 3d Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division in support of Operation
Wheeler/Wallowa. Battery A was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry,
Battery B was in direct support of the 1-35th Infantry and Battery C was in
direct support of the 2-35th Infantry.
GEORGE E. WEAR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
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